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ABSTRACT 
 
 
A Critical Interrogation of the Mind, Brain, and Education Movement:  
Toward a Social Justice Paradigm 
 
by 
 
Bibinaz Pirayesh 
 
Much attention has been given to “bridging the gap” between research and practice since 
neuroscience research first made claim to its potential impact in classrooms. With the inception 
of Mind, Brain, and Education (MBE) as a new interdisciplinary field, an unprecedented 
opportunity to explore the educational implications of new research coming out of neuroscience 
has presented itself. And yet, the gap between research and practice persists while new problems 
arise as education looks to brain science for answers with ongoing social and academic 
difficulties faced by students. A critical bicultural methodology, grounded in a decolonizing 
interpretive approach, is utilized to interrogate the field of MBE in order to shed light on the 
epistemological power dynamics and social justice issues that inform the field. By examining the 
 xii 
historical, philosophical, economic, and ideological roots of neuroscience and education, a 
colonizing epistemology and hidden curriculum of inequality is revealed. The lack of awareness 
of how MBE, if left unexamined, will continue to fall short of the democratic and socially just 
goals of education is also addressed. The argument made is that there exists an abyssal divide 
within the field that epistemologically privileges neuroscience with its reductionist, Eurocentric, 
and positivist discourse. The case is made that the field must move toward an itinerant position 
that honors hierarchical dialogue and praxis and places the voices, scholarship, and values of 
educators and students at the forefront of this educational movement, in order to close the gap 
between research and practice in emancipatory ways. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Growing up, school always felt like a safe place where the chaos of everything around 
me, the pressures of war, an oppressive regime, and the chaos of my family life seemed to 
disappear as my mind was able to apply itself to something pure and clear: academics. Whereas 
it seemed overrun by anxiety in real life, in the classroom, my brain was my favorite friend. Like 
a high-performing car on an endless open highway, it could finally do what it was designed to do 
seamlessly: learn. That may have been when I decided, as early as first grade, that I would 
someday study learning. 
But to study learning cannot be separate from studying education, and even in those early 
years when I took joy in my ability to learn and excel, I knew school didn’t always make sense. 
As an “academic kid,” as my schoolmates called me, I struggled with many aspects of our 
curriculum and could see that the very systems that often helped me to feel free (so long as I 
followed the rules), took away the freedom of many of my friends and classmates who could not 
follow the curriculum presented to them. It’s no surprise then, that as a learning specialist, I not 
only work to understand learning better, but also try and understand curriculum and the school 
system better as well, in order to help the many different kinds of learners I encounter in my 
practice. 
But the school system has yet to make this connection. Following the explosion of fMRI 
studies in the 1970s, where scientists were able to observe the brain as it learned, departments of 
neuroscience and education began to form at universities across the country in the face of both 
academic and public wonder. What can observation of what happens in the brain as it reads or 
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does math or as it experiences emotion teach us? How can educational practice shift to help the 
millions of kids who cannot access it, come to do so in a different way? How can learning about 
the brain help us make changes for kids who have specific learning difficulties? How will the 
brain’s newly discovered plasticity change what educators once thought was impossible? And 
how can our age-old educational practices help inform this new science? The future seemed vast 
and bright, and the most important finding of brain science—plasticity—seemed almost like 
scientific proof of hope itself.  
And yet, almost 50 years later, children with different learning styles or challenges are 
more marginalized in the special education system than ever. Classroom teachers report little to 
no helpful impact of neuroscientific research for their pedagogy and practices, and the literature 
in the field of neuroscience and education seems to be stuck on trying to figure out why the field 
has failed in effective communication and goal setting, all while the brain-based private 
educational market is booming, but with alarming consequences. These consequences may 
increase exponentially with the new U.S. administration and a push toward privatization, which 
will increase the risk of unfounded neuroscientific methodologies making their way to the 
forefront of new movements in education reform (Goldstein , Eder, & Fink, 2017).  
As a learning specialist now with more than a decade of experience using neuroscience 
research to help kids with all kinds of minds thrive in school, I find such divides to be of 
concern. As someone who can see those with means access what the field of neuroscience has to 
offer, the issue of equity and why those without means continue to have little access, or are in 
fact exploited by the private sector because of their lack of knowledge, is also of concern to me.  
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And there are other curious questions. Why, for example, had I been working for 10 
years, but the makeup of my clientele—affluent White families—has never changed? Work in 
private practice means that only people of a certain socioeconomic status usually walk through 
the office door. But why was the racial demographic of this group in West Los Angeles never 
changing? And how was it, that with all our advancement in neuroscientific tools, some of which 
were making it into public schools, children in public schools continue to struggle, while 
children who have access to learning specialists like me, in addition to the tools, are closing the 
gaps in their learning while others stay behind?  
And, perhaps most alarmingly, how was it that although I had relationships with many of 
the school leaders in private schools, many of whom refer clients to me, they wanted my work 
with their students to remain “on the down-low,” as if they were ashamed of these “infected” 
students?  How is it that despite the fact that the National Association of Independent Schools 
(NAIS) stated, “We expect member schools to create and sustain diverse, inclusive, equitable, 
and just communities that are safe and welcoming for all” (National Association of Independent 
Schools, 2012) systems for more inclusionary pedagogical practices for diverse learners continue 
to be lacking? So, while we spoke about brain plasticity and multiple intelligences, when it came 
down to it, most students with diverse needs were being turned away from these schools; and 
those who remained were seen as having disorders that required labels and diagnosis, before any 
change or classroom modification could be implemented.  
What these experiences showed me was that there were issues, both structural and 
philosophical, that prevented a change toward the very types of learning environments 
neuroscience research was aiming to shape. Neuroscience had taught me that we could change 
 4 
the brain. But when it came to changing hearts and minds, and beliefs and structures, there was 
not much to be done. In fact, with all the advancements in neuroscience, all that was advancing 
in schools, even many progressive private schools, the discussion was ultimately just about more 
sophisticated testing and labeling techniques. My dream of someday using the Individuals with 
Disabilities Education Act as a blueprint for individualized education for all students, seemed to 
be always getting further, not closer, to becoming reality. What was happening?  
The Canadian education and environmental activist Wendy Priesnitz (2000) argued, 
“public education reflects our society’s paternalistic, hierarchical worldview, which exploits 
children in the same way it takes the earth’s resources for granted” (p. 12). Could it be that this 
wasn’t limited to just public education? And could it be that as scientific research moved into the 
practice of education, its positivist foundations have been doing more harm than any good that 
such research findings could do?   
Beyond such questions is also the larger question of the field itself. My experience 
attending neuroscience and Mind, Brain, and Education (MBE) conferences has also raised 
concerns. The tendency in the field and in such venues seems to be to perpetuate science’s 
universalism and patriarchal lens, often linked to a debilitating medical model that functions, 
wittingly or unwittingly, to perpetuate inequalities and derail conversations related to questions 
of social justice. As Paulo Freire (2000) argued, if we seek to eliminate injustice, we must get 
directly engaged. To understand how a process works in the brain, neuroscientists look at where 
it breaks down. In an attempt to better understand why there is such little engagement with social 
justice and such little (or sometimes negative) impact between neuroscience research and 
education, the first step is to take a closer look at the divide or the disjunction. This study aimed 
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precisely to dive into the context of the problem and, from there, move toward possibilities for 
establishing a critical paradigm for the study and practice of MBE, where social justice becomes 
a central concern. 
Statement of the Problem 
Much attention has been given to “bridging the gap” between research and practice since 
neuroscience research first made claims to its potential impact in classrooms. With the inception 
of Mind, Brain, and Education as a new interdisciplinary field, unprecedented opportunities to 
explore the educational implications of neuroscience research emerged, yet the gap between 
research and practice has persisted while new problems also arose as education looked to brain 
science for answers to learning difficulties (Bruer, 2006; Busso & Pollack, 2015; Clement & 
Lovat, 2012; Fischer, Goswami, & Geake, 2010; Goswami, 2004). This gap and the subsequent 
problems have been examined extensively in the literature, and there seems to be a consensus 
that, at the very core of this divide, is a question of differences in the histories, philosophies, and 
most importantly epistemologies between the fields of education and neuroscience (Bruer, 1997; 
Campbell, 2011; Clement & Lovat, 2012; Howard-Jones, 2008; Samuels, 2009). 
However, a deeper look at the literature, its language, authors, and explanations for the 
enduring divide reveal that the problems facing research and practice may not be due to 
epistemological differences alone, but to the values given to these differences, creating a 
hierarchical relationship based on asymmetrical relations of power. Moreover, there is an 
absence of a critical social justice lens in the field that could potentially help shed new light and 
present new ways of interrogating how MBE can truly support education in classrooms and how 
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to shift away from bridging gaps or even working at boundaries to truly co-creating knowledge 
and establishing horizontal structures and conditions for dialogical praxis. 
At the same time, as Special Education continues to fall short of its goals in serving 
students in public schools (Connor, Gabel, Gallagher, & Morton, 2008; Dudley-Marling & 
Burns, 2014; Smith, Gallagher, Owen, & Skrtic, 2009) and new brain research around learning is 
gaining traction in educational curriculum (Fischer et al., 2010), scientific research continues to 
advance some children, while leaving behind or labeling others (Four Arrows, Cajete, & Lee, 
2009). This reality raises important questions and concerns about the value and influence of 
science and scientific thinking in education. The hierarchical manifestation of scientific research 
has a long history in the United States (Darder, 2012; Gould, 1996) and any emancipatory effort 
to bring brain research into educational settings must contend forthrightly with this history.  
Therefore, while the mission of the new field of Mind, Brain, and Education (MBE) is to 
take shape as an interdisciplinary field that aims to move away from the old “paradigm war” 
(Campbell, 2011) between neuroscience and education, the fact remains that the field has not 
been well examined with respect to such an aim or, as a consequence, been informed by a critical 
or social justice analysis related to inequalities within the field. An underlying assumption of this 
study is that the lack of such a lens has had troubling consequences.  
First, in its discussion of the issue, the MBE rhetoric within the fields of neuroscience 
and education, including inclusion rhetoric, claims neutrality, and objectivity, continues to 
ponder why the field remains disconnected. What is even more alarming is that some of the 
literature in the field suggests that many of its contributing scholars remain unaware of how 
disconnected and disconnecting their so-called scientific approach remains. Even within the 
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discussion of the historical and philosophical differences between science and education, there is 
no discussion related to the historicity or ideological dimensions of knowledge, which, as part of 
the critical tradition, reminds us that knowledge is created within a historical, cultural, political 
and economic contexts and, thus, everything has an intellectual history (Darder, 2014). Critical 
theory works to uncover the dominant ideologies (in this case, science) that present themselves 
as neutral and asks us to do away with preconditioned and hegemonic patterns in how we name 
the world, in order to move away from the fixed or prescribed ways of how things are, toward a 
relational understanding of knowledge (Darder, 2014). Reading the literature with a critical lens 
therefore helps reveal the more historical and political roots that contribute to the enduring gap 
between these two fields, with specific attention to the field of Mind, Brain, and Education.  
Second, as new brain technologies continue to create a revolution (Four Arrows et al., 
2009) with the MBE movement as a testament to the increasing interest in brain sciences in 
education, as educators we must be more vigilant than ever in our efforts to guard against the 
dominant Western ideologies both in academia and scientific research, particularly with respect 
to issues of implementation in public education, which have historically advanced a hegemonic 
perspective while labeling and hindering the advancement of other ways of knowing, thinking, 
and learning. In other words, according to Four Arrows et al., one of the major issues that the 
MBE movement must remain aware of as it grows and expands is that “Western neuroscientists 
and the philosophers who attempt to make sense of their ‘objective’ findings may lead us further 
away from, not closer to, the truth about what humans can do to live in harmony on this planet” 
(p. vii).  
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Although MBE claims to be an interdisciplinary field housed often in schools of 
education, the research and literature of the field is, ironically, lacking in its attention to 
educational theories and research methodologies. While the enduring gap and lack of impact 
between research and practice is what Paulo Freire might call a “limit situation,” or a situation 
beyond which people cannot imagine themselves (Dimitraidis & Kamberelis, 2006; Freire, 
2000), critical theories in education, which could potentially aid as pedagogical steps to move the 
conversation forward, are not part of the literature or pedagogy of the MBE field. As Darder 
(2014) argued, a true process of problematization that is integrated within a critical praxis of 
dialogue can only happen through what Freire called democratic forms of horizontal 
engagement. Only then can love and humanity, which Freire called our true vocation in the 
world, prevail. As such, it is not the idea of integrating neuroscience and education that is 
categorically problematic, but rather the persistence of dominant Western ideologies both in 
academia and in public education.  
In short, the lack of critical literature in MBE puts the field at risk of first, not being able 
to have the impact it seeks; and second, perhaps even more problematic, reproducing bias and 
exclusionary outcomes that widen the divide. Moreover, the lack of a critical lens in the MBE 
literature has troubling consequences, the most important of which seems to be the lack of 
engagement with questions of social justice within the research in the field. This phenomenon, in 
turn, has resulted in questionable practices with respect to students from subaltern communities. 
To address this problem, this study first examines the history of the field of neuroscience, tracing 
its epistemological roots and its systematic progression into education, through the emergence of 
the field of neuroscience and education. From there, the history and subsequent literature in the 
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field of Mind, Brain, and Education is considered using a critical interpretive lens, in hopes of 
signaling a new emancipatory paradigm for the transformation of theory and practice in the MBE 
movement. 
Research Questions 
 The overarching questions that inform this critical interpretive study of the field of Mind, 
Brain, and Education include:  
• What are the historical and epistemological roots of neuroscience and MBE? 
• How does the MBE field view the concept of social justice and its implications with 
respect to the impact of MBE research within oppressed communities?  
• How does the MBE field view its relationship to educational institutions and how 
does this view impact teachers, students, and communities? 
• What types of theoretical reformulations and new pedagogical practices are required 
within the field of MBE, in order to move in a more critical direction, where issues of 
social justice are central to research, teaching, and practice in the field? 
Conceptual Lens 
This study employed critical pedagogy as its conceptual lens. Critical pedagogy is 
grounded in principles of cultural politics, economics, dialectics, hegemonic power/knowledge 
relations, ideology, critique, dialogue, and social consciousness (Darder, Baltodano, & Torres, 
2009). Simply stated, critical pedagogy is an educational philosophy that emerges when critical 
theory encounters education (Kincheloe, Steinberg, & Gresson, 1997). The genesis of the work 
in North America goes back to Paulo Freire, John Dewey, and other social reconstructionists 
(Darder et al., 2009); but because of its transdisciplinary origin, it serves as an umbrella under 
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which theorists have developed their own critical pedagogies. According to McLaren, critical 
pedagogy is first and foremost an approach to schooling (teaching, policymaking, and the 
production of curriculum) that emphasizes the political nature of education. Therefore, the aim of 
this framework is to understand, reveal, and disrupt the mechanisms of oppression imposed by 
the established order (in this case, science) pushing education toward its emancipatory goals. 
Inherent in this perspective are also concerns related to hidden curriculums, the banking model 
of learning, class formations, and obstacles to democratic schooling (Darder et al., 2009). More 
specifically, critical pedagogy is grounded in a set of critical philosophical principles that engage 
questions of cultural politics, economics, dialectics, hegemonic power/knowledge relations, 
ideology, critique, dialogue, and social consciousness (Darder et al., 2009). 
Cultural Politics 
Supporting a “politically emancipatory and humanizing culture of participation, voice, 
and social action” (Darder et al., 2009, p. 10) is at the heart of critical pedagogy. The principle of 
cultural politics, that is understanding that culture and power are inextricably linked (Darder, 
2012), is central to examining asymmetrical power relations between neuroscience and 
education, specifically as it relates to the “cultural struggle over what is accepted as legitimate 
knowledge” (Darder et al., 2009, p. 10) by researchers and scholars in the field.  
Political Economy  
Institutions that gave rise to the MBE movement (namely academic institutions) function 
in the interests of conserving the existing political economy of capitalism and neoliberal ideals 
(Darder, 2012). The values of collaboration and interdisciplinary engagement of the MBE 
movement continue to be developed in ways that conserve the interests of the academic elite. 
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Moreover, the brain-based product industry is a $300 million a year industry (Busso & Pollack, 
2015) that often capitalizes on the ignorance of teachers, parents, and students. As such, MBE, 
wittingly or unwittingly can function to preserve structures of power and privilege within 
educational institutions and the society at large.  
Historicity of Knowledge  
Knowledge is both historical and contextual (Darder et al., 2009). In scientific research, 
the lived histories of those being researched are often ignored or perceived as deficit. Similarly, 
what is generally ignored is the history of the privilege of researchers. Thus, the work done by 
scientific researchers can often result in the continuing colonization of the mind and body of the 
very “subjects” they seek to serve. Critical researchers understand themselves and their 
“subjects” as historical beings who, simultaneously, shape and are shaped by historical 
conditions that inform the contemporary moment. Thus, the personal histories of researchers and 
their “subjects” are always implicated in the research process and, because this is so, researchers 
begin their study of inequalities from the definitions provided by those with whom they seek to 
learn. Nowhere is this more important than in a field that seeks to understand teaching and 
learning.  
Dialectical View of Knowledge  
Critical research seeks to disrupt the traditional binaries, dichotomies, and hierarchical 
notions of the world. This speaks to an epistemology of knowledge construction where 
contradictory elements and tensions linked to the negation of positionalities must be recognized 
and engaged in efforts to arrive to emancipatory knowledge. Such a view is essential to a field 
like MBE, which also seeks to disrupt the traditional binaries but cannot do so until it recognizes 
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the embedded hierarchical notions that inform meaning making within the field. Critical 
researchers view knowledge as dynamic and reconstructive, much like how MBE researchers 
would like their research to be. A dialectical view of knowledge is therefore imperative to 
building a social justice paradigm of MBE.  
Ideology and Critique  
Ideology is the embedded societal lens through which order is created. Therefore, all 
theories and methods of research are linked to particular cultural/class interests and relations of 
power. Important to note here is that ideology generally exists at the level of unexamined 
assumptions often considered to be “common sense” or “naturally” existing. This is where 
critique becomes important. Through the process of critique, the MBE movement can be 
systematically deconstructed with respect to racialized, capitalistic, and neoliberal ideologies that 
conserve hegemonic practices. This allows, then, for commonsense, normative assumptions to be 
unveiled, challenged, and transformed.  
Hegemony, Resistance, and Counter-Hegemony 
The construction of commonsense notions within the process of research functions 
effectively to naturalize or normalize dominant relations of power and practices that perpetuate 
paternalism and deceptive notions of impartiality that shroud hegemonic interests (Gramsci, 
1971). This is made possible in that traditional research practices, especially scientific research, 
serves to legitimate the existing social order, irrespective of contradictions and inequalities that 
exist. Research practices, then, as part of an ideological machine (i.e., culture industry) function 
to preserve the status quo. But the status quo is what the MBE movement wishes to disrupt. How 
then can this happen without a critical examination, of the moral and intellectual leadership of 
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researchers, deemed legitimate makers of knowledge? Further, principles of resistance and 
counter-hegemonic spaces are absolutely critical to any effort aimed at transforming the 
hegemonic culture of MBE. It is through forms of resistance and counter-hegemonic spaces that 
those engaged in MBE practice can potentially resist the dominant forms of knowledge in the 
field and work toward addressing social justice concerns. 
Alliance of Theory and Practice  
The alliance of theory and practice is a unique goal of the MBE movement. Critical 
researchers also contend that research must be informed by and exist in alliance with practice. 
However, for critical researchers, the emphasis is in on what Freire (1970) called praxis, where 
social relations are grounded in a reconstituting and self-generating process of reflection, 
dialogue, and action. Research then must be understood as having purpose within the context of 
institutions and everyday life of the most vulnerable populations. Hence, critical research 
outcomes must be linked to the real world; and, as such, must be flexible and fluid, able to shift 
and move according to the actual conditions that emerge within the context of human 
interactions. Similarly, critical research theory is always informed by practice, just as practice IS 
always informed by the epistemological loyalties we embrace. Since the aim of this study is 
toward a paradigm for this kind of praxis, understanding how theory and practice must align 
from a critical perspective will be hugely beneficial to the field.  
Conscientization  
Critical research seeks to support a purposeful and emancipatory interaction between the 
research and the people or the texts that are engaged in the course of study. Essential to this 
process is a deep concern for the development of democratic voice, participation, and solidarity 
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within the context of institutions and larger society. To this end, knowledge construction of the 
research process is always understood as a collective process (not just the personal curiosities of 
the researcher), which engages the on-going interactive process through a subjective/objective 
dialectical approach. Through this dialectical engagement, critical pedagogy seeks to support 
knowing the world and self through a connected, humanizing and democratizing process. At its 
core, a deliberate intent to support conscientization or what Freire (1970) termed 
Conscientização—the development of social consciousness and an expanding sense of collective 
human interaction—must be ever-present. Hence, underlying the outcome of critical approaches 
is always the question of collective emancipatory action for transforming existing conditions of 
inequality and injustice in schools and society. Such an aim is the purpose of this MBE research.  
Methodology 
The study employed a critical interpretive method. Rooted in critical social theory, 
interpretive research has evolved through the writings of Marx, Hegel, Gramsci, Lukács, the 
Frankfurt School, Foucault, Habermas as well as in the progressive and radical educational 
theorists of the 20th century such as Dewey, Freire, Giroux, McLaren, Apple, Shor, hooks, 
Kincheloe, and others (Darder, 2015). Interpretive research methods came into their own in the 
1970s and 1980s, and have since become more present in education, nursing, and increasingly in 
psychology (Packer, 2000), allowing for standards of good research practice (e.g., Elliott, 
Fischer, & Rennie, 1999) though such standards are again more in line with the positivist 
approach. 
The methodology is based on the recognition that there are important social and cultural 
variables impacting a subject matter, interconnections that must not be ignored (Maroun, 2012). 
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A major argument of this methodology is that research needs to be of relevance to the profession 
in which it is rooted as well as the larger society in order to be truly significant, and validity must 
be established not by a clinical or positivist approach but through detailed documentation that 
provides a thorough account (Maroun, 2012). In this way, interpretive methods work to disrupt 
the primary stance taken by the positivist outlook where research tends to become a means for 
the promotion and the self-fulfilling achievement of commanding respect in academic circles.  
An interpretive approach is therefore a form of qualitative research practice, which seeks 
to formidably challenge and disrupt the one-dimensional Eurocentric epistemicides prevalent in 
traditional theories of schooling and society (Paraskeva, 2011). The methodology seeks to mine, 
articulate, and, where necessary, critique our everyday understandings (Packer, 2000). A 
hallmark of interpretive research is critical self-awareness of the researcher as well as a critical 
understanding of the complexity of social issues (Taylor & Medina, 2013). 
Decolonizing interpretive research is rooted, then, in a critical approach that focuses on 
creating counterhegemonic intellectual spaces, in which new readings of the world can unfold in 
ways that lead us toward change both in theory and practice (Darder, 2015). According to 
Antonia Darder (2015), decolonizing interpretive research also “seeks to unveil and destabilize 
existing structures of power that perpetuate the material and social oppression of the most 
vulnerable populations” (p. 4). I have, therefore, used this qualitative methodology to examine, 
analyze, and interrogate the literature in the field of MBE regarding its mission and aims for 
education and practice, in order to expose what Henry Giroux (1983) considered the unstated 
norms, values, and beliefs embedded in the literature and social relationships of the field, in 
order to see how they are then transmitted to the practice of the field. Moreover, as Piantanida 
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and Garman (2009) posited, “It is the researcher’s right and obligation to decide what major 
message is important to put forward” (p. 190) through an inquiry of “sensitivity, rigor and 
integrity,” which can provide for “others who are struggling with the phenomenon” (p. 191).  
The interpretive decolonizing research process is often an intimate one wherein the 
researcher is connected to and has intimate knowledge of the phenomenon (Piantanida & 
Garman, 2009) and it is through this connection that the researcher must “struggle toward the 
emancipatory reinvention of social and material relations” (Darder, 2015, p. 3). As a bicultural 
researcher with a background in neuroscience, education, and cognitive and developmental 
psychology, a member of the International Mind, Brain, and Education society, as well as a 
practicing learning specialist and educational therapist engaged in applying brain based research 
to student learning, my aim was to critically reinterpret the MBE movement, in hopes of creating 
a critical bicultural MBE pedagogy to counteract the classical positivist approach of the field 
and, instead, move toward a transformative theory and practice. 
  Tejeda (2008) emphasized the importance of acknowledging the past and present as 
coexisting in our understanding. Therefore, in order to understand where this young field is now 
and where it hopes to go, we must realize the present is unintelligible without a reading of the 
past cannot (Tejeda, 2008). The history of science with its colonial as well as its capitalistic 
structures must therefore be considered when examining the field of MBE, which both rests on 
those structures and aims to move past them through a decolonizing pedagogical praxis. As such, 
the aim of decolonizing interpretive research is to identify asymmetrical structures of power and 
recognize that all research practices are political processes that are not neutral, but instead 
political and historical. The aim of this type of research is therefore not to empower individuals 
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or impact specific research, but to be a systematic political effort to shift the field “in both theory 
and practice” in the ways “in which we comprehend ourselves and make sense of the world” 
(Darder, 2015, p. 3).  
A critical perspective requires a deep commitment to an emancipatory ideal of schooling 
that is genuinely democratic (Darder et al., 2009). For MBE to be genuinely democratic, a 
radical re-engagement between the sciences and education is necessary. Such an engagement 
first requires re-reading the literature in the field through a critical lens that engages the historical 
and philosophical foundations that inform its evolution. Though it may not address this, the MBE 
movement is entrenched in dominant and hegemonic ways of thinking and oppressive practices 
that continue to engage education as a field and students from subordinate cultural communities 
as deficit. In the process, these become the targets of what Freire (1970) termed false generosity 
by those in the world of scientific research. 
The aim of decolonizing interpretive educational researches is to engage the dominant 
literature on pedagogy, curriculum, methodology, and schooling in ways that treat these writings 
as data to be systematically and qualitatively analyzed, based upon their own historical and lived 
experiences as critical educators in the field (Darder, 2015). Darder has carefully articulated a set 
of critical principles for decolonizing interpretive research that are linked to a critical bicultural 
pedagogy. These principles—cultural politics, political economy, historicity of knowledge, 
dialectical theory, ideology and critique, hegemony, resistance and counter-hegemony, praxis, 
dialogue and conscientização—as discussed earlier, will be utilized theoretically and 
methodologically in this study to critically engage the literature with respect to its social justice 
connections and divergences within the research and practice in the MBE field. 
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Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this study was to re-think and re-envision the field of MBE, looking 
specifically at the lack of engagement with social justice concerns, in order to (a) critique the 
dominant epistemology of science that reproduces inequalities not just within the field itself but 
in its intended practice; and (b) move toward the formulation of a social justice paradigm of 
MBE that emancipates and humanizes teachers, students, and brain-based educational practices. 
The aim of this study, then, was to derive critical neuroscientific conclusions through a 
decolonizing examination of the primary literature that informs the field and to offer suggestions 
and recommendations for a social justice approach to MBE education and practice in the field. 
From a critical standpoint, therefore, instead of “taking issue with the rising dominance of brain 
sciences” we must “utilize these technologies in concert with a more organic grounding” (Four 
Arrows et al., 2009, p. vii). Only then, can the theories and practices of MBE begin to reflect an 
emancipatory intent. 
Today, in my work as a learning specialist, I sometimes wonder if by working with 
children with learning difficulties, using some of the most cutting-edge brain-based tools we now 
have, I am still just trying to make school a safe place for kids. A place where they can go, no 
matter what kind of mind they have, and know that what they bring to that space, their questions 
and demands, are valid and important and worthy of recognition and encouragement. This is the 
reason that the Mind, Brain, and Education movement is so incredibly important to me.  
I firmly believe that this field has the potential to close the gaps in academic success for 
all kinds of children, including children who are historically seen as having deficit intelligence. I 
am hopeful that in critically examining this movement I can help ensure that the field also works 
 19 
to close the gap around making schools a place for the decolonization of our hearts, the 
expression and engagement of our souls, and the adventure of our spirits. As Paulo Freire 
reminds, humanization must be the work of education and love the vocation of educators, the 
vocation of us all. As the field of Mind, Brain, and Education begins to take hold in a time where 
new brain technologies are creating a revolution (Four Arrows et al., 2009), it is up to us as 
educators to insist on just philosophical interpretations of what is happening. This, more than 
anything, is the aim of this study. 
Significance of the Study 
Since George W. Bush termed the 1990s as “the decade of the brain” (See Presidential 
Proclamation 6158 http://www.loc.gov/loc/brain/proclaim.html), there has been unprecedented 
development in the field of neuroscience, with a particular emphasis on the field’s potential for 
impacting the social and cultural life of human beings (Choudhury & Slaby, 2011). Aside from 
garnering attention at similar levels as the space race of the 1960s, “the neuroscientific 
revolution” (Lynch, 2009) is also accumulating resources at a tremendous pace, including 
President Barak Obama’s multi-billion-dollar BRAIN initiative in 2013.  
Alongside this overwhelming interest, a “widespread over-confidence in the 
transformative power of the new neurobiologism” (Choudhury & Slaby, 2011, p. xiv) has spread, 
including in the field of Mind, Brain, and Education. The field of MBE has made the enduring 
gap between neuroscience research and classroom practice (as well as some of the consequences 
of this gap) a central topic since its inception. However, the larger issues, including the economic 
and political context of brain-based initiatives, are seldom mentioned in the literature of the field. 
Issues of social justice as well as the differences in the placement of the sciences and education 
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in the field are equally absent from the literature. Moreover, while there now exists critical 
literature in both education and special education, no similar body of literature critically 
examines MBE in terms of social justice. This is one of the few studies concerned with social 
justice in MBE and the first with a critical interrogation of MBE as the primary focus of the 
work.  
Currently, as the push for further privatization of public education puts the multi-billion-
dollar brain-based industry in an advantageous position as an alternative or perhaps replacement 
for both special education and educational practices at large, critically examining the field using 
a social justice lens is ever more important. My hope is that leaders in MBE will take the social 
justice recommendations of this study seriously. Ultimately, this study seeks to help bridge the 
gap between neuroscience research and educational practice in ways that not only help students 
and teachers benefit from the rich knowledge base of MBE, but also encourage MBE 
practitioners to be a part of the conversation and begin to shift the way we do neuroscientific 
research so that our aims are emancipatory and move us toward a more socially just world.  
Positionality  
Growing up as a first-generation immigrant has given me a critical outlook. Coming from 
a country whose politics are in direct opposition to your new adopted country, further heightens 
such an outlook. I was born in Tehran, Iran, and lived there until I was 11. As a “child of the 
revolution” as we were called, I was taught in school and encouraged in society to critically 
examine the power structure of the world in which I lived. Unless, of course, such critique 
should turn to the Islamic regime. From the age of 11 to 15, I lived in Los Angeles, where I 
attended public schools, learned English in a time with no funding for English Language 
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Learners, where I was now faced with looking at my homeland through a very different lens. In 
Toronto, Canada, where I completed high school, I was once again charged with viewing my old 
homes, both Iran and the United States, with yet a different lens and from a different 
positionality. 
These experiences not only exposed me to many different curriculums, philosophies, and 
systems of education, but also trained my brain to always step back and look at phenomena 
within a larger cultural, political, and economic context, and to do so with the understanding that 
there are relationships at play between otherwise seemingly separate entities that impact each 
other in ways not always apparent from within. Navigating three different cultures, from two 
very different and often antagonistic worlds, each with their own epistemologies, beliefs, history, 
philosophy, and goals, has forced me to constantly reflect not just on differences, similarities, 
and relationships, but on my own experiences while moving through these worlds. Therefore, my 
own lens and outlook lends itself to critical bicultural research. 
My journey to work as an educator was not a typical one. I entered my undergraduate 
program at the University of Pittsburgh excited about my pre-med classes, convinced that a 
serious student like myself was meant for the sciences. As part of these requirements, I began 
taking courses in the then new field of neuroscience. But what began to stand out to me in these 
classes was the ways in which neuroscience was being linked to learning and education, which, 
much to my counselor’s (and my parent’s) dismay, prompted me to begin taking courses in 
education. Soon, I was “aimlessly” – to use my counselor’s word - taking courses in different 
departments: psychology, linguistics, education, philosophy, and neuroscience. Since there was 
no existing major that connected these disciplines in the ways that I saw them connect, when the 
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final deadline for deciding on a major came, I decided to create my own major in neuroscience 
and education. I never thought then that a decade later there would be centers and degree 
programs that recognized the importance of connecting the mind and education in the ways I had 
envisioned. Hence, as the MBE movement continues to grow, I feel validated for making a very 
controversial choice at the time.  
When I entered my graduate program at Teacher’s College, Columbia University, I was 
excited to learn more about how the learning brain is influenced by developmental, social, and 
psychological factors. By this time, I knew that an interdisciplinary approach to studying 
learning and development was the right fit for me. I worked with Professor Herbert Ginsberg on 
learning how to administer clinical interviews with children. My practicum work with Professor 
Clea Fernandez on the differences between Japanese and American teachers’ beliefs about their 
lessons in math allowed me to return to delve deep into comparative studies of education and to 
see how powerful teaching can be when professionalization and collaboration are emphasized. It 
was also at Columbia, in my work with Lucy Calkins at the Teacher’s College Reading and 
Writing Project, that I learned research should never be just a theoretical construct. It can and 
must be applied in the real world with all its richness, nuances, and messiness. It was here that I 
realized the potential for creating effective partnerships between research and public education.  
I began working in private practice after graduation for one reason alone: the one-on-one 
nature of private practice afforded me the privilege of being able to create an optimal 
environment where learning could happen, in the way that Piaget did, as well as the opportunity 
to work with students holistically within the context of their home, families, schools, and culture. 
This setting also allowed me the opportunity to work with children at their own pace. My hope 
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had been that I, in the tradition of great educational researchers, would be able to better 
understand “why children fail,” to use John Holt’s phrase in order to figure out how to assist 
them in succeeding. This work has provided me with the opportunity for real-life research. For 
years, I have been able to use brain-based approaches to actually make changes for struggling 
students while observing the larger forces at play in the education of children in Los Angeles.  
Over the years, I have worked as what MBE scholars would refer to as a “neuro-
educator” (Gardner, 2008) or an educational translator who helps “make useful connections 
between research and practice” (Fischer, 2009, p. 13). For example, I regularly use computer 
programs that have exercises that aim to rewire dyslexic brains, based on research from 
neuroscience that links dyslexia to a difficulty in processing the sounds of speech. Similarly, I 
may be asked by parents to evaluate brain-based programs recommended by others to ensure that 
they are in line with neuroscientific principles about how learning actually occurs at the synaptic 
level. Because of the private nature of my work and the privilege of in-depth, one-on-one work 
with students, their families, and their individual schools, I have been in a position also to see 
how fragile this work can be and how quickly and easily it can succumb to the threat of 
“neuromyths” (Fischer, 2009, p. 4), where, desperate to help their children, parents willingly 
spend thousands of dollars on programs that make false neuroscientific claims to “fix” children. 
 This phenomenon is also associated with over-testing, over-diagnosis, and misdiagnosis 
of children utilizing a clinical and medical model as well as the slippery slope that results when 
schools—sometimes well-meaning, sometimes not—either track students or place them in 
expensive outside-school programs. All these practices occur under the umbrella of brain-
research and its positive impact in education, while sticking close to old beliefs about the brain 
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and children’s lives and abilities despite the new and alluring label of neuroscience and cutting-
edge brain research. Most alarmingly, I have watched as more advanced testing and diagnosis 
have rendered children “unfit” for regular classrooms, which has led to the popularity of 
different specialized schools that not only create a new educational economy but also cut at the 
very roots of our democratic ideals tied to education and inclusivity in our society.  
Nonetheless, I continue to believe that MBE, neuroscientific research, and educational 
therapy have much to contribute to the field of education. Likewise, these fields have much to 
add to the ongoing conversation about the practices of special education in public schools, 
private and charter schools, and issues of social justice around education at large. It is important, 
however, that the field enter into this conversation as a member and partner. To do this, it is 
imperative that it first understands its critical position. One of the important ways in which 
neuroscience can transform the lives of children and citizen alike, for example, is through 
legislative action (Shen, 2016), as “legislators come in contact with the largest number and 
widest array of matters involving science” (Faigman as cited in Shen, 2016, p. 497). Therefore, 
MBE research today may very well fuel special education practices and policies in the near 
future. In fact, making such an impact is an explicit goal of the field. As a private practitioner 
with a background in neuroscience, I have the advantage of using the research of MBE in the 
informed ways the field wishes to have its research used. From this position, I could foresee 
many potential problems as brain science continues its push into both private and public 
education, including in special education.  
I came to this study as an immigrant, a learning specialist, a student of neuroscience and 
MBE, an educational researcher, a woman in the sciences, and a social justice advocate for the 
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rights of all children to learn. I believe MBE can transcend the challenge of bringing together 
fields with different historical roots. However, I believe that, in order to do so, the field must first 
better understand its own positionality, as well as that of the fields it hopes to merge. Only then 
can true dialogue and praxis of the kind the field aims to have, take place. It is my hope to use 
my own positionality to help shed more light on the path toward this goal. 
Definitions of Key Terms 
 Critical Pedagogy: A theoretical framework that proposes that education is a form of 
intervention and is capable of creating the necessary conditions for social transformation. The 
practice focuses on the lived experiences and genuine voices from which critique, resistance, and 
alternatives are to be realized. 
Decolonizing Interpretive Research: A research methodology rooted in a critical 
approach that focuses on engaging the dominant literature on pedagogy, curriculum, 
methodology, and schooling in ways that treat these writings as data to be systematically and 
qualitatively analyzed, based upon the researcher’s own (auto-ethnographic) historical 
experiences of difference, in order to create counterhegemonic intellectual spaces in which new 
readings of the world can unfold, leading to change in theory and practice. 
 Learning Specialist/Educational Therapist: A professional who combines educational 
and therapeutic approaches for evaluation, remediation, case management, and 
communication/advocacy on behalf of children, adolescents and adults with learning disabilities 
or learning problems. 
 Mind, Brain, Education (MBE): An emerging scientific field that brings together 
researchers in cognitive neuroscience, developmental cognitive neuroscience, educational 
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psychology, educational technology, education theory, and other related disciplines to explore 
the interactions among biological processes, learning, and education. 
MBE Movement: A movement started by the Harvard Graduate School of Education to 
pull together different disciplines from neuroscience, psychology, and education in order to 
create a new scientific field within education to answer questions faced by classroom teachers. 
Neuroscience: A branch of the life sciences that deals with the anatomy, physiology, 
biochemistry, or molecular biology of nerves and nervous tissue especially with their relation to 
behavior and learning. 
Social Justice: The fair and just relation between the individual and society as measured 
by the explicit and tacit terms for the distribution of wealth, opportunities for personal activity, 
and social privileges. 
Outline of Dissertation Chapters 
A critical bicultural interpretive study of the field of MBE was conducted in order to 
interrogate normative assumptions about scientific research and educational practices that 
currently prevent the field from having the impact it seeks. This study took concepts that are 
usually assumed to be neutral—such as science, research, and learning—and engaged them with 
respect to the political assumptions that inform them. The aim of the study was to provide a new 
foundational paradigm for moving the field toward a more socially just direction. 
Chapter 1 has provided an introduction to the problem, research questions, a discussion 
of the critical conceptual lens and research methodology that informs this work as well as the 
potential contribution of the study not just to the field of education.  
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Chapter 2 examines the history of neuroscience, how it came about as well as the 
historical, epistemological, and philosophical foundations that form neuroscience.  
Chapter 3 tracks the movement of neuroscience into education, the politics related to this 
move, as well as the emergence of the field of Mind, Brain, and Education as its own field and 
the politics and circumstances that resulted in this phenomenon.  
Chapter 4 takes a social justice lens to the meeting place of neuroscience and education 
and asks questions of the social justice implications and limitations of Mind, Brain, and 
Education as a field. This chapter also provides a rationale for moving toward a critical social 
justice paradigm of MBE and the emancipatory potential of such a shift.  
Finally, Chapter 5 brings the study together by articulating a set of principles for a social 
justice vision of MBE and concludes with a set of recommendations, to support an emancipatory 
praxis of MBE and, by so doing, better support an effective relationship between MBE and 
education as intersecting fields of study. 
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CHAPTER 2 
HISTORY OF NEUROSCIENCE AND ITS DISCONTENTS 
In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the scientific revolution took hold in Europe. 
Historians of science mark this as the beginning of modern science, modern philosophy, and 
modern life. It was in this revolution, or “crisis of European consciousness” (Koyre, 1957, p. v) 
that the geo and anthropocentric world of Greek and Medieval astronomy was replaced by a 
heliocentric, and later centerless, view of the universe, thus shifting social and even spiritual 
beliefs. Human beings were no longer mere spectators of nature, but owners and masters of it. 
Later, as the organismic pattern of thinking and explanation was replaced by the mechanical and 
causal, the “mechanization of this world-view” (Koyre, 1957, p. v), so prevalent in modern 
times, was born. It is at this point in history that the heavens no longer announced the glory of 
God and instead, the destruction of the infinite cosmos was followed by the measurement of 
space in an attempt to create a finite, well-ordered, hierarchy of perfection that forms the very 
basis of scientific thinking.  
Interestingly, this divorce of the world of values and the world of facts and the 
secularization of consciousness as the human mind turned from transcendent goals to immanent 
ones is also reflected as a goal of the traditional historians of science. In other words, 
traditionally, the job of the historians of science was to find truths about science with emphasis 
on the peculiarities of science, which included disinterestedness, universality, epistemic 
communism, and organized skepticism (as opposed to the doubt of the isolated researcher), 
through the critical scrutiny of an entire community (Merton, 1938). If the job of the scientist 
was to seek truth, then the job of the historian of science was to chronicle the growing body of 
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knowledge, as scientists continuously repaired it and made it deeper. In short, scientism ruled 
strong and prestigious; following the positivist approach, most historians of science saw their 
field of history in the image of science, as a purely descriptive discipline.  
Within this framework, and among scientists, a theory is accepted if and only if it is 
“true.” To be true means that a theory is in agreement with observable facts that can be logically 
derived from it. The influence of moral, religious, or political factors must be kept separate or the 
theory becomes illegitimate and must be deemed as such by the community of scientists. This is 
how scientific theories come to be validated (Frank, 1954); and as such, the history of any 
science is to shed light on the nature of scientific enquiry and the processes that lead to scientific 
discovery of truth. In fact, the history of the sciences was meant to separate the facts of science 
from such influencing factors as history itself and the political, economic, and cultural forces it 
entails. As such, a history of science was meant to be a chronological series of encyclopedia 
articles in the manner of old-fashioned textbooks.  
But as has been said, the historian is the avenger, standing as judge between the parties 
and rivalries of bygone generations (Butterfield, 1951). Generally speaking, historians do not 
assume that facts emerge in a simple and uncomplicated way from the record of the past because 
historical epistemology is necessarily inferential and inductive (Smail, 2012). However, in the 
traditional view of the history of science, the historian, like the scientist, was not to bring his or 
her own biases, preferences, and antipathies to the work.  
 “The beast lives unhistorically,” wrote Nietzsche (1957), and nowhere is this truer than 
in the traditional history of science, where biology is seen as independent from a political order 
and the state and is, therefore, in Hegelian terms, a historyless (or ahistorical) condition. The idea 
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that history was founded on a break with nature cast a very long shadow over the practice of 
history in science and the traditional view of the history of science that ruled supreme for 
centuries. It was not until 1962, with the publication of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 
that coming from that tradition, Thomas Kuhn (1962) challenged the rigid and authoritarian view 
of science as a discipline and instead put forth a more creative, emergent view in the West of 
how the history of science ought to be considered. 
Kuhn’s book was considered the most revolutionary book about the history of science in 
the West and the “most widely read, and most influential work of philosophy written in English 
since the Second World War” (Rorty, 2000, cited in Kuhn 1962, p. 7). Influenced by the works 
of historians like Arthur Lovejoy and Alexandre Koyre, Kuhn’s idea about how science evolves 
and the role science historians must play not only challenged traditional positivists views but also 
made popular the concepts of preconceptions, prejudices, points of view, principles, and 
conceptual frameworks as essential to comprehending science. Arguing that history is not a 
purely descriptive discipline, but an interpretive and normative one, Kuhn (1962) critiqued the 
traditional accounts of science and scientific texts, which imply that “the content of science is 
uniquely exemplified by the observations, laws, and theories described in their pages” (p. 1), 
resulting in “a view of science with profound implications about its nature and developments” (p. 
1).  
Kuhn (1962) argued that the position of scientific historians as chroniclers of an 
incremental process simply does not make sense when one looks at the development of the 
sciences. When we look at the data in science itself more carefully, according to Kuhn (1962), it 
becomes clear that much of what was once scientific belief is now myth such that if these out-of-
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date-beliefs are to be called myths, “then myths can be produced by the same sort of methods 
and held for the same sorts of reasons that now lead to scientific knowledge” (p. 2). 
Arguing that a concept of science drawn from books written by scientists is “no more 
likely to fit the enterprise that produced them than an image national culture drawn from a tourist 
brochure or a language text” (Kuhn, 1962, p. 1), Kuhn claimed that the logical positivist image 
that we possess of scientific history does not stand up to historical scrutiny. Hence, Kuhn’s work 
in the history of sciences is important to this study for two reasons. First, while Kuhn is lauded as 
a revolutionary thinker who was the first to challenge the positivist approach to the history of 
science, countless other traditions of science and history were ignored within the history of 
science. This alone points us to the problematic nature of the history of science in the West. Yet, 
Kuhn is seen as suddenly shifting the job of the historian of science from a mere spectator and 
reporter of scientific developments to that of a critical thinker who must look at the underlying 
values, politics, and power relations that result in the success of one paradigm over another. 
However, this “discovery’ is only new in the Western tradition itself. Second, and perhaps more 
alarmingly, none of his ideas is reflected in the history of neuroscience, which seems to rigidly 
follow the traditional view of history.  
The literature on the history of neuroscience is sparse (Shepherd, 2010; Wickens, 2015). 
Stanley Finger’s Origins of Neuroscience (1994) gives a historical account but only to explain 
brain functions, while his book Minds Behind the Brain (2000), written for a more general 
audience, focuses specifically on neuroscientists from ancient Egypt to the modern era who 
pushed the field forward. Andrew Wickens’s A History of the Brain (2015) is perhaps the most 
thorough account of the history of the field from the Stone Age to the modern era, while Gordon 
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Shepherd’s Creating Modern Neuroscience (2010) covers the revolution of neuroscience in the 
1950s exclusively. Outside of these books, little exists in the form of a history of the field.  
History is of course itself a discipline, and as such, there is always concern for the 
implications for the historical method of construing it along one way, rather than another. It is 
important to note therefore that the authors of these books on the history of neuroscience are not 
historians of science but themselves trained scientists as in the early traditions of the history of 
science. Stanley Finger is Professor Emeritus of Psychology at Indiana University. Both Andrew 
Wickens and Gordon Shepherd are neuroscientists. In fact, the history of the neurosciences as it 
has been established in the International Society for the History of the Neurosciences (ISHN) 
was based on the accounts of the founding members of the ISHN who were practitioner-
historians. In other words, they were practitioners of the neurosciences with an interest in the 
great moments and ideas in the history of their field.  
The historiographical precedent set by these clinician-historians emphasizes the aspects 
of history most interesting to them as trained scientists (Smail, 2012), resulting in a rather biased 
account of the history of the field (Rosner, 1999). In raising such critiques of the 
historiographical tradition of the history of the neurosciences, the young age of neuroscience as a 
distinct science is often noted as a potential cause (Kragh, 2002; Rosner, 2010). Neural research 
is a new science, and hence it is not surprising that most of the contributors to its history are 
neurologists or, otherwise, practitioners of the neurosciences (Kragh, 2002). Understanding that 
“our knowledge of the past is seriously affected if we learn how that knowledge came into 
existence and see the part which historical study itself has played in the story of the human race” 
(Butterfield, 1955, p. 1) is central in the study of history as a field and is not a new idea. Given 
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this, and the work of Kuhn in the history of science, not to mention the radical science movement 
of the 1960s–1980s as well as the work of many critical thinkers around the biased ways in 
which history is presented, one would expect that neuroscience would be at an advantage not to 
follow the traditional positivist view in its own history, because of its young age. This, however, 
is not the case.  
The thoroughly inter- or multidisciplinary nature of neuroscience is also noted as making 
it distinct from other sciences (Kragh, 2002). The interdisciplinary nature of this “hybrid of 
hybrids” field (Abi-Rached & Rose, 2010) is argued as presenting a challenge to historians even 
when the field does begin to be considered by them (Kragh, 2002). This is because historians 
would have to decide if they might approach the field from the history of medicine only, or from 
the perspective of history of psychology or physics only, for example, and would, in either case 
miss many important points characterizing the field. This critique, however, seems 
counterintuitive to how interdisciplinarity is seen as an asset in both neuroscience and the field of 
Mind, Brain, and Education. If Neuroscience is unique because of the way the field emerged 
from a number of distinct fields, why would that not be seen as an asset in studying the history of 
the field, unless of course the goal is to do that in the traditional way?  
The dearth of literature on the history of the field then and the fact that only scientists and 
not historians of science have so far written on the history of the field is itself an interesting 
finding. Neuroscience remains a relatively new field and “the history of neuroscience is not 
regularly taught in schools or university” (Wickens, 2015, p. xi), although neuroscience has 
begun to make a strong showing within schools of psychology during the last decade. Yet, as 
Wickens contended, “History is less about hard facts, and more to do with reconstruction and 
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interpretation” (p. xiii). Therefore, the positionality of these authors is important to the account 
of history they provide.  
History of Neuroscience 
In the history of the neurosciences, there are also many parallels between neurological 
theories and classical philosophical questions, including questions on the nature of the soul, the 
free-will problem, and the origination of knowledge, such that tracing the history of 
neurosciences also traces the history of the soul. This other high degree of interdisciplinarity of 
neuroscience also necessitates a perspective that goes beyond traditional disciplinary boundaries 
(Kragh, 2002). But instead of using this as an opportunity to be truly interdisciplinary, it is 
viewed as a hindrance to the study of the history of the field (Kragh, 2002).  
 While the academic history of the sciences has shifted in recent decades toward a more 
contextual historiography, where science is no longer considered an autonomous body of 
knowledge but as a “social activity, born of society, and mediating its structures and values'' 
(Young, 1973, p. 369), the history of neuroscience has not yet been considered in such a light 
and is instead presented in the texts of neuroscientists or practitioner-historians writing about the 
history of the field. What is interesting about these practitioner-historians accounts is that, 
despite being in and of this interdisciplinary field, they view their subject as “traditional 
theorists” (Horkheimer, 1937) who position themselves somehow outside of the practical, 
political, economic, and social contexts of their field of study. As such, the history of 
neuroscience is unrelated to the kind of interpretive, post-Kantian philosophical tradition and the 
post-Kuhnian tradition of scientific history, which would argue that scientific observation and 
methodology must not reduce the field to a single body of belief and that true and effective 
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scientific research by definition must not begin with the answers as decided upon by the 
scientific community. 
Accordingly, the approach of most of the authors writing about the history of 
neuroscience echoes the same detached values of how they have been trained to approach nature 
or their own research as scientists. So while no historian in recent times would assume that facts 
emerge in a simple and uncomplicated way from the record of the past, historians of 
neuroscience still seem to do so. With this in mind, this literature review draws mainly from the 
texts of these practitioner-historians, although other texts from the neurosciences that 
occasionally refer to the history of the field are also engaged in the following historical 
discussion.  
Antiquity to the 1800s 
The ancient history of the neurosciences is a kind of chimera as there were obviously no 
neuroscientists in ancient times. Yet the study of the brain in the West dates back to ancient 
Egypt, whose writings about the brain have been found on the papyrus plant paper they used 
(Finger, 1994; Schulkin 2015; Walshe, 2016; Wickens, 2015). The Egyptian symbol for the brain 
(see Figure 1) is a four-part hieroglyph containing a vulture, reed, folded cloth, and the final 
suffix meaning “little.” The sounds made by the symbol “ah-i-s” translates to “skull marrow,” 
which the Egyptians, as evidenced from their writing and their mummies, did not view to be as 
important as the heart (Wickens, 2015). While the heart, which was believed to be the source of 
thoughts, desires, and actions, was meticulously persevered for the afterlife, the brain was 
extracted through the nose with an iron hook and discarded.  
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Figure 1. The ancient Egyptian hieroglyph for brain as shown in the Edwin Smith papyrus. 
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Hieroglyphic-brain.jpg 
 
Even so, the Egyptians placed the brain at the center of disease, as evidenced by skulls 
that were trepanned, perhaps to remove evil spirits (Finger, 1994; Wickens, 2015). Evidence of 
trepanation has also been discovered in Inca cemeteries, and the practice continued for thousands 
of years in Europe as a viable operation for Neolithic surgeons, perhaps as a way to control 
epilepsy (Finger, 1994; Wickens, 2015). Egyptian medicine seems to have set the context for 
inquiry into brain function in the West (Schulkin, 2015), and its discoveries are recognized in the 
field as important steps in neuroscientific history and development. Yet, for the Egyptians, it was 
the heart that had primacy as the center of the spiritual mind, which remained separate from the 
physical body, including the brain. The predominance of the heart continued into Biblical times, 
and the idea that body and spirit exist as separate entities persists as a central tenant of the world 
religions. Moreover, this line of reasoning continues in scientific and philosophical discussions 
within neuroscience today. 
The Brain in Ancient Greece 
 The pre-Socratic thinker Alcameon (55–450 BC), who performed experimental 
dissections and focused on sensory and cognitive systems, is regarded as the first neuroscientist 
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in Western history (Finger, 1994; Schulkin, 2015; Wickens, 2015). He marks the point at which 
the Greeks turned their attention from gods and myths to analyzing human experience through 
reason. Until Alcameon, the Greeks also embraced the heart as the most important reasoning 
organ (Wickens, 2015); but, with the phrase “all senses are connected with the brain,” (p. 23) 
Alcameon forever changed the course of Western thinking (or “mankind” as noted in the texts) 
and is therefore worthy of comparison to Copernicus and Darwin in the history of science 
(Wickens, 2015). 
 Hippocrates (460–370 BE), well recognized as the father of modern medicine, perhaps 
more than anyone “freed medical practice from mysticism and superstition by replacing it with 
the idea that health is a physical process amenable to understanding through observation and 
reasoning” (Wickens, 2015, p. 13). His book On the Sacred Disease, which deals with epilepsy, 
makes the claim that the brain is responsible for all human mental activity, including intelligence 
and madness, and provides detailed anatomical descriptions of the brain. In demythologizing the 
sacred disease, Hippocrates recognized the pathos of insanity as a pathology of the body, perhaps 
laying the foundation for all future Western thought that places disease in the body of the person. 
Aristotle (384–322 BC), on the other hand, identified the heart as the seat of intelligence 
and believed that the “brain served to cool the heart” (Schulkin, 2015, p. 3). Like Plato, he 
believed the psyche to be made of three hierarchical parts (nutritive psyche, sensitive psyche, 
intellectual psyche), but unlike Plato he maintained that the psyches worked together and not as 
individual entities. Not content to observe, Aristotle (regarded as the greatest biologist of 
antiquity) cut into the brain; but, unimpressed with its cold and uniform structure, he maintained 
that the heart was the site where all the senses came together (Wickens, 2015). This is considered 
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Aristotle’s greatest error, though one wonders if his error was due to his scientific observations 
alone. 
As the Greeks went on to conquer other lands, they passed on their observational science 
on to the world, as did the Romans after them. The Roman physician Claudius Galen (AD 129–
200), who worked in the great city of Alexandria, expanded on the works of the Greeks but 
believed the brain to be the final common pathway of experience and behavioral expression 
(Finger, 1994; Schulkin, 2015; Wickens, 2015). Galen, who discovered the nervous system, is 
believed to be the founder of experimental physiology, requiring “a constant supply of animals” 
(Wickens, 2015, p. 39), from pigs to the North African Barbury ape, his preferred choice, as he 
believed the ape most resembled man. As there was no anesthesia, the animals often had to be 
strapped down on his operating table, squealing and struggling as Galen began to discover how 
different nerves and the brain controlled different parts of the body (Wickens, 2015).  
Galen’s “rigorous and careful experimentations” (Wickens, 2015, p. 44) made him the 
authority in medical matters for 1,500 years, during which time there was no further study of the 
brain and the nervous system. He wrote voluminously, forming the basis of medicine through the 
Islamic world in the centuries after Rome’s fall. Because he claimed that the beauty and the 
design of the body could not be due to chance, he had the endorsement of the Christian church 
helping him further rise as the greatest medical authority of the fourteenth and fifteenth 
centuries. It was not until the sixteenth century that the errors in his anatomical and physiological 
writings became apparent. In fact, using animals such as dogs, pigs, and macaques as models for 
the human body led to much misunderstanding, which was slow to be resolved, itself marking an 
important development in “mankind’s quest to understand his nature better” (Wickens, 2015, p. 
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45), though his authority as “a genius whose determination to understand the workings of the 
body, brain and nervous system through experimental methodology” (Wickens, 2015, p. 45) lay 
the foundation for the scientific revolution later and earned him the title of the earliest true 
neuroscientist. 
Building on Galen, thinkers in the Renaissance who emerged from the Dark Ages and 
saw no divide between the artist and the scientist, marked a particularly salient time for 
neuroscience as detailed drawings of the brain and the nervous system introduced “experimental 
philosophy” (Schulkin, 2015, p. 8) or a scientific approach based on the discernment of 
mechanisms. The science of this age was experimental, taxonomic, and naturalistic (Schulkin, 
2015), resulting in positive knowledge, or logical positivism, culminating in the twentieth 
century in what came to be called the “unity of science” (Carnap, 1928). The culmination of the 
thinking of this time period came in the publication of Fabrica (1543) by Andreas Vesalius 
based on his own observations and dissections of the human body, which revealed much of 
Galen’s errors and marking the reawakening of neuroscience.  
The Long Century: 1660–1800s 
The late sixteenth century until the opening decades of the eighteenth century, also 
known as the “long eighteenth century” (Whitaker, Smith, & Finger, 2007, p. 3), was an 
extraordinary period for all of science, including neuroscience, given “old teachings were 
replaced by fresh knowledge obtained through experimentation and empirical endeavor” 
(Wickens, 2015, p. 83). There was an “enormous increase in interest in the nervous system as the 
source of many ills of both body and mind, along with new therapies” (Whitaker et al., 2007, p. 
3). The beginnings of the industrial society brought about new creations, like the microscope as 
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well as a new upper stratum of polite society with a new and often neurotic concern for the 
proper health and functioning of the nervous system. Alongside these changes was a shift in 
philosophical thought, as represented by Rene Descartes (1596–1650), in the use of objective 
scientific investigation for the discovery of truth. As Newtonian physics began to construct 
sound models of the universe, Descartes invented the “reflex” to show how, in the dualism of 
body and mind, the brain acted in mechanical ways independent of a guiding spirit. Descartes’s 
book Discourse on Method (1637) offered a “new foundation for scientific thought based on 
certain and irrefutable knowledge” (Wickens, 2015, p. 84). 
A short while after, Thomas Willis, the father of modern neurology, published his book 
Cerebri anatome (1664), which provided an updated and thorough anatomical and physiological 
account of the brain. No longer were the workings of the body to be explained by a spiritual or 
soul-like force. Cartesian dualism was doing away with the old thinking of the Egyptians, the 
Greeks, the Romans, and even the church at the time with the concept of automata or the 
machine-like nature of life. With Luigi Galvani’s (1791) work on the intrinsic nature of 
electricity in the nervous system, the notion of spirit was firmly rejected. When the first action 
potential was recorded in the 1800s, a two-thousand-year belief that a spiritual force governed 
the body was replaced by “the nerve impulse.” When the speed of the impulse was finally 
recorded in 1850 at about 60 miles per hour (much lower than expected), neuroscience as a field 
became convinced that it could someday measure and explain all biophysical and biochemical 
events, and perhaps even the soul itself. 
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Franz Joseph Gall and the Theory of Phrenology 
 The term phrenology was first put forth by Franz Joseph Gall (1798), a German-born 
physician who saw his theory that skull features indicated underlying brain development as the 
“new” science (Finger, 1994; Wickens, 2015) that could be used to “construct an entirely brand 
new science of human nature, with implications for the individual and society (Wickens, 2015, p. 
135). That Gall was known as a womanizer with a colorful personality; that he used to entice 
street urchins into his home with cake and brandy in order to learn more about the skull features 
of the “lower classes”; that his theory was the idea of a self-determining spiritual entity held by 
the church at the time; that he was taking phrenology on a tour throughout Europe and the United 
states more like a circus show than a science; or the fact that many scientists at the time ridiculed 
his ideas did not avert phrenology’s popularity in Europe (Wickens, 2015).  
However, the movement really took off in the United States, where Gall and his 
colleagues were guests of honor at universities like Harvard and Yale and in the higher societies 
of Boston and New York, where American audiences, just 50 years after the American 
declaration of independence, were finding in phrenology a “scientific basis for the American 
belief in hard work and self-advancement” (Wickens, 2015, p. 147). The impact of phrenology 
did not end with Gall’s death in 1828. By the 1830s, phrenology had become big business in 
America, where phrenologists toured and gave lectures and held exhibitions where customers 
paid high fees to have their skull features read. Phrenologists were consulted on choosing 
employees and marriage partners, published in The American Phrenology Journal, and even 
diagnosed illness.  
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Phrenology’s popularity in the United States is attributed to the allure of the idea that mental 
phenomena have a biological origin that can be discovered (Wickens, 2015), an idea that persists 
today in modern neuroscience with more advanced techniques than reading skulls. But while 
there is little mention of the darker side of the history of phrenology in the United States, such as 
the way races were ranked from least to most evolved based on their skull patterns (see Figure 
2), gender stereotyping, diagnosing criminal tendencies that had an impact on the prison system, 
as well as the negative impact of the field on education reform in these history texts, the fact 
remains that the desire to naturalize the inequality of people, in order to situate them in the most 
appropriate place in society is also a part of American history as well as the history of 
neuroscience.  
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Figure 2. Skull patterns used in phrenology. 
Source: Drawing of the Greek god Apollo with an extensively high forehead juxtaposed with 
drawings of black Africans with distorted features to make them look more like apes (Finger, 
1994). 
 
Instead, Gall’s work is seen as one that was eventually disproved by scientists as evidence 
showed that “variability across subjects was high” (p. 307) and as it became inescapable that 
“brain size and complexity were unreliable correlates of intellectual powers or faculties” (Finger, 
1994, p. 307).  
It can be argued that the study of phrenology leads the historian “to face, inescapably, the 
political and social function of all scientific thought'” (Cooter, 1976, p. 228). However, in the 
current history of the field, ultimately, Gall’s contribution is seen as “a positive one” (Wickens, 
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2015, p. 150) because he was the first major scientist to pursue the science of human behavior by 
replacing the soul with a materialistic view of the mind—known as monism, and the position 
adopted by most neuroscientists today—forever changing academic psychology with the pursuit 
of character typing, rating scales, and inventories to measure personality. Gall’s work also had an 
impact on neurosurgery, as his cortical localization ideas led to lesioning methods, thus 
beginning a new chapter in brain research and psychology. Gall’s science was perhaps also the 
first “neuromyth” (Pasquinelli, 2012) to capture the popular imagination, leading to the precursor 
discovery that brain science could be big business.  
From the Neuron Doctrine to the American Psychiatric Association 
The discovery and understanding of cell theory in the late 1830s was another major 
accomplishment of the long eighteenth century (Wickens, 2015). Also known as the “neuron 
doctrine,” the cell or individual neuron was understood to be an independent, self-governing 
entity with various components like any other part of the body (Glickstein, 2006; Shepherd, 
1991). This was an unexpected discovery, as the brain had still been assumed to be a more 
mystical organ at that time. Soon after the neuron doctrine, synapses were discovered, and the 
general flow of information from the dendrites into the cell and then down the axon was 
understood. Three of neuroscience’s most prominent names, Camillo Golgi, Santiago Ramon y 
Cajal, and Charles Sherrington all played a role in this mapping, “when modern neuroscience is 
said to have been born” (Wickens, 2015, p. 160).  
These findings also pointed to the return of the idea of Descartes’s reflex, as Sherrington 
was able to show, through studies that identified how excitation and inhibition impact the nerve 
(Glickstein, 2006; Shepherd, 1991), an idea then used by Ivan Pavlov to explain how learning 
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occurs. Pavlov’s work, along with the work of his student Donald Hebb, whose theory proposed 
that learning and memory involve circuits of reflexive neural activity in the brain had a strong 
impact on both education and psychology for years to come. Conditioned reflexes, which Pavlov 
believed to be the fundamental unit of learning in animals and human beings, began a period in 
the nineteenth century when psychology came to be dominated by experimental methods that 
brought “rigor and objectivity” (Wickens, 2015, p. 208) to the field, as stimulus-response 
psychology became highly influential (Hunt, 2007). Soon behaviorists followed, with promises 
that they could “train” any infant to become anything they wished acting as “social engineers, 
helping society to scientifically engineer individuals to fit their environment” (Wickens, 2015, p. 
209).  
At around the same time, the mapping of the cerebral cortex brought back Franz Gall’s 
notion of cortical localization, as neuroscientists and doctors began to discover specific areas of 
the brain associated with specific functions. Paul Broca (2006), for example, localized speech in 
the posterior region of the left frontal lobe (Schiller, 1992), while Carl Wernicke discovered a 
second “language center” in the brain (Geschwind, 1974). With the return of the reflex and 
cortical localization as neuroscientifically proven theories, the long eighteenth century gave rise 
to both modern psychiatry and clinical neurology, which are based on the classification of 
psychiatric disorders and the practice of brain surgery. These classifications and methods served 
as the foundation of the American Psychiatric Association and The World Health Organization.  
Two factors stand out in this reading of the history of neuroscience from antiquity to the 
modern age. First, this history once again attests that we are, in fact, a scientific culture and 
scientific rationality permeates our dominant mode of thinking (Aronowitz, 1988). At no point 
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do the authors who tell the story of neuroscience, nor the men who make up that science, seem to 
doubt that their way of seeing the world, their attempts at rationally understanding it should itself 
be called into question. Even in the ongoing philosophical debate over mind-body or even the 
bigger question of the existence of God or a mystical force that embodies or guides the soul, is 
there doubt about whether the answer to these questions should be interrogated rationally.  
Of course, many of these men were, in their own time, radical thinkers who wished to 
emancipate human beings from darkness and doctrine. They sought truth, and one cannot deny 
that this is a noble endeavor. Nor can one deny the knowledge of the brain produced by this field 
and the ways in which it has transformed conditions of life, at least in the West. However, the 
pursuit seems too one-sided, reductionist, and unable to question itself. And, as has been argued, 
truth is neither outside power nor deprived of it (Foucault, 2008). Since science’s claim to truth 
is bound to the methodology that dictates its implementation, unless something can be proven 
using the scientific method, it cannot be true; it then follows that only science can bring us to 
truth and, at a step further, that science is truth. It is therefore the “conflation of knowledge and 
truth” (Aronowitz, 1988, p. vii) that is problematic. 
In explaining his critique of the traditional view of the history of science, Kuhn (1962) 
argued that science somehow always remembers its heroes, but seems to forget how they, and 
the scientific communities to which they belonged, came to their achievements. Instead of 
looking at science as a process, the field, even in its history, is seen as a series of products. 
Similarly, scientists, philosophers of science, and even historians of science seem to aim to 
present a rational reconstruction of the logic of science, making the discipline into a normative 
one. What results is a history of what science is at its best, as seen in this review of the literature, 
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rather than a true picture of how science really, or typically, is. But the fact is, the picture painted 
by these accounts of science is dependent on certain values, and different values would result in 
a very different and yet, historically accurate, picture of science.  
To this point, Kuhn (1962) coined the term “paradigm,” or an integrated cluster of 
substantive concepts, variables, and problems attached with corresponding methodological 
approaches and tools to refer to the worldview held by any scientist at a given time. Paradigms 
provide a “scientific community” (Kuhn, 1962, p. 10) with a model for examining problems and 
finding solutions. A paradigm, then, is a set of accepted examples of scientific practice, including 
law, theory, application, and instrumentation, that provides a model from which spring particular 
coherent traditions of scientific research. Every scientific community shares its own paradigm of 
truth (examples are "Newtonian physics" and "Aristotelian dynamics”) and, in fact, it is its 
possession of a common paradigm that constitutes it as a scientific community.  
The problem is that paradigms are limited in both scope and precision. The only reason 
some paradigms gain status is that they are more successful than their competitors in offering 
solutions to problems that a group of practitioners have recognized as important. In other words, 
there is no “truth” behind a paradigm—only that it can beat out other paradigms. In this way, 
science itself and its methodology can be seen as a paradigm that has been able to beat out other 
paradigms; and, has thus, become normalized by the scientific community (and in this case all 
academic communities).  
It is only when the scientific community can no longer suppress an anomaly that the 
profession is led toward a new basis. This phenomenon Kuhn (1962) called “scientific 
revolutions” (p. 6) and the only way science has over history moved forward. Scientific progress 
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then occurs through a series of renegotiations by the established scientific community through a 
crisis of meaning. What is important here, however, is the argument that, in resisting new ways 
of thinking, science is ultimately the enemy of new discovery until the new way of thinking can 
no longer be suppressed. Copernicus, Newton, Lavoisier, and Einstein were all radical thinkers 
who were marginalized by the scientific community for rejecting their time-honored scientific 
theories of the time. Each transformed the scientific community by ultimately having to 
transform the world within which scientific work was done. It is easy to see, then, that if the 
paradigm is problematic, the field itself perpetuates falsehoods. Equally important, and perhaps 
even more so, is that if the paradigm is biased in its aims, one can easily see how phenomena like 
phrenology could gain such ground as science. All these, of course, still fall within the Western 
scientific tradition. Even with Kuhn’s revolutions, there is no history of science allowing for a 
nonscientific, nonempiricist points of view.  
There exists a rich body of critical literature on Western science that, pointing to the 
individualistic, androcentric, detached, and biologist tendencies of the sciences, brings the 
scientific epistemology, not just its history, under question (Alcoff & Potter; 2013; Harding, 
1986, 2008; Potter, 2006). Unfortunately, the sources of the traditional history presented in this 
literature review do not employ any of these perspectives. Instead, the history, like the science 
itself, seeks to arrive at a “general or universal account of the nature and limits of knowledge, an 
account that ignores the social context and status of knowers” (Alcoff & Potter, 2013, p. 1), since 
“science must be held immune from the influences of social and historical situations” 
(Aronowitz, 1988, p. viii).  
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Feminist thinkers, for example, have called into question science’s theories of 
knowledge, its professional philosophers and its epistemology “proper” both for its lack of 
attention to the significance and particularity of the context of its theory, but also to its inability 
to recognize that “dominant knowledges, that is, knowledge produced and authorized by people 
in the dominant political, social, and economic positions, can apply to subaltern knowledges as 
well” (Alcoff & Potter, 2013, p. 1). But before the question of where neuroscience as part of the 
dominant knowledge system can be applied to subaltern knowledge, one must call into question 
the innocence of science’s limited epistemology. As the history shows, the pioneers in this field 
were all highly educated men with the necessary financial support to test and build their science, 
interlocking knowledge with power. With the exception of those women who served as patients 
(often plagued by neurosis) alongside men of the lower classes and races who were used as 
subjects, much like the North African Barbury ape, there are no women or racial minorities in the 
history of the field bringing to question issues around “patriarchy and reconstructing the sexual 
politics that obstruct the participation of women as full and equal contributing members of 
society” (Darder, Baltodano, & Torres, 2009, p. 14), as well as race and class relations in a 
hegemonic mindset.   
One would expect historians of neuroscience, a field that boasts its interdisciplinary 
nature, to act more like critical theorists who consider themselves part of a movement accepting 
that “the scientific calling is only one, non-independent, element in the work or historical activity 
of man” (Horkheimer, 1972, p. 198). In this way, neuroscientists or historians of neuroscience, 
like a critical theorist, do not study objects objectively. This, moreover, highlights that the basic 
conceptual and methodological tools of science cannot be isolated from the social, political, and 
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economic forces in which they exist. But these historians easily ignore the contextual aspect of 
science and, instead, promote the naturalizing effect of the scientific method and theory, which 
postulates law-like generalizations into the natural and social world such that the world is 
experienced as alien and driven by forces outside human control.  
The history of neuroscience presented then seems to begin with the logical positivist and 
empiricist tradition that assumes that science has to master nature and so it is conceived as “a 
sort of dialogue or interrogation in which one party (a scientist’s inquiring mind) asks questions, 
while the other (nature) provides answers” (Machamer, Pera, & Baltas, 2000, p. 4). It follows 
that since the procedures are impersonal, the same means of interrogation are available to each 
and every person, and anyone can put questions to nature because nature is a book whose true 
meaning is manifest to anyone who can read the book in the proper way (Machamer et al., 2000) 
and as such, scientific findings are universal. What is missing in these assumptions, however, is 
not just the point of view of the scientist (who can never be objective no matter how impersonal 
the methodology) because she is human, but the point of view of nature itself. Nature is not a 
passive, silent “thing” to be studied.  
Environmental history, a field that explores human history in relationship to the 
environment we inhabit, for example, challenges the assumptions of positivism and 
environmental determinism that assume human sovereignty over the environment and humans’ 
“conquest of nature,” which has a deep pedigree in nineteenth-century historiography (Kragh, 
2002). The key feature of this field, which rejects a simple Aristotelian pattern of cause-and-
effect, is that environmental history does not treat either humans or the environment as the 
sovereign partner in the relationship. Instead of a model in which influence flows from a prime 
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mover toward an object that is moved, the field puts forth a dialectical model for understanding 
change in human past. Challenging solipsistic history, wherein humanity is seen as the only 
agent in creating change, this field assumes that change emerges from a complex relationship 
between humans and the environment. 
In his study of the German landscape from the age of Frederic the Great to the twentieth 
century, for example, the historian David Blackbourn (2006) explored how rivers, marshes, and 
coastal zones were diked, drained, dammed, and channeled, and how, in the process, a new 
landscape was created, with unpredictable consequences for the people who lived in it. The 
channeling of rivers, for instance, lowered the water table, and agrarian patterns were 
transformed by the resulting need to rely on irrigation. The channeling of rivers also influenced 
seasonal fish runs. In this changed environment, certain cultural patterns and institutions faded 
away and others emerged in their place. Studies like this promote an understanding of the past in 
which humans and their environment are engaged in an ongoing relationship defined by a mutual 
and reciprocal set of influences.  
The study of nature then should not just generate knowledge about nature but also about 
how humans should behave with respect to nature, and the scientific paradigm does that by 
promoting a relation of power of humans over nature. In this way, positivism, as demonstrated in 
this history, has managed to disenchant nature in its attempts to objectively describe reality. This 
“scientism” (Habermas,1971), however, was not limited to science.  
By legitimizing science and subjugating nature, positivism promotes a “technocratic 
consciousness” (Habermas, 1971) that suggests that all matters, including matters in the social 
and cultural dimensions such as education can be dealt with using a technological perspective. 
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Inside such a consciousness, human beings are no longer characterized as beings who “live 
together and discuss matters with each other” but rather beings “who manipulate” (Habermas, 
1971, p. 255). In other words, the technocratic elite—which includes the neuroscientists of this 
history as well as the neuroscientists writing their history—do not regard human beings as 
capable of determining their own fate but as beings implementing the norms of technological 
reality, thus promoting a kind of scientific domination and coercion. In other words, positivism is 
not limited to scientific inquiry, but also to the natural sciences, including history and education, 
because it subjugates all knowledge to epistemic naturalism (Habermas, 1971). As such, 
epistemic naturalism considers the scientific method as the only avenue to truth and no other way 
of understanding human beings is deemed legitimate.  
This is all to say that though there existed throughout the historical time noted above, 
other epistemologies, bodies of literature, and scientific knowledge that preceded Western 
science, there seems to be no hint even now as these books are written that Western science and 
its history present only one way of knowing. Instead, neuroscience is defined by the field and 
pursued as if the human brain is the property of European men and they themselves invented it. 
Therefore, the history of the field, thus far, demonstrates a “historical privileging of the purely 
conceptual or mental over the corporeal” (Grosz as cited in Alcoff & Potter, 2013, p. 187); such 
that even as the body is examined for understanding, it is seen as independent from its context—
a view which, interestingly, neuroscience research itself now contradicts (Damasio, 2010; 
Holroyd, Larsen, & Cohen, 2004; Immordino-Yang & Damasio, 2007). So while the history of 
the field presents itself as neutral, much like its subject, from a critical perspective, it reads like 
an “all-consuming meta-narrative” steeped in notions of “totality, reason and the universality of 
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absolute knowledge” (Darder et al., 2009, p. 16), which seems to “legitimate its power by 
claiming self-referentiality” (Aronowitz, 1988, p. viii). As will be apparent, little seems to 
change as the field moves into the modern age. 
The Move into the Modern Age 
 The ideas of cortical localization, the reflex, and cerebral dominance persist in 
psychology and education today. Speech language pathologists, for example, learn about Broca’s 
and Wernicke’s areas in the brain and how they are “impacted” in children and adults with 
dyslexia. Occupational therapists are taught that each half of the body is controlled by the 
opposite side of the brain; but these concepts have also been the cause of much debate and 
controversy in these fields since their discovery. The right hemisphere, for example, seen as the 
“female” (Finger, 1994, p. 388) hemisphere, was for years seen as the inferior hemisphere “that 
could be educated, perhaps even as much as the intelligent left hemisphere” (p. 397). These 
notions were put into practice in American schools, where left handed children were forced to 
use their right hand or where all children were forced to be ambidextrous for “balance in the 
brain,” for example (Finger, 1994).  
In short, there has been a long and robust history of “neuromyths” based on 
neuroscientific findings, sometimes with negative implications for society. Soon the concepts of 
cortical localization and cerebral dominance led to a wealth of other findings, giving a physical 
seat to learning problems such as alexia, dyslexia, apraxia, dysgraphia, in education and diseases 
such as Alzheimer’s disease, Parkinson’s, and Tourette’s in psychology. Discovering the 
physical ground of disease in the “patient’s” body in neuroscience solidified Western thinking’s 
reliance on positivism, giving rise to a new view of human beings as neurological patients.  
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The Greatest Decade: The 1950s 
“More has been learnt about the brain over the last 50 years than in the rest of human 
history put together” (Wickens, 2015, p. 345), suggesting that if the speed of progress keeps up 
at this exponential rate, we truly are on the cusp of a revolution. But while the last 50 years have 
been a time of incredible fecundity in the field, perhaps the decade of the 1950s can match this 
time in the advancement of neuroscience. In the aftermath of World War II, where science 
demonstrated its effectiveness in helping to win the war, broad and systematic federal support for 
the advancement of biomedical science began in the United States. With the establishment of 
The National Institutes of Health, direct research grants to students and researcher as well as 
well-established academics and academic departments allowed for money and the freedom to 
pursue the “solving of the next problem” (Shepherd, 2010, p. 235).  
The energy of the post-war era in the United States, alongside monetary supports, 
advanced the biomedical field, including neuroscience, in unprecedented ways (Shepherd, 2010). 
This “freedom of inquiry” (Shepherd, 2010, p. 235) at the heart of the scientific enterprise” is in 
many ways the subject of Gordon Shepherd’s Creating Modern Neuroscience: The 
Revolutionary 1950s (2010). Shepherd, one of the founding members of the Society for 
Neuroscience, wrote the book based on a course he taught with two of his graduate students 
beginning in 2005 at Yale University, where he serves as Professor of Neuroscience. He and his 
students developed the course, which is now mostly taught online, in response to growing 
interest in the history of the field.  
A contemporary of Andrew Huxley and Francis Crick, Shepherd has given a passionate 
account of the investigators, the concepts, the history, and the politics and the people that 
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characterized the field as only an insider can. He has noted issues of gender, ethical concerns, 
and the role of history, politics, and culture in the development of the field. Educated at Harvard 
and Oxford Universities and author of over 280 articles and many of definitive texts in 
neuroscience, his approach has certainly not been a critical one, although it is one of a small 
number of books on the history of the field. Shepherd, who also wrote Foundations of the 
Neuron Doctrine (1991) declared the difficulty in writing a history of field that spans virtually 
every field of learning from physics, biology, and chemistry, to psychology, sociology, and 
philosophy, to politics and religion (Shepherd, 2010). Yet he maintained that the field must “take 
responsibility for its own history” (Shepherd, 2010, p. vii) and was the first person to form a 
committee on the History of Neuroscience in 1985. 
 To help illustrate the difficulty in establishing a history of neuroscience, Shepherd (2010) 
first offered a table to show all the fields involved in neuroscience (see Table 1). He then offered 
a list of all the species investigated in neuroscience (Table 2), a list that covers a large range of 
species from bacteria to human beings. 
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Table 1  
 
Fields of Neuroscience 
 
Nervous system fields 
Neuroanatomy 
Neurochemistry 
Neurophysiology 
Neuropharmacology 
Neurology 
Psychiatry 
Biology fields 
     Molecular Biology 
     Biochemistry 
     Biophysics 
     Cell Biology 
     Genetics 
     Developmental biology 
     Evolution 
Physical science fields 
Physics 
Chemistry 
Engineering  
Computer science 
Behavior fields 
Ethology 
Psychology 
Sociology 
Neuroeconomics 
Humanities fields 
Linguistics 
Neurophilosophy 
Neuropolitics 
Neuroreligion 
 
Note. Reproduced from G. M. Shepherd (2010). Creating modern neuroscience: The 
revolutionary 1950s. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. 
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Table 2  
 
Species Investigated in Neuroscience 
Invertebrate 
     Bacteria 
     Worms 
     Insects 
     Arthropods 
     Molluscs 
         Limulus 
         Squid 
         Aplysia 
Vertebrate 
     Fish 
     Amphibians 
     Reptiles 
     Birds 
     Mammals 
         Hedgehogs 
         Rabbits 
         Rats 
         Mice 
         Cats 
         Dogs 
         Subhuman primates 
         Humans 
 
Note. Reproduced from G. M. Shepherd (2010). Creating modern neuroscience: The 
revolutionary 1950s. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. 
 
Shepherd offered a similarly wide-ranging list of the systems studied in neuroscience (see 
Table 3), covering virtually every system from the five senses to the higher cognitive systems 
and made the claim that biological organization involves a hierarchy of levels that begins with 
the genes and ends in specifically neural pathways and systems that coordinate the multiple 
systems that underlie behavior (see Table 3).  
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Table 3 
  
Systems Studied in Neuroscience 
Sensory Systems 
     Smell 
     Taste 
     Touch 
     Hearing 
     Vision 
Motor Systems 
    Autonomic 
Posture 
Reflexes 
Central pattern generation 
Spinal cord 
Higher motor centers 
Central Systems 
    Neuroendocrine 
Circadian rhythms 
Feeding 
Mating and reproduction 
Motivation 
Perception 
Learning and memory 
     Human higher cognitive functions 
 
Note. Reproduced from G. M. Shepherd (2010). Creating modern neuroscience: The 
revolutionary 1950s. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. 
 
Shepherd (2010) argued, “Our interest in history is much more than a recounting of what 
was discovered when” (p. 8). What interests him and the students and scientists for whom he is 
writing his book is the creative process. “What are the factors that produce the great leaps 
forward in science?” (Shepherd, 2010, p. 8), he asked. To answer this question, he offered a 
number of factors that he called the gold standard neuroscientists need in order to make their 
discoveries. They are methodology, biological preparation, investigator, theoretical framework, 
chance, and support (see Table 4). 
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Table 4  
 
Hierarchy of Levels of Nervous Organization  
Higher cognitive and social functions 
Clinical disorders: neurology, neurosurgery, psychiatry 
Systems for behavior 
Circuits of specific systems 
Dendritic integration 
Cellular functional properties: synaptic potentials and action potentials 
Synapses 
Molecules in development and neurotransmission 
Genes 
 
Note. Reproduced from G. M. Shepherd (2010). Creating modern neuroscience: The 
revolutionary 1950s. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. 
 
 
Table 5  
 
Factors in Discovery in Neuroscience 
 
Methodology 
Biological Preparation 
Investigator 
Theoretical framework 
Chance 
Support 
 
Note. Reproduced from G. M. Shepherd (2010). Creating modern neuroscience: The 
revolutionary 1950s. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. 
 
Methodology, expressed in the Latin dictum “Teknik ist alles” from the nineteenth-
century, meaning, “Methods are not everything, they are the only thing” (Shepherd, 2010, p. 8) 
are crucial to the success of the neuroscientist, according to Shepherd. “Historically, knowledge 
of neural mechanisms has been built on those systems accessible to study by the methods 
available at the time” (Shepherd, 2010, p. 6). In the nineteenth century, therefore, neuroscientific 
study was limited to reflexes, the sensory systems, and learning around central behavioral 
systems. In the 1950s, however, with the advances in technology, knowledge expanded to all the 
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systems. Perhaps this was one of the reasons for the neuro-revolution in that decade. Of this 
time, Shepherd (2010) wrote, “Biological preparations come in an almost infinite variety; the 
trick is to find a ‘model system’ that will enable something new to be discovered” (p. 9). The 
neuroscientific value of a number of new species, for example, the squid with its giant axon, was 
discovered during this time, which allowed neuroscientist to more careful study nerves.  
As such, the investigator, with a blend of skills, insights, and personality, used the 
available methodology to apply to the model system of investigation. But the investigator had to 
be educated and trained properly and had to know how to interact effectively with others in order 
to persevere (Shepherd, 2010). And although, “Experimentalists often prioritize experiments 
over theory…the importance of a strong theoretical foundation for the development of a field 
cannot be overemphasized” (Shepherd, 2010, p. 9). Theoretical framework was the next 
important factor in the aiding of discovery. Shepherd contended that one could not explain a fact 
without a theory and emphasized the importance of one’s theoretical framework for generating 
hypothesis and making predictions. 
Next, the hand of chance or luck must also be present. Scientists rely on “the fortuitous 
coming together of these components in unpredictable ways” (Shepherd, 2010, p. 9) to make 
their discoveries. Finally, Shepherd (2010) cited the importance of support for scientists like any 
“artist or creative worker” (p. 9). It is important to note that the rise of technically sophisticated 
science in the late nineteenth century gave rise to scientists receiving support from philanthropic 
institutions such as the Rockefeller Foundation. While the vast demands of WWII were 
following the use of the atomic bomb, science became important not as a “creative process” but 
as a means to power and critical to scientists receiving the support they needed. 
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All these factors combined to lead to the density of discoveries Shepherd shows in Table 
6 when we were first thrust into the brave new world of modern neuroscience. Reminding the 
reader that “it is not enough to leave one’s mark by one’s discoveries” (Shepherd, 2010, p. 10) 
Shepherd also offered a table that summarizes the ethical issues in neuroscience (see Table 6) to 
show relationships between mentors and students, male and female, competition between 
laboratories, single-discipline and multidisciplinary studies, bias on the basis of race and ethnic 
group, political intrusion and coercion, nationalities and language.  
Table 6  
Ethical Issues in Neuroscience 
 
Recognition between mentor and student 
Recognition between male and female 
Recognition in competition between laboratories 
Recognition between single-discipline and multidisciplinary studies 
Bias on the basis of race and ethnic group 
Political intrusion and coercion 
Nationalities and language 
Note. Reproduced from G. M. Shepherd (2010). Creating modern neuroscience: The 
revolutionary 1950s. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. 
 
Throughout the book, he referred to the exclusion and difficulty faced by Jewish scientists 
through the use of their individual stories, and also highlighted the “historical gender wall” 
(Shepherd, 2010, p. 234) as he chronicled the mostly male (he mentions eight women in the 
history of the field), mostly White (of European decent) pioneers of the field. Nonetheless, 
Shepherd maintained, “The origins of modern neuroscience are truly international” (p. 234). 
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The issue of methodology in science has been the subject of critique. First, in scientific 
methodology, “the qualitative is excluded, or, more precisely, quality is occluded from the 
objective world” (Aronowitz, 1988, p. x). Second, scientific methodology is rooted in the idea 
that statements must be tested and validated by others, using the identical methodology, in order 
to guarantee validity and reliability. But the fact is that when all scientists must use the same 
methodology, what is first guaranteed is the reliability of what counts as science (Aronowitz, 
1988). In other words, the field defines rationality in a specific way, makes that way the 
privileged discourse, and uses empirical validation to hold its privilege. Stanley Aronowitz 
(1988) argued that “Since the truth claims of science are tied to the methodological imperative, it 
insists that science must be held immune from the influences of social and historical situations” 
(p. viii); which explains how Shepherd goes on to tell a history of neuroscience embedded within 
larger historical developments but assured that none of that larger history could impact the 
science, because the methodology makes it immune to such penetration.  
Perhaps, this is because, as Sandra Harding (1986) posited, “Only to the extent that one 
person or group can dominate the whole, can ‘reality’ appear to be governed by one set of rules 
or be constituted by one privileged set of social relations” (p. 26). In fact, it can be argued, “it is 
commitments to antiauthoritarian, anti-elitist, participatory, and emancipatory values and 
projects that increase the objectivity of science” (Harding, 1986, p. 27). But Shepherd obviously 
does not prefer such an approach. Instead, it then follows that in “searching for the machine that 
can yield the raw material for penetrating the secrets of nature” (Aronowitz, 1988, p. viii), what 
is set up is a competition to forever develop more sophisticated equipment in order to conquer 
nature and yield its secrets.  
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Atop the shoulders of the many slaughtered animals in the history of neuroscience then 
lies the squid with its giant axon as the prime example of the biology “to which a technique is 
applied” (Shepherd, 2010, p. 9), a phrase that in no way reflects a dialogical relationship between 
man and nature but instead “fractures knowledge and supports the further alienation of human 
beings from nature” (Darder et al., 2009, p. 17). Other epistemologies, for example, indigenous 
knowledge, would find such an approach problematic at the very least in coming to understand 
the secrets of nature, arguing that the principal relationship here between man and nature is one 
of exploitation or the imposed extraction of natural resources for personal gain (Four Arrows, 
Cajete, & Lee, 2009; Grande, 2015) though the researcher or scientists is not an active 
participant in, but rather a detached observer, of life (Banuri, 1990). One would expect that a 
methodology dedicated to the study of nature would be more enchanted with its object of study, 
taking a more loving approach toward the interrelationship and delicate balance that exists 
between all living beings. But instead of a formidable relationship with the earth, one that is 
infused with physical, emotional, intellectual, and spiritual wisdom, the process feels rigid and 
missing a “supple and fluid view of humans and nature that is relational; an objectivity and 
subjectivity that is interconnected” (Darder et al., 2009, p. 11).  
In its place, values such as individualism, competition, and privatization reflect the free 
market more than nature, only to “sustain patriarchy and its subjugation of all subordinate living 
things” (Darder, as cited in Kahn, 2010, p. xii), ultimately disrupting the ecological order of 
knowledge essential to the sustainability of nature itself. In its discussions around objectivity 
versus subjectivity, rationality versus intuition, mind versus body, and so forth, the scientific 
method seems to claim that “human progress requires the former to achieve domination of the 
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latter” (Harding, 1986, p. 23), where the former, in this case scientists as knowing subjects, are 
associated with masculinity, while the latter, objects of his inquiry are associated with the 
feminine. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the videos of the scientists working on the giant 
squid laying itself bare on the table for the curious pleasure of the highly respected 
neuroscientist.  
In outlining the characteristic of the investigator, Shepherd emphasized that being 
educated and trained is a requirement for scientists. In other words, you must first agree to this 
particular way of knowing, train your brain in it, and exclude all other ways, in order to be 
allowed to participate in scientific inquiry. What follows, and the history shows this, is not just a 
preference for particularly educated investigators but for investigators of a particular race and 
gender as science insists that “only those inducted, by means of training and credentials, into its 
community are qualified to undertake whatever renovations the scientific project requires” 
(Aronowitz, 1988, p. viii). As a result, the very notion that the scientific method rids us of bias 
comes under question because of the androcentric bias that results in the selection of certain 
problems as interesting over others. There is also the critique that males tend to interpret nature 
based on masculine metaphors of power (Harding, 1986), again making scientific research 
politicized exactly at the places it claims to create neutrality.  
While Shepherd acknowledges that we cannot know a fact independent of theory, at no 
point does he question science’s preferred theories of empiricism and positivism. In other words, 
no matter what the specifics of a theoretical framework in science, they must all follow 
empiricism as a general theory. As a theory, not only does empiricism not consider “the practical 
intent of transforming asymmetrical relations of power” (Darder et al., 2009, p. 13), but one 
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could also argue that science’s insistence on empiricism enacts the existing power relations 
between science and its subjects of study in order for science to retain its privileged position. 
Harding (1986) asked, “If theories are constructed to explain problems, if methodologies are 
always theory-laden, and if observations are methodology-laden, can there be value-neutral 
design and interpretation of research?” (p. 22). Shepherd has insisted there can be.  
Similarly, in his discussion of chance or luck, given the academic climate of competition 
in the 1950s, when scientists were looking to leave their mark, it is unclear if Shepherd is 
referring to the eureka effect or the kind of luck that kept the ethical issues he notes in 
neuroscience in place long enough for the pioneers of the field to push forth in their endeavors. 
Instead, what is presented as luck seems to be about calculated support, advancement from both 
the U.S. government as well as traditional philanthropic foundations hoping to make the 1950s 
the “greatest decade in the history of modern biology and neuroscience” (Shepherd, 2010, p. 
viii). 
Perhaps Shepherd’s positionality as a neuroscientist explains his exceptionalism and his 
“belief that Western science alone among all human knowledge systems are capable of grasping 
reality in its own terms” (Harding, 2008, p. 3). Nowhere in the book is there any doubt about the 
excellence of “objectivity, rationality, good method, real science, social progress, and 
civilization” (Harding, 2008, p. 3) that advances the field. His work exemplifies “triumphalism” 
or the assumption that “the history of science consists of narratives of achievements” with no 
significant downsides (Harding, 2008, p. 4).  
Although a look at the specific scientific models and explanations presented by 
neuroscience is beyond the scope of this study, it is worth noting that the scientific method itself 
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with its unidirectional attempts to control is itself problematic; although not according to 
Shepherd. Like all scientists he gives the scientific method primacy and power over all, without 
questioning the validity of the commonsensical assumptions that drive the method. As a result, 
within the pages of Shepherd’s treatise, there are two stories—one of the history of neuroscience 
from the perspective of a White male neuroscientist and the other hidden, subaltern story of 
oppression, which bleeds through between the pristine lines of his proclaimed neutrality.  
The Discovery of DNA 
While the discovery of DNA in 1953 did not have an immediate impact on neuroscience, 
Shepherd (2010) maintained that this discovery alone is “sufficient to claim the 1950s as the 
greatest decade in the history of modern biology” (p. 15). This is because the discovery of the 
structure of DNA showed once and for all that “biology could be based purely on classical 
physics” and on “principles of chemistry and biophysics” (Shepherd, 2010, p. 27). In other 
words, “the hereditary material was firmly in the domain of biological structures operating by 
biological mechanisms” (Shepherd, 2010, p. 27). The information contained in these structures 
and mechanisms provided the blueprint for the human being and the most complex information 
would be found in the most complex organ: the brain. 
 The distance between the gene and the brain did not take long to travel, though it may 
have seemed “infinite at the time” (Shepherd, 2010, p. 27). After the discovery in 1953, the 
genetic code was obtained by 1963. DNA engineering was ushered in the 1970s. The polymerase 
chain reaction was discovered in the 1980s allowing the identification of any gene and protein in 
any cell and, in the year 2000, the full human genome was obtained. Half of the genes were 
expressed in the brain bringing us to the “threshold of a new golden age” (Shepherd, 2010, p. 
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28), where, because of its continuing impact on stem cell research, this discovery set up brain 
research to overshadow all other biosciences forever (Wickens, 2015). This is the reason that the 
discovery of DNA, by James Watson and Francis Crick, is considered by neuroscientists to be 
the single most important neuroscientific advance of the 1950s. However, for non-
neuroscientists, interested in the history of the field—what may stand out most about the 
discovery of DNA is not the scientific advances it allowed but the story itself. It is perhaps one 
of the most famous stories in modern science. Most high school graduates have at least heard the 
names Watson and Crick and can picture the double helix. What they may not know is that while 
the story is often told as a great moment of discovery by two curious, enthusiastic, and smart 
young scientists, it was anything but. 
 In a section called “The Race to DNA” (Shepherd, 2010, p. 19), Shepherd described the 
environment in the United States around biomedical research after the second World War, 
where, inspired more by the opportunity for fame, young graduate science students could get 
direct monetary support to solve the secret of the universe. James Watson, an American, and 
Francis Crick, a Brit, were both doctoral fellows wandering through different laboratories in 
academia “looking for something stimulating” (Shepherd, 2010, p. 20); which, when the story is 
examined closely, simply means something that would allow them to leave their mark and make 
a name for themselves. By the early 1950s, it was already recognized that the chemical structure 
of DNA would reveal the holy grail of the mechanisms of hereditary material and Watson and 
Crick got together specifically to try “to win the race to discover the structure of DNA” 
(Shepherd, 2010, p. 22).  
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The story is legendary and well-documented from the moment the two scientists raised a 
pint at Cambridge to declare they had “discovered the secret to life” (Shepherd, 2010, p. 20) to 
the story of Rosalind Franklin, their young contemporary whose pioneering crystallographic data 
Watson and Crick used without her knowledge or permission to construct their physical model. 
While Shepherd has noted the ethical issue with using other people’s data, recognizing the 
ethical issue around the fact that, at the time, female scientists were not even allowed in the same 
university lunchrooms as males, Watson and Crick are characterized as heroes and pioneers in 
the field, two great minds with an appetite for prodigious work. Yet they seem, according to 
Shepherd’s account (and their own account—see The Double Helix [1968] and What Mad 
Pursuit [1988]) two ambitious men galvanized not by scientific curiosity, but by the large-scale 
investment by politicians in the aftermath of the WWII and the development of the radar and the 
atomic bomb to carve out a name for themselves by discovering “the secret to life,” confident 
that this was a noble goal, indeed, and to do it at the expense of others who later “generously 
acknowledged the correctness and beauty of the final structure” (Shepherd, 2010, p. 21).  
 Perhaps a different account of this history might note the discovery of DNA as the most 
important of the neuroscientific discoveries in the 1950s not because of how much the discovery 
pushed the field forward but because the story symbolizes the insatiable ego, calculated 
ambition, colonizing mindset toward nature, and androcentrism that defines the history of the 
field both before, during, and after the 1950s. Despite the rich critical literature around science, 
feminist critiques of science, and the simple facts of the story, little more than regret is offered 
for Rosalind Franklin, who was not named for her contribution to the discovery of the DNA 
double helix with her colleagues who received the Nobel Prize in 1962, followed by a wish to 
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bring more women into the field. Otherwise, by itself, the discovery of the structure of DNA is 
enough to warrant the 1950s as the golden age of neuroscience, impacting how neuroscience has 
been conducted since that time. The discovery gave a new perspective on doing science, where it 
was made out to be an exhilarating race among gifted scientists who were out to take the exciting 
steps toward the discovery of truth.  
From Signaling Molecules to Neural Circuits 
 Another factor contributing to the explosion of neuroscience in the 1950s was the 
improvement of methodology and techniques. While scientists before had to rely on limited 
experimental methods for observing and “manipulating” nature such as frog embryos and the 
large eggs of sea urchins (two of neuroscience’s favorite subjects), advanced methods now 
allowed neuroscientists to push the field forward.  
The “nerve growth factor” was reported in 1951, followed by confirmation of the axonal 
growth cone (possible because of advances in the microscope, including the invention of the 
electron microscope that allowed the study of cellular structure). By the early 1960s, the 
introduction of radioactive tracers allowed for the tracing of axonal transport, finally helping to 
confirm and build on the work of Cajal (Shepherd, 2010). Before the 1950s, the biochemistry 
and pharmacology of the brain was also nonexistent. It was in this decade that second 
messengers, neuropeptides, pheromones, and other signaling molecules were discovered, leading 
to the understanding of neurotransmitters in the 1980s.  
In 1954, The First International Neurochemical Symposium was held in Oxford which 
published Biochemistry of the Nervous System (1954). Three more books, Biochemistry and the 
Central Nervous System (1955), The Pharmacological Basis of Therapeutics (1955), and Central 
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and Synaptic Transmission in the Nervous System; Pharmacological Aspects (1961) followed 
this text. These four publications are significant because with the discovery of these chemical 
molecules that seemed to “control” the brain and behavior came “drug discoveries in the 1950s” 
(Shepherd, 2010, p. 206)—precursor discoveries that would propel the future multi-billion-dollar 
profits of the pharmaceutical industrial complex.  
Before 1950, psychiatric disorders were treated with psychoanalysis, on one hand, and 
more extreme treatments such as surgery or electrical stimulation on the other. “The Mind was 
still conceived to be separate from body” (Shepherd, 2010, p. 206). This all changed in the 1950s 
as a central theme in neuroscience became the molecular basis of the synapse and neurological 
disorders began to be viewed as “pathological changes affecting synaptic function” (Shepherd, 
2010, p. 65). As a result, pharmaceutical research on drug discovery began to target the synapse. 
New drugs such as chlorpromazine, reserpine, and butyrophenones showed dramatic changes in 
quieting schizophrenic patients, especially around their violent outburst in hospital wards. 
Antidepressive drugs (such as iproniazid, monoamine oxidase inhibitors, and tricyclics) were 
discovered to treat both mental and emotional disorders. Lithium began to be used as a treatment 
for depression and bipolar disorder. Drugs such as meprobamate and benzodiazepines were 
prescribed for anxiety, which then was referred to as “neuroses.” Discoveries about the chemical 
composition of the brain and the drugs that could be used to manipulate were considered 
“revolutionary not only for psychiatry but for all humanity” (Shepherd, 2010, p. 206). Whether 
one interprets this revolution as positive or negative, there is no denying that modern psychiatry 
was established as a result of advances in neuroscience in the 1950s. 
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As it often happens in science, a concept that seems universal is suddenly found to have 
exceptions. Soon after advances tied to chemical synapse were made, electrical interaction 
between nerve cells was shown. The nerve impulse therefore seemed to contain both the physical 
spread of electricity as through a wire as well as active biological processes. The term “action 
potential” was therefore coined and the study of action potentials began. But it was also shown 
during this time that the speed of the action potential was not as fast as once thought. The fact 
that the impulse travels at far more moderate rates than originally believed had tremendous 
implications for psychology as the action potential seemed to “separate the mind from the actions 
that the mind wills” (Shepherd, 2010, p. 71), supporting Descartes’s dualism. This discovery also 
contributed to the materialistic view that the mind can be equated with the signals in the nerves, 
laying the foundation for modern psychology and behavioral studies.  
The Neural Basis of Behavior 
The advances in methodology in the 1950s also validated the “neuron doctrine” and 
showed the importance of dendritic function. It soon became evident that the nerve cell was not a 
simple functional unit as originally envisioned by the classic neuron doctrine. Neurons contained 
“complexity within unity” (Shepherd, 2010, p. 100) and did not function as a single element but 
had different properties in the dendrites and axons with several forms of graded activity. 
Theodore Bullock (as cited in Shepherd) in his review of electrophysiological studies during the 
1950s called this a “quiet but sweeping revolution” (Shepherd, 2010, p. 112) in neuroscience as 
it shifted the view from seeing the neuron as the only functional unit to new concepts of 
multilevel, multi-neuronal functional units, moving the field away from simple explanations and 
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toward more complexity and begging the question: can what appears to be complex and creative 
processes in the brain be studied and explained by the linear approach of science?  
 In addition to methodology, biological preparation advanced greatly in the 1950s. 
Science has long used nature, animals specifically, to inquire about the workings of human 
beings, and the 1950s were no exception in this regard. Many animals, including frogs whose 
electrocuted muscles helped neuroscientist better understand electrical signaling in the body, to 
the giant squid (video of the ongoing contribution of the giant squid is available for view at 
http://www.science.smith.edu/departments/neurosci/courses/bio330/squid.html) whose axon was 
used with the voltage-clamp technique that lead to discovery of the action potential and a Nobel 
Prize for the experimenters (Alan Hodgkin and Andrew Huxley), to the large unborn embryos of 
the sea urchin that illuminated how cell development occurs and how cells organize, nature 
continued to offer herself as the biology “to which a technique is applied” (Shepherd, 2015, p. 9). 
In fact, the story of neuroscientific advances in this era is overwhelmed by examples of what 
philosophers of science typically refer to “cutting nature at its joints” (p. 4) and then “projecting 
onto nature cultural assumptions, fears, and desires” (Harding, 2008, p. 4). 
The Rockefeller Foundation “whose benignant hand was behind the establishment of 
many research institutes around the world and many travelling fellowships in the early part of the 
century” (Shepherd, 2010, p. 235) also played a chief role in the funding of research in 
neuroscience following WWII in the United States. As part of the support factor in the discovery 
of neuroscience, these grants funded further research of the giant squid axon, resulting in the 
Hodgkin-Huxley Action Potential model that then opened the door for a physical basis to 
experimentally test neuroscientific theories for decades. Thus began “the hunt” (Shepherd, 2010, 
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p. 83) in the 1950s for the identification of other molecular structures and physiology of the 
nervous system, bringing many scientists to fame at the expense, one would imagine, of many 
more giant squids and other animals. Shepherd professes that the history of neuroscience extends 
across all species and provides a table (see Table 2) of the specific species of vertebrates and 
invertebrates “utilized in research through the 1950s” (Harding, 2008, p. 6). The mere title of the 
table “Species Investigated in Neuroscience” reveals the unchallenged power given to man and 
to science over all other species. Nowhere is there evidence to be found of the profound love for 
the world of which Freire speaks when he insists, “the naming of the world, which is an act of 
creation and re-creation, is not possible if it is not infused with love” (Freire, 2000, p. 87). In 
Shepherd’s history, careerism at the expense of separating humankind from nature, for purposes 
of domination, seems more paramount than a life-affirming ecological praxis that places the 
scientist where he belongs, within nature.  
Learning and Memory 
The 1950s also marked the physiological study of the human cortex. Surgical removal of 
cortical tissue for the relief of epilepsy lead to the mapping of the human cortex and pushing 
recording microelectrodes into the unknown territories of the major cortical systems, resulting in 
the homunculus or map of the cortex. But this research more than anything, allowed for advances 
in methodology that specifically allowed more exact manipulation and control, in order to push 
the field forward. The control this research provided allowed scientists to begin to understand 
that the brain is not just a computer but also a gland. Neuroscience was therefore for the first 
time challenging the long-held position of behavioral studies conducted through laboratory 
manipulation.  
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Until that point, learning theory was the domain of psychology and was primarily studied 
by behavioral psychologists, who observed animals in laboratories carrying out tasks they 
devised (Boring, 1950; Mandler, 2011). The most famous examples are Pavlovs dogs, Skinners 
boxes, and Watsons conditioning experiments. In these experiments, the brain was treated as a 
black box, and psychologists argued that studies of the brain are not relevant to studies of the 
mind. In the earlier part of the century, operant conditioning as exemplified by Skinner’s box 
(1953) was the dominant form of behavior analysis (Shepherd, 2010), and motivation was not 
understood as intrinsic. Some have called this period in psychology the “bad period” (Milner, 
1999).  
Neuroscience studies in the 1950s, however—specifically those concerned with feeding 
behavior—were now showing that “the sensory characteristics of food transform themselves into 
a complex conditioned stimulus that guides behavior” (p. 151), suggesting a “learning of 
palatability” (Shepherd, 2010, p. 151) that, along with comparative studies, further proved that 
the brain is not just a computer but also a gland. Study after study in neuroscience was showing 
that the brain can self-stimulate. This shift had profound effects on psychology. With the advents 
in neuroscience, a “good period” began in psychology. It was around this time that studies of 
brain-damaged patients also began to change how scientists perceived mechanisms of motivation 
and learning. In fact, it was the study of one particular and now-famous brain-damaged patient 
that lay the foundation for the new study of cognitive science. 
The Case of H. M. and the Emergence of Cognitive Psychology 
Neuroscience considers learning and memory to be fundamental to human cognitive 
abilities. Much of what is still understood about these mechanisms today is based on the work of 
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Donald Hebb, who, in the 1950s, developed Hebb’s Postulate, reflected in one of the most well-
known phrases in neuroscience today: “Cells that fire together, wire together.” Hebb was 
influenced during his graduate studies in psychology by reading William James, James Watson, 
and Sigmund Freud. He was convinced that learning was the most important factor in 
intelligence. Armed with the new research and information on neurons and synapses, membrane 
physiology, fine cell structure, and the role of neurotransmitter and bioactive substances on the 
1950s, Hebb published his book The Organization of Behavior (1949), arguing for associative 
learning.  
Hebb’s Postulate asserts that when an axon of cell A is near enough to excite a cell B and 
repeatedly or persistently takes part in firing it, some growth process or metabolic change takes 
place in one or both cells such that A's efficiency, as one of the cells firing B, is increased (Hebb, 
1949). This biological basis for learning challenged pure behaviorism and the idea that 
psychological concepts were divorced from neural substrates. More importantly, Hebb showed 
that synapses have the ability to strengthen or weaken over time, in response to increases or 
decreases in their activity. This idea not only gave rise to physiological psychology and 
psychobiology in the 1960s and 1970s, but also lay the foundation of what later came to be 
known as the “plasticity” of the brain—neuroscience’s most revolutionary contribution to 
education.  
Hebb therefore established what later became cognitive psychology in the 1980s, which 
directly informs how we think about teaching and learning in education today. For this reason, 
his book is considered by some to be as influential in the history of biology as Darwin’s On the 
Origin of Species (Shepherd, 2010). Hebb’s influence on what we, today, considered 
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foundational in our understanding of cognition, learning, and memory, continued with his 
graduate student, Brenda Milner. Milner’s work with H. M. (perhaps the most famous patient in 
the history of brain science) is well documented and well known. William Scoville, the man who 
performed the doomed psychosurgery on H. M., called in Milner on the case because of her 
background and expertise analyzing the effects of brain lesions and the insights this might 
provide into brain mechanisms.  
 While most who have taken a course in cognitive psychology have heard of H. M., it is 
important to also reveal what is known about William Scoville as he demonstrates the “clinical 
gaze” (Jacyna & Casper, 2012, p. 1) of doctors and scientists toward disease and also toward 
patients. Scoville was a practicing neurosurgeon who based his work on neurosurgeries 
conducted on a chimpanzee named Becky whose vicious behavior became docile after the 
removal of her frontal lobes. Scoville, who completed his undergraduate work at Yale, finished 
his medical degree at Penn, and trained in neurosurgery at Harvard, had a sober academic record 
but also an insatiable ego and sometimes “unchecked emotions” (Shepherd, 2010, p. 170). In a 
story that reads like a desire to play god, Scoville, who seemed to take particular pleasure in 
administering frontal leucotomies, performed the surgery on H. M. on September 1, 1953, 
despite having shown only some success with previous patients who had undergone the 
procedure. It should be noted here that the procedure, known as “frontal leucotomy,” gained 
prominence as a treatment for schizophrenic patients and was particularly taken up in the United 
States, where “by early 1950s some 10,000 operations had been performed” (Shepherd, 2010, 
p.169).  
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H. M. had come to Scoville with his family because of seizures he was experiencing after 
a childhood biking accident. When Scoville recommended the operation, H. M. had already 
completed his education and held a job but had to fight drowsiness, a complication from the 
medication he was taking. What happens next is one of the most famous stories in modern 
science. Following an operation that went well and was initially deemed successful, H. M. 
suffered severe memory loss, including anterograde amnesia. He could not remember anything 
up to 3 years before the accident and would never again be able to form a new memory. Stunned 
and distressed, Scoville called in Milner to evaluate H. M.’s “undesirable side effects” 
(Shepherd, 2010, p. 171). 
What followed was a historical turning point in neuroscience’s understanding of memory 
and the role of the hippocampus. Milner and Scoville went on to publish many articles, noting 
“The experimental procedure was justifiable because the patient was totally incapacitated by his 
seizures” (Shepherd, 2010, p. 172). H. M. was invaluable to the field because his mental state 
could be assessed without complications of a disturbed emotional state as in the case of 
schizophrenic patients studied before him. Milner spent her lifetime “studying” H. M. and 
earning herself recognition as a co-founder, along with Hebb, of cognitive neuroscience. On 
December 2, 2008, The New York Times revealed H. M.’s identity in his obituary and recognized 
Henry Gustav Molaison as “the most important patient in the history of brain science. As a 
participant in hundreds of studies, he helped scientists understand the biology of learning 
memory and physical dexterity, as well as the fragile nature of human identity” (p. 175). 
The case of H. M. marked another turning point in the history of the field. In the 1960s 
and 1970s, a new histography of medicine began because of the tragedy of cases such as H. M., 
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who were essentially part of the construction of a category in Western medicine called the 
neurological patient (Jacyna & Casper, 2012). Concerned with how doctors constructed 
categories of nervous disease for centuries, these historians of medicine began to question how 
neurological disease is not an essence waiting to be discovered, but rather a construct with a 
discernible historicity. This view is not currently reflected in the literature on the history of 
neuroscience.  
The 1950s ends with what some call the second big advance (after the discovery of DNA) 
in the history of neuroscience: the rise of the digital computer (Wickens, 2015). The 
developments of the 1950s also created the new field of cybernetics contributing to artificial 
intelligence and computer-brain interfaces. Game theory also has its roots in the 1950s, as does 
information theory (Shepherd, 2010; Wickens, 2015). The promises of these fields moved us into 
a new era of big investments targeting the brain. Congress and the European Union have begun 
investing large sums of money into long-term and large-scale multidisciplinary brain projects 
paralleled perhaps by the investments into biomedical sciences in the 1950s. While these projects 
have many aims, one overarching aim is to “finally establish the true nature of the human mind” 
(Wickens, 2015, p. 372).  
Advances in Brain Imaging and Neuroscience Today 
 Advances in techniques continued after the 1950s with the introduction of the operating 
microscope as well as noninvasive brain imaging. Both these techniques pushed neurosurgery 
into the modern era but they also helped shift neuroscience, no longer bound to studying dead or 
defective brains, into other fields, namely education. The word neuroscience, though generally 
meant to define the study of the nervous system, began to be used more specifically as the study 
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of the human brain, after the formation of The Neuroscience Program (by Francis Schmitt) in the 
1960s, and gained currency after the establishment of The Society for Neuroscience in 1971 
(Shepherd, 2010). Soon after, departments of Neuroscience and Education began to form in 
schools across the United States, first as part of cognitive psychology programs but soon as their 
own interdisciplinary programs focused on the educational implications of brain research and 
how this research could be used to enhance student success.  
A Final Note  
It is not difficult to see in the history of neuroscience its epistemological parallels with 
the deep structures of colonialist consciousness: belief in progress as change and change as 
progress; belief in the effective separateness of faith and reason; belief in the essential quality of 
the universe as of reality as impersonal, secular, material, mechanistic, and relativistic; 
subscription to ontological individualism; and belief in human beings as separate from and 
superior to the rest of nature (Grande, 2015). It is also not difficult to see the implications of such 
a consciousness on schooling today, where independence, achievement, competition, 
consumerism, humanism, and a detachment from local sources of knowledge and nature form the 
dominant definitions of reality all under the guise of scientific thinking.  
 As may be apparent, important to this discussion has been the critical pedagogical 
principle of historicity, which asserts, “that all knowledge is created within a historical context 
and it is this historical context which gives life and meaning to human experience” (Darder et al., 
2009, p. 10). With this in mind, following the history of neuroscience within the larger historical 
context of the 1950s reveals two surprising features about this history. First, while it seems that 
philosophical developments in history have always influenced and even shaped the scientific 
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mindset, the fact is throughout history critiques of dominant philosophies have also existed not 
just in the form of non-Western philosophies but as part of the Western tradition. Thomas 
Kuhn’s critique of the historical accounts of science is one example. Hegel’s critique of science 
in Phenomenology of the Spirit is another. While Hegel did not dispute the validity of the 
scientific method or scientific knowledge as a partial truth, he saw the subject-object relationship 
as key to seeking truth within a totality of relations, but the scientific community seems to have 
conveniently ignored this philosophy (Aronowitz, 1988). It is in Hegel’s thinking that the 
feminist standpoint originates and later gets elaborated through the writings of Marx, Engels, and 
Lukas (Harding, 1986). Similarly, postmodern thinkers beginning with Nietzsche, Derrida, and 
later Foucault, Cavell, Wittgenstein, and others shared a “profound skepticism regarding 
universal (or universalizing) claims about the existence, nature and powers of reason, progress, 
science, language and the ‘subject/self’” (Flax as cited in Harding, 1986, p. 27). 
These philosophies and critiques all predate Shepherd’s book, challenging philosophies 
of science and arguing that European patriarchal dominance in social life “results in partial and 
perverse understandings” (Harding, 1986, p. 26). But Shepherd, perhaps due to his scientific 
training, seems ignorant to all such critiques. Even when discussing the ethical issue of the 
gender gap in neuroscience, the discussion remains at the surface level (i.e., we need to have 
more women in the field) but maintains the problematic mainstream notion that if women are to 
become scientists, they must first train their brain to think empirically and embrace a Western 
scientific epistemology of knowledge construction.  
In short, what is put forth by this history is a kind of intellectual fascism that promotes 
the epistemological power of the sciences over all other domains. In the process, it determines 
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what is legitimate thought, while ignoring challenges to scientific discourse. As such, knowledge 
produced as science becomes “the privileged discourse, and all others are relegated to the 
margins” (Aronowitz, 1988, p. 9). In this way, any critique or difference is rendered invisible or 
as acceptable in the margins, but nonscientifically acceptable. Hence, the scientific framework is 
considered singularly paramount to explaining facts (Shepherd, 2010). As a result, even 
philosophy “has become the servant of the sciences” (Aronowitz, 1988, p. x), despite the fact 
that, during the enlightenment and before, the scientist and the philosopher were one.  
 Second, after demoting philosophy to the “arts,” science seems to have also risen above 
religion in a genius way. In its ability to “identify the absolute with knowledge of nature, taken 
as a quantitatively apprehended series of appearances whose essential object is a particle that 
defies observation” (Aronowitz, 1988, p. viii), science has gained absolute power much like 
religion, but without the doubt. While in religious beliefs, those who doubt can turn to scientific 
methods or experience or reality as a way to escape the power of religious dogma; in science, 
because there is always the promise that we will eventually find a way to prove what is true, the 
power becomes more absolute than God. Herein lie the authoritarian epistemological roots of 
science that will be discussed in Chapter 4. 
 As a result, one would expect that as neuroscience makes its way into education—the 
focus of Chapter 3—education itself, like art, philosophy, and religion can be pushed to the 
margins of human experience and “become extracurricular” (Aronowitz, 1988, p. 9). The irony 
here is that the scientific methodology, much like dogmatic religion, actually trains our brains to 
“exclude speculation” (Aronowitz, 1988, p. x), except at the outset of the empirical tradition. 
This, in essence, limits our learning capacity, thereby training our brains to become worse at 
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learning. The implications of scientific empiricism, particularly with respect to neuroscience, in 
schooling and education, therefore, necessitate careful exploration and interrogation. Equally 
important is the consequence of science’s social structures on the issues of social justice in 
education.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
THE HISTORY OF SCIENCE IN EDUCATION 
While most would trace the beginning of neuroscience’s move into education to the 
advent of fMRIs in the 1970s (Fischer 2009; Fischer, Daniel, Immordino-Yang, Stern, Battro, & 
Koizumi, 2007; Jensen, 1998; Tokuhama-Espinoza, 2011a), the fact is the field has had a strong 
presence in American public education since its inception. Just as in other aspects of society, the 
industrial revolution forever changed the face of education. As a result, education went from an 
apprenticeship model, to what has often been referred to as the “factory model” (Jenson, 1998, p. 
2). In the process, standardization was introduced, allowing for the formation of larger 
classrooms and schools, where the idea flourished that everyone could be brought together in a 
single place and taught through a “conveyer belt” curriculum (Jenson, 1998, p. 1). This paradigm 
of schooling, already influenced by scientific ideas, both reinforced the universality of 
knowledge as well as science’s universalizing claims about the human brain.  
Therefore, despite the democratic ideals of many forefathers of American education, like 
John Dewey (Darder et al., 2009), the popularity of the factory model of schooling in America 
has mimicked the Aristotelian view of science that regards children’s brains as blank slates that 
should be molded and shaped by those with power, authority, and knowledge (Darder, 2012). 
Although a review of the history of American public education is beyond the scope of this study, 
one must wonder about the political and economic goals of schooling, in the same light that one 
must question such goals in the pursuit of science. There is much literature critiquing the ways in 
which schooling, especially in a capitalist system like the United States, reifies existing 
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economic inequality and class structures (Bowles & Gintis, 2011). What is noteworthy in this 
discussion is that  
the evolution of the modern school system is accounted for not by the gradual perfection 
of a demographic or pedagogical ideal, but by a series of class and other conflicts arising 
through the transformation of the social organization of work and its rewards. (Bowles & 
Gintis, 2011, p. x)  
The reason this evolution of modern schooling is of concern here is that the entire system 
has been grounded on a foundation of behaviorism wherein students, like mice, have been 
viewed as subjects in an operant conditioning experiment, in line with B. F. Skinner’s famous 
remark: “Give me a child and I’ll shape him into anything.” In concert, the institution of 
schooling has managed to shape children into what the workplace required them to be, all the 
while constructing scientific proof to legitimize their subjugation and deem inequalities as 
nothing but the natural order of things, given the inferiority of subaltern populations. In fact, it 
could be argued that the origins of neuroscience in education started when psychology first 
began to promote itself as a science, grounded in empiricism and experimentation. Prior to when 
the “physicalists” like Joseph Gall first began to shift psychology toward measurement and 
science (Wickens, 2015), “prescientific psychology” was led by philosophers who were regarded 
as the leaders in Western education practices. However, as a result of this shift, and long before 
science began to move directly into education, psychology sought to align itself with the field in 
an effort to establish greater legitimacy. Thus, as psychology moved into the arena of education, 
it naturally planted the seeds that later easily permitted the move of the scientific paradigm into 
the educational system.  
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Psychology as Science: The Measurers 
Many claim that psychology was born on a December day in 1879 (Hunt, 2007). On this 
day, at the University of Leipzig, a professor and two younger graduate students positioned a 
chronoscope on a table with a sounder, a telegrapher’s key, a battery, and a rheostat, in order to 
collect data for a dissertation project on the duration of apperception, or the time lag, between 
when a “subject” hears a ball hit the platform and when he presses the telegraph key (Hunt, 
2007). The professor, Wilhelm Wundt, and his students, Max Freidrich (a German) and G. 
Stanley Hall (an American) recorded the elapsed time on the chronoscope, thus marking the 
moment “the modern era of psychology begun” (Hunt, 2007, p. 140).  
Of course it could be argued that many psychologists already did empirical experiments 
attempting to measure nature since the early 1800s—Helmholtz’s measurement of the speed of 
nerve transmission in 1850 is one particular example relating to neuroscience specifically, as is, 
some would argue, Gall’s skull readings—but that experiment in that room in 1879 went on to 
result in a formally organized laboratory that became the mecca for aspiring psychologists and 
later enlarged to become the university’s official Psychologisches Institute (Hunt, 2007). Mostly 
because of this institute, Wundt is today considered the principal founder of modern psychology, 
which at its core aligns itself with the scientific method and studies driven by empirical data and 
measurement. Wundt is also credited with restoring the study of conscious mental processes to 
psychology, which had been at the core of the field from the time of the Greeks, though they 
were mostly explored through introspection. But the German mechanist, seeking to make 
psychology scientific, rejected introspection on the grounds that it was subjective and dealt with 
unobservable phenomena. Instead, Wundt became the leading proponent that mental processes 
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must be experimentally studied, claiming that “as soon as the psyche is viewed as a natural 
phenomenon, and psychology as a natural science, the experimental methods must also be 
capable of full application to this science” (Wundt as cited in Hunt, 2007, p. 142).  
Some years later, in 1867, even the famous American psychologist William James, who 
later, when writing about psychology, claimed “this is no science, it is only the hope of a 
science” (James as cited in Hunt, 2007, p. 160), is known to have expressed an interest in 
meeting Wundt (although the meeting never happened), writing in a letter to a friend as a young 
man in 1867, “perhaps the time has come for psychology to begin to be a science” (James as 
cited in Hunt, 2007, p. 142). Of course, in the midst of this view was a larger social and 
intellectual milieu that was also contributing to the emergence of the new science of psychology. 
The sociological studies of Auguste Comte, the growth in the field of anthropology, even the 
publication of Darwin’s On the Origin of Species, all created an atmosphere to think that human 
nature could and must be scientifically studied. But, while William James, with his eventual 
skepticism and dislike of experimentation in psychology, is considered the founding father of 
psychology in America, Wundt’s efforts to make psychology a scientific endeavor have endured.  
It is important to note that even Sigmund Freud, who invented psychoanalysis, was 
trained first as a medical doctor and created the practice with no clear historical or sociological 
explanation of how psychoanalysis suddenly came to be. In this sense, James and Freud, and 
even later Carl Jung, perhaps the most famous of all the modern psychologists, were actually 
outliers in their own field. It was, in fact, the measurers like Francis Galton and the behaviorists 
like Thorndike, Pavlov, Watson, Hull, and Skinner whose work had the most enduring impact in 
the larger society, and especially within education.  
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While Wundt looked for universal psychological principles that could be measured and 
applied, another prominent psychologist of his time, Francis Galton, a cousin of Charles Darwin, 
was looking to scientifically substantiate differences in individual characteristics. A firm believer 
in the hereditary basis of intelligence, Galton was the first to use mental tests (Hunt, 2007). He 
believed in the importance of measurement and published Hereditary Genius (1869), in which he 
gave an account of unusually gifted people and presented how their traits were more common in 
their families than in the general population (Hunt, 2007). The most influential of his four books, 
Hereditary Genius launched a new form of psychological research and the new field of study of 
individual differences.  
 While Galton’s anthropometric approach to mental testing died out rapidly, his studies on 
the biology of learning have endured in education. Moreover, Galton, who is considered by some 
to be the father of eugenics, not only initiated the nature versus nurture scientific debate, asking 
if intelligence was based on genetics, but questioned whether schools should be obliged to serve 
all students (Gould, 1996). Using the argument that no matter how bright or dull, our genes are 
not our fault, Galton argued that it is morally acceptable for schools to serve only those pupils 
with proven intelligence (Tokuhama-Espinoza, 2011a). Mark Baldwin’s theory, around the same 
time (the Baldwin Effect), proposed that learning ability follows the dictates of evolutionary 
selection, suggesting that learning occurs only when it is beneficial to survival. And so, by the 
start of the 1900s, there was a great rush not just in psychology but also in education to link 
behavior scientifically to biology and to measurable criteria (Tokuhama-Espinoza, 2011a). 
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The Measurers in Schools: Intelligence Testing 
It is ironic that it was, in fact, the beliefs in the democratic nature of schooling that 
introduced intelligence testing into education. In 1904, commissioned by the minister of public 
education to develop techniques for identifying children who might qualify for extra services and 
special education, Alfred Binet began his work on the development of what came to be known as 
the IQ test (Gould, 1996). It is not surprising that Binet began his work by looking to 
craniometry and measuring skulls, but switched his techniques from the medical to the 
psychological in hopes of better assessing reasoning and intelligence. After developing a series 
of tasks and assigning an age level to each task, a child’s “mental age” was determined based on 
how far an individual could get on the tasks. The mental age was then subtracted from the child’s 
chronological age, producing a number that determined whether the child qualified for special 
education services, thus fulfilling Binet’s charge from the French Ministry (Gould, 1996). 
Though Binet did not know it at the time, and never meant for his tests to be used on the regular 
population as they later were, the tests he developed had (and continue to have) considerable 
consequences in American life, especially in public education. In fact, soon, what craniometry 
was for the nineteenth century, intelligence testing became for the twentieth century (Gould, 
1996).  
In 1912, the German psychologist W. Stern made the case to divide the mental age by the 
chronological age (instead of subtracting it) creating the intelligence quotient (IQ) with the 
assumption that intelligence is a fixed, quantifiable, innate “thing” housed in the brain. While 
Binet continued to fear that his test might be misused, especially by school masters to get rid of 
troublesome students, and declined intelligence as inborn, the hereditarian argument for the IQ 
 89 
scale took full form in America, where the tests were no longer used for identification and 
remediation as Binet intended but to create a kind of “theory of limits” (Gould, 1996, p. 183), 
which shifted social policy and educational practice aimed at reification and hereditarianism to 
maintain social ranks (Darder, 2012).  
Given America’s egalitarian values, it is paradoxical that IQ testing for such purposes 
became an American product. However, the “indigenous racism” (Gould, 1996, p. 188) that 
resulted was in response to patriotic nationalism, which instilled fear about the nation’s identity 
as people from Eastern and Southern Europe were immigrating to the United States during 
World War II. Pioneers of hereditarianism in America like H. H. Goddard (who first brought 
Binet’s scale to America and then reified the scores as innate), L. M. Terman (who developed the 
Stanford-Binet scale at Stanford University in hopes of developing a rational society based on IQ 
scores), and R. M. Rakes (who convinced the U.S. army to test nearly two million soldiers 
during WWI, leading to the Immigration Restriction act of 1924), which paved the way for what 
was to become yet another wave of eugenics practices in American history (Gould, 1996). The 
results of these efforts, in particular army tests that ranked 89% of Black men as “morons,” were 
used to argue for “the development of primary schools, on the training in activities, habits, 
occupations which do not demand the more evolved faculties” (Cornelia James Cannon as cited 
in Gould, 1996, p. 261), not only limiting access for Black people to higher education but also 
justifying segregation in schools, since “A public school system, preparing for life young people 
of a race, 50 percent of whom never reach a mental age of 10, is a system yet to be perfected” 
(Cornelia James Cannon as cited in Gould, 1996, p. 261). 
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Considering the prestige that science enjoys as objective knowledge and mathematics as a 
way to “guarantee irrefutable precision” (Gould, 1996, p. 106), those in power can easily claim 
that their positions are free from social and political taint, given that science and the status quo is 
considered to be “an extension of nature” (p. 53). Therefore, to criticize the natural 
manifestations of science is to criticize nature itself, unless of course you can make the argument 
that science is not an objective enterprise but rather a social phenomenon influenced by culture 
and human error, and itself “a socially embedded activity” (Gould, 1996, p. 53) where 
“quantifiable data are as subject to cultural constraint as any other aspect of science” (Gould, 
1996, p. 59). But such critiques are usually met by being labeled as nonscientific, not serious, 
forever suspending us in “the twin myths of objectivity and inexorable march toward truth” (p. 
55) as we record and prove with certainty little more than social prejudice. In other words, it may 
be science’s enduring allure about its own objectivity that allowed Alfred Binet’s tests to win out 
over Galton’s, but Galton’s quantophrenic views won out over Binet’s (Hunt, 2007).  
 And so, psychologists of the second half of the nineteenth century came to be known as 
“the measurers” (Hunt, 2007, p. 233), intrigued by the allure of numbers and faithful that 
measurement guaranteed irrefutable precision (Gould, 2011); and their work, coupled with 
advances in anthropology, formed an “unholy alliance” (Gould, 2011, p. 106), forging a new 
powerful theory of “scientific racism” (p. 106). The fact is that science is rooted in creative 
interpretation, as is any human endeavor, and numbers do not by themselves tell a story. As 
Shepherd (2010) correctly stated, it is the theoretical framework of the scientist that gives 
meaning to the experiment, and once again, as in the case of Broca, the influence of the cultural 
context and preheld beliefs of practicing scientists were mistaken for objective truth.  
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 Of course, this durable ideology of science and measurement as objective has had 
immense and tragic consequences for oppressed populations in all aspects of society but 
especially in education, where children enter school with the promise of democracy and justice. 
The history of how the American education system has systematically reproduced, reinforced, 
sustained and promoted practices of social control and regulation is well documented (Au, 2008; 
Darder, 2002, 2012; Bowles & Gintis, 2011; De Lissovoy & McLaren, 2003; Lipman, 2004; 
Molnar, 1996). What is sad is that the overwhelming support for the over-testing of racialized 
children in schools is normalized because of the public trust in the power and objectivity of tests, 
numbers, and science, with little understanding of the racializing or colonizing epistemicides 
employed by scientists, who use numbers to substantiate and reproduce their existing ideologies 
of inequality (de Sousa Santos, 2005; Paraskeva, 2011). It is important to note that this history is 
very current, though today the term “measurer” has been replaced by “psychometrics.” As late as 
1989, for example, John Rust, who still directs The Psychometrics Centre at the University of 
Cambridge, gained the contract from the Psychological Corporation to carry out the 
standardization of the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children (WISC). The WISC is the most 
widely used test for determining children’s intelligence and educational placement worldwide. 
The test’s popularity endures despite mounting critiques of its reliability and construct and 
ecological validity (Stein, 2014). Similarly, centers such as The Psychometrics Centre at 
the University of Cambridge continue to be heavily funded in order to research and be involved 
in the invention and refinement of more tests. In fact, excellence in psychometry and the 
development of ever more sophisticated schemes for basing school improvement on 
technological advancement continues to surpass research on the actual nature of learning (Stein, 
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2014). Coupled with the power of expertise, this enthusiasm has helped psychometrics become 
the biggest proponent of educational determinism in history (Stein, 2014). Everything from the 
advent of SAT testing, ETS,  and the legislating of NCLB continues to build on this history, at 
the expense of subaltern children, in the name of objectivity. 
Psychology as Science: The Behaviorists 
As Galton’s eugenics won the nineteenth century, the views of behaviorists ruled the 
twentieth century, especially in America (Hunt, 2007). Again, the popularity of behaviorists’ 
perspectives was in sync with the era of modernity, in which the promotion of their branch of 
psychology as “the first truly scientific psychology” (p. 296) was fully embraced. Moreover, 
claiming that they could construct a psychology from totally visible and measurable events in 
animals (Thorndike’s cats and Pavlov’s dogs are the primary examples), behaviorist 
psychologists were finally able to do what Wundt had dreamt: “given the stimulus, to predict the 
response” (Wundt as cited in Hunt, 2007, p. 297). The power to predict behavior further 
solidified the view of behaviorists as grounded in the scientific laws of the universe and, 
consequently, “the laws of natural learning” (Wundt as cited in Hunt, 2007, p. 277). This 
phenomenon was highly evident, from Thorndike’s experiments and “the laws of conditioning” 
(Wundt as cited in Hunt, 2007, p. 277) to Pavlov’s experiments—generating ideas that were 
translated into laws of human learning and quickly permeated into the field of education.  
 But perhaps no behaviorist—or psychologist—left as deep a mark on American 
schooling as did Burrhus Frederic Skinner and his theory of reinforcement (Hunt, 2007). Like 
Broca and Wundt before him, what distinguished Skinner is not so much the credibility of his 
views, as the confidence and authority with which he believed and promoted them. 
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“[Behaviorism] may need to be clarified, but it does not need to be argued” (Skinner as cited in 
Hunt, 2007, p. 304), Skinner claimed, all while insisting that thinking is behaving and that “we 
do not need to try to discover what personalities, states of mind, feelings, traits of character, 
plans, purposes intentions, or other prerequisites of autonomous man really are in order to get on 
with a scientific analysis of behavior” (Skinner as cited in Hunt, 2007, p. 305).  
 It was during a visit to his granddaughter’s fourth-grade class in 1953 that it first 
occurred to B. F. Skinner that his operant conditioning, which allowed him to teach pigeons how 
to play the piano, could be far more efficient in teaching children than the traditional methods 
(Hunt, 2007). Operant conditioning can best be understood as a type of learning where the 
learning behavior of the subject is controlled by consequences. Key to this approach is the use of 
positive reinforcement, negative reinforcement, positive punishment, and negative punishment to 
procure the desired behavior from subjects. Perhaps it is the allure of efficiency within the 
capitalist modernist culture of America that aided the popularization of Skinner’s views in 
education, even more than the power to predict and measure. The resulting “programmed 
instruction” (Hunt, 2007, p. 309) based upon principles of operant conditioning, where complex 
subjects are simply broken down into logical simple steps and presented to students who then 
hear whether their thoughts are correct or wrong, coupled with provision or withholding of 
immediate reward or reinforcer, forever changed schooling in America.  
Since one teacher cannot simultaneously provide reinforcement to an entire classroom of 
children, new textbooks with step-by-step instruction and answers that the children could look up 
on their own came about. A “programmed learning movement” (Hunt, 2007, p. 309), in which 
teachers were systematically taught how to instruct through operant conditioning, was also 
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developed; the remnants of which continues to be seen in contemporary reform efforts in 
education. What is ironic is that as psychology began to critique and move away from 
behaviorism, opting for theories that allowed for more complexity—such as Gestalt psychology, 
developmental psychology, and social psychology—and despite advancing arguments for 
holistic, whole child approaches to education, behaviorism continues to dominate how we view 
teaching, learning, and testing in our education system. In fact, it could be argued that while 
psychology as a field divided into two groups of social and experimental psychologists, and 
social psychologists were never eclipsed by behaviorism as were the experimental psychologists, 
and that experimental psychology has, paradoxically, dominated the social expectations and 
business of education and schooling.  
Behaviorists in Schools: Standardized Teaching 
By the early 1900s, standardized tests were already being used in making curricular and 
eligibility decisions in American public schools (Darder, 2012). The impact of behaviorism in 
education, however, with its assumption and promise that all students are blank slates that could 
be shaped, if subjected to the right mix of training and accountability, led to the school system’s 
use of standardized testing as a way to standardize teaching. Ironically, much of this was done in 
the name of equity. Following WWII and later during the Sputnik era, education became even 
more competitive, with the desire to teach all American children in ways that could ensure 
American superiority. This competitive drive within education eventually resulted in the 
Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) of 1965 (Darder, 2012). The ESEA was 
passed as a part of United States President Lyndon B. Johnson's "War on Poverty" and has been 
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the most far-reaching federal legislation affecting education ever passed by the United States 
Congress.  
More specifically, ESEA constitutes an expansive statute that funds primary and 
secondary education by emphasizing equal access to education through high standards and 
accountability. And so, by using both the rhetoric of equity and closing the achievement gaps, 
public education under ESEA was expected to provide each child with fair and equal 
opportunities to achieve an exceptional education. Undergirding this legislation, however, was a 
deep commonsensical belief in science, measurement, and behaviorism, which proponents 
believed would change the face of schooling in America. President George W. Bush reauthorized 
ESEA under the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001; and, on December 10, 2015, President 
Barack Obama reauthorized the ESEA as the Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA). Accordingly, 
testing practices that had originally been meant to identify deficiency in children, now through 
the promise of behaviorist theories, became mandated practice for all children. 
The Culture of Special Education 
 
While this literature review is concerned with the impact of science on public education 
in general, it must be noted that science, namely the psychological movements discussed above, 
fueled a culture of labeling, categorizing, and separating of students, which shaped special 
education practices in American schools. The history of Special Education in America, which 
includes the counter-narratives of people with disabilities who gave rise to a movement against 
handicapism and the rise of what came to be known as disability studies and the social model of 
disability (Connor, Gabel, Gallagher, & Morton, 2008; Smith, Gallagher, Owen, & Skrtic, 2009) 
contains a rich literature far more deserving than what this study can cover. However, it is 
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important to understand that the traditional model of special education, which continues to be 
enacted in schools today, has managed to ignore educational critiques of positivism and 
meritocratic cultural ideals of the United States. This is so much so, that special education in the 
current moment continues to be deeply entrenched in the empirical and medical assumptions 
(Connor et al., 2008; Dudley-Marling & Burns, 2014; Smith et al., 2009) made popular by the 
“measurers,” while special education pedagogy and curriculum emphasizes the models put forth 
by the “behaviorists.”   
Many believe that special education, as we know it today, grew out of the landmark civil 
rights case of Brown v. Topeka Board of Education (Osgood, 2005; Smith et al., 2009). But the 
fact is, the field of Special Education has a 200-year history in the United States (Osgood, 2005). 
Moreover, the adversarial relationship waged with children with disabilities in American schools 
has been there from the start (Osgood, 2010); which actually sheds more light on the impact of 
science on American schooling.  
Despite the work of such pioneering educators as Elizabeth Farrell—the first person in 
the United States to bring attention, on a large scale, to kids with different learning needs and to 
try to systematically deal with their educational needs in the public school system (Kode & 
Howard, 2002)—the dominant belief of the education system in the United States in those early 
years was that the presence of children with disabilities gets in the way of the American school 
system working efficiently (Osgood, 2010). Labeled as laggards and later, as “morons, 
imbeciles, idiots” (Osgood, 2005, p. 6) officially, many believed that having these children in 
classrooms made the life of the teacher more difficult because they took time and attention away 
from “the normal children” (Osgood, 2005, p. 5). Deeply rooted in the belief that schools must 
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be efficient systems, the question of what to do with “these” children plagues the history of the 
field of special education; and some argue, the “age old battle of student-centered practices vs. 
efficiency and convenience in school operations” (Osgood, 2005, p. 8) have always been at the 
heart of the special education movement.  
Over the years, many have contended that behind the forces driving the field of special 
education are far deeper questions of meaning related to the very definitions of democracy and 
identity (Young, 2002), as well as questions of purpose related to politics and economics 
(Brantlinger, 2006). Recognizing the positivist and meritocratic cultural ideals of the United 
States is therefore critical to understanding the empirical and medical assumptions (Connor et al., 
2008; Dudley-Marling & Burns, 2014; Smith et al., 2009) that form special education as a field. 
In fact, the traditional model of special education that persists in schools today, despite such 
radical movements as the disability and inclusion movements in more recent years (Connor et al., 
2008; Smith et al., 2009), follows the scientific method and has its roots in the neuroscientific 
evidence of the late 1800s.  
Later, as in the case of general education, special education began to rely more and more 
heavily on testing and diagnosis of children in order to appropriately place them with the 
intention of predicting, diagnosing, controlling, and fixing students at best and marginalizing and 
segregating them at worst (Slee, 1998), when they are not able to fit in the dominant system of 
education. This trend, which eventually led to not only the overrepresentation but also 
misrepresentation of students of color and English language learners in special education 
(Artiles, Rueda, Salazar, & Higareda, 2002; Artiles & Trent, 1994; Connor et al., 2008; Skrtic, 
1991) has its roots in neuroscience and phrenology. Hence, one could argue that neuroscience 
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has done more to damage the democratic ideals of American schooling than to support or 
cultivate them.  
Psychology as Science: The Cognitivists 
 The dominance of experimental psychology within cognitive psychology effectively laid 
the ground for the official entrance of neuroscience into education and later the Mind, Brain, and 
Education movement. Trained in behaviorism and experimental psychology, George A. Miller 
started the first department of Cognitive Psychology at Harvard University in 1960, thus 
beginning a movement that fundamentally changed and zealously led the field ever since (Hunt, 
2007). Behaviorists, until then, like neuroscientists, had primarily focused on rats and mazes and 
electric impulses. This new scientific flurry, which came to be known in psychology as “the 
cognitive revolution” (Hunt, 2007, p. 592), shifted the focus of the field to experimentation with 
higher human mental processes.  
Many factors combined to lead to this shift in the field. Within psychology itself, 
Gestaltists, personality researchers, developmentalists, and social as well as Freudian 
psychoanalysts had brought much attention to higher mental processes, since behaviorist ideas 
first surfaced. It is important to note, however, that none of these groups had the tools to measure 
the processes they studied. Once again, as Shepherd (2010) has argued, in science it is new 
methodology, tools, and techniques, allowing more precise measurement, that pushes the field 
forward. Two methods—advances in computer science and imaging techniques—along with 
advances in drugs and biomarkers, became the driving force behind the development of cognitive 
psychology. These methods pushed the field to the point where “some expected it to replace the 
field of psychology” (Hunt, 2007, p. 593) altogether. 
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 Following WWII, where allied forces urgently needed computers to calculate large sets 
of numbers, the field of computer science was born. In 1948, the idea that a computer functions 
like the human mind resulted in an explosion of research and funding in the field (Hunt, 2007). 
The first artificial intelligence program (Logic Theorist) was formed during the 1950s as 
advances in neuroscience were also taking place; and, by the late 1970s, cognitive psychology, 
along with the related fields of mathematics, psycholinguistics, computer science, neuroscience, 
and anthropology came to be known collectively as “cognitive science” (Hunt, 2007). The 
interdisciplinary nature of cognitive science mimics that of MBE as later some argued that 
efforts to combine neuroscience and education should remain part of cognitive psychology 
(Bruer, 1997). However, it was the advances in imaging techniques that brought about the 
“cognitive neuroscience revolution” on the heels of the “cognitive revolution” (Hunt, 2007, p. 
598). Most of the literature on the history of MBE begins in the 1970s; with the invention of 
imaging techniques, there was once again a resurgence of empirical efforts to quantitatively 
measure natural phenomena, in this case, mental processes. This resurgence, moreover, was 
responsible for pushing the field forward.  
While behavioral neuroscientists had attempted to surgically manipulate brains in order 
to link it to behavior, now scientists were able to measure the workings of the brain in a living 
human being. Before the 1980s, the electroencephalogram (EEG) was used to measure the 
electrical output of the brain, but in the 1980s several new advances were made as the PET 
(positive emission tomography) scan, and CAT (computerized axial tomography) scans allowed 
the measure of blood flow. By far, the most important tool, the MRI (magnetic resonance 
imaging) and its sub-tool the fMRI (functional magnetic resonance imaging) allowed scientists to 
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observe the brain while it worked. These techniques, especially the fMRI, had profound 
implications for education, as scientist could now study the brain as it set out to learn. Thus the 
fMRI became “the workhorse of cognitive neuroscience” (Hunt, 2007, p. 604) and promised to 
replace old school pen and paper IQ tests in the everlasting quest to label and categorize human 
brains, but now at the molecular level. Data from imaging also promised to end, once and for all, 
the ancient debate about body and mind, by explaining mental processes in terms of material 
substances and events.  
These advances, which came largely out of neuroscience, also gave cognitive 
psychologists dominance in their own field because their measurements now legitimized their 
field as a real science. In the 1970s, a number of neuroscientists began to explicitly link brain 
functioning to education and learning. One of the most notable scientists, Michael Posner 
(Peterson, Fox, Posner, Mintun & Raichle, 1998; Posner, 1980; Posner & Boies, 1971; Posner & 
Raichle, 1994;), conducted research on attention, memory, and sound processing, and made 
notable contributions to the field of educational neuropsychology, a precursory field to MBE, 
which sought to merge education, neuroscience and psychology (Tokuhama-Espinoza, 2011a). 
Soon, cognitive psychology, armed with quantitative data, marched into the larger public sphere, 
including education. For example, learning specialists often use a commercial program based on 
Michael Posner’s work to aid in the remediation of specific language and sound processing 
difficulties. Unfortunately, in my own practice, I have found that the use of this program, which 
is advertised for almost all learning problems, is actually not appropriate for many children.  
The 1980s became “the last hurrah of brain-free psychology” (Hunt, 2007, p. 602), 
setting the stage for what President George W. Bush later termed, “the decade of the brain” (See 
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Presidential Proclamation 6158 http://www.loc.gov/loc/brain/proclaim.html) in the 1990s. In 
1983, a new paradigm the combined brain function and educational practice was established. 
While many trace the roots of the coming together of neuroscience and education to Howard 
Gardner’s book Frames of Mind: The Theory of Multiple Intelligences (1983), it was the 
argument put forth by Leslie Hart (1983) in her book Human Brain and Human Learning—
where she argued that education threatened cognitive processes—that lit the flame for both fear 
and excitement, fueling a completely new field of neuroscience and education. Nonetheless, both 
of these books, because they were written first with the educator in mind, influenced those in 
educational circles to truly take note of the brain–learning connection in the teaching profession. 
Soon, the word brain became popular as a new genre of books emerged, but this time the 
funding for academic fields was not that of the earlier post-war era government grants but from 
pharmaceutical companies pouring a massive influx of dollars into brain research to see who 
would find the next Coumadin, Zoloft, Celebrex, or Viagra (Jensen, 2008). This interest resulted 
in the establishment of the first departments of Neuroscience and Education. It is important to 
note that most of these departments were housed within departments of cognitive psychology, 
although in 1990 the first undergraduate educational degree in educational neuroscience was 
instituted at Dartmouth College, which incidentally also held the oldest doctorate program in the 
nation in psychological and brain science (Tokuhama-Espinoza, 2011a). 
However, the merger between neuroscience and education proved difficult from the start, 
and there were many objections from the field of cognitive psychology, especially stating that 
the aim to connect the two fields was too lofty a goal and that all efforts should be kept under the 
umbrella of cognitive psychology (Bruer, 1997), which had established a strong reputation as a 
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credible offshoot of experimental science. Nevertheless, as interest in the brain grew, the new 
field of Mind, Brain, and Education began to take shape, creating a separate research niche 
within the field of education. 
The Cognitivists in Schools: Mind, Brain, and Education   
Before the first dissertation on MBE science, entitled Neuroeducation: Brain Compatible 
Learning Strategies was written by O’Dell in 1981 (Tokuhama-Espinosa, 2011a), many different 
terms were used to define the field: brain-based teaching, brain-based education, educational 
neuroscience, learning sciences, educational psychology, cognitive neuropsychology, cognitive 
neuroscience, and educational neuropsychology. Many of these terms continue to exist today, 
even as fields of study; but it was in the establishment of the Mind, Brain, and Education 
program at Harvard University by Kurt Fischer that the push to bring neuroscience into 
education took its most official hold. But even after the establishment of the program, there were 
about three decades of confusion about how and if neuroscience and education could actually 
coexist. 
From its inception, MBE set out to distinguish itself from neuroscience and education by 
rejecting the idea of being housed in a department of psychology and by shaping itself as a field 
not just interested in the science of learning, but also “the scientifically substantiated art of 
teaching” (Tokuhama-Espinosa, 2010, p. 9), thus establishing itself as the Rosetta Stone for 
educators and researchers about all things related to the mind, brain, and learning. While 
“teaching was a simpler craft in generations past” (Tokuhama-Espinosa, 2011b, p. xxi) when 
only the wealthy aspired to education, today teachers face the challenge of teaching children with 
a wealth of differences. This shift in the demographics of schools led to the creation of a new 
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kind of scientist called the MBE scientist (Tokuhama-Espinosa, 2010). Hence, a neuroscientist 
working in a lab, a teacher working in a classroom using MBE-approved methods, and a 
psychologist using therapy to stimulate behavioral changes in a student would all be considered 
MBE scientists (Tokuhama-Espinosa, 2010). However, regardless of the neuroscientist, the field 
perseveres a scientific bias of learning as a brain function, and is built on the commonsensical 
assumption that “if learning can be well understood then good teaching will follow” (Geake, 
2009, p. ix). 
From its inception, MBE science also set out to distinguish itself as a practical field, 
concerned with the science of learning and teaching, claiming that while neuroscience and 
psychology have been helpful in establishing theories of learning, education has been left on its 
own (with no guidance from science, one assumes) to develop teaching. In this light, Usha 
Goswami (2008), one of the most prominent researchers in MBE working to secure funding for 
the field and impact policy, noted, “The identification and analysis of successful pedagogy is 
central to research in education, but it is currently a foreign field to cognitive neuroscience” (p. 
35). In other words, despite the rhetoric of communication and interdisciplinary relationships, the 
fact is a major aim of MBE has been to make education more “scientific.” The MBE goal to 
make education more scientific will be further discussed in Chapter 4. The point here is to 
establish that, despite its desire to separate itself from cognitive psychology, MBE was deeply 
influenced by and embraced a similar mission as the psychological movements that preceded it, 
in terms of its relationship to education. 
Similarly, despite the desire to emerge as an interdisciplinary field with the intention of 
communication between scientific research and educational practice, from the beginning, MBE 
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has been plagued with failure to establish the types of communication it aspired to, wittingly or 
unwittingly, preserving the gap between the fields (Beauchamp & Beauchamp, 2013; Bruer, 
1997; Bruer, 2006; Busso & Pollack, 2015; Campbell, 2011; Clement & Lovat, 2012; Fischer, 
2009; Fischer, Goswami, & Geake, 2010; Howard-Jones, 2008; Samuels, 2009). In fact, much of 
the literature of its own journal, Mind, Brain, and Education (established in 2007), seems to be 
focused on addressing the same questions that have plagued neuroscience and education over the 
years (Fischer, 2009; Fischer et al., 2010). It would seem, then, that while MBE aimed to evolve 
as its own interdisciplinary or even transdisciplinary field (Beauchamp & Beauchamp, 2013), it 
continued to grapple with the old science/education divide while also struggling to set itself free 
from the insipid language and conceptual problematics of bridges and islands (Fischer, 2009; 
Szűcs & Goswami, 2007). As will be discussed in Chapter 4, this points to the epistemological 
impossibility of transcending what Boaventura de Sousa Santos (2007c) calls the abyssal divide, 
as long as the same colonizing or hegemonic constructs continue to frame the research in the 
field.  
It should be noted that epistemological differences between science and the social 
sciences and how such differences impact MBE have been acknowledged by both critics and 
proponents of the field. Some have warned against “mixing” the two fields as far back as when it 
was first gaining popularity in the public sphere (Bruer, 1997). Dividing the disciplines into hard 
versus soft and pure versus applied (Samuels, 2009) has been one way to look at the reason 
behind why these fields can’t mix. The impact of these more general epistemological differences 
on how learning is defined is also discussed (Bruer, 1997; Campbell, 2011; Clement & Lovat, 
2012; Howard-Jones, 2008; Fischer, 2009; Samuels, 2009). From the point of view of 
 105 
neuroscience, learning is often perceived as being synonymous with memory (Howard-Jones, 
2008); for example, whereas educational ideas about learning are diverse and eclectic in their 
sources.  
The general consensus in education is that learning is the product of a variety of 
processes and forces that include not just the educational system (much less the laboratory), but 
also the students’ own knowledge, cultural influences, emotions, and values (Howard-Jones, 
2008). Using the language of “holistic and subjective” with respect to education and “analytic 
and objective” for neuroscience, Samuels (2009) further posed a question that echoes throughout 
the literature: How can findings about learning in neuroscience inform the field, when one group 
is interpreting the results based on knowledge as a constructed phenomenon, while the other sees 
it as memory tied to internal neurological factors. 
The issue has also been approached from a mind and brain perspective where it has been 
argued that neuroscientists hold a monistic view; the brain equals the mind; and educators hold a 
dualistic view, where the mind and the brain are considered two separate entities (Howard-Jones, 
2008). Another argument has been that the idea of brain science being relevant to learning results 
in a “category mistake” from the beginning (Bruer, 1997; Howard-Jones, 2008). In yet another 
critique, it has been pointed out that neuroscience and education each have their own academic 
“tribes” or “territories” (Biglan, 1973), making communication and collaboration across these 
cultural terrains difficult. As described by Mel (2002) for example, “pull the average 
neuroscientist off the street and ask them about learning, and you’re likely to get a response that 
includes such pat phrases as actively-dependent changes in synaptic strength LRP/LTD” (as cited 
in Howard-Jones, 2008, p. 363).  
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Aside from the epistemological implications of this language, there is the issue of 
language differences itself. When one goes into a new tribe, it is expected that one adopt the 
culture and language of the new terrain. It has been argued that neither field has been either 
willing or terribly successful at accomplishing this level of inclusion. Yet, regardless of how 
epistemological differences have been described in this “paradigm war” (Campbell, 2011), or 
agreements that an enduring epistemological barrier has made the two fields fundamentally 
impermeable to one another (Beauchamp & Beauchamp, 2013; Busso & Pollack, 2015; Bruer, 
1997; Campbell, 2011; Clement & Lovat, 2012; Samuels, 2009), what has not been discussed are 
the underlying values associated with these epistemologies.  
In a study that used 26 semistructured interviews with 14 neuroscientists and 12 
education professionals between 2010 and 2013 (all people who could have already 
demonstrated interest in both neuroscience and education), researchers aimed to find out how 
education and neuroscience professionals view the field of neuroscience and education. What the 
study revealed was that the dominant opinion of the neuroscientists was that the gap is mostly 
due to language differences between the fields, claiming that educators didn’t understand the 
language of science while educators mostly cited differences in the cultures of each field as the 
problem (Edelenbosch, Kupper, Krabbendam, & Broerse, 2015). Accordingly, the researchers 
concluded that cooperation is not apparent and that professionals in both groups demonstrated 
the type of incalcitrant barriers often noted in the literature (Edelenbosch et al., 2015). 
What is missing from the analysis of the results of this study, in particular, and from the 
discourse in MBE literature, in general, however, is what these differences reveal. First, there is 
no question of whether MBE should even seek to have an impact in education, given the 
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detrimental history of science in education. That is a given. In fact, it could be argued from the 
responses of the neuroscientists and the analysis of the authors, that the field itself views the 
contentious history of science in education as a problem of education not being scientific 
enough. Building on the assumption that educational research does not and cannot provide the 
best approach to many educational issues from its own resources and thinking (Blakemore & 
Firth, 2005), the implication of such studies is that educators need to become more well versed 
and educated as scientists.  
In one of the foundational articles in the Journal of Mind, Brain, and Education, where 
the authors answer the “why” question of MBE, they asserted, “It is time to for education, 
biology, and cognitive science, to join together to create a new science and practice of learning 
and development” (Fischer et al., 2007, p. 1). To make this connection and create this “new 
science,” the authors offered the comparison between medical research and medical practice, in 
order to make the argument that research must move beyond the ivory tower and into the arena 
of real life, such that “educational practices must be available for scientific scrutiny” (Fischer et 
al., 2007, p. 1). Nowhere is there talk of whether such a comparison could or should be made, all 
while the language of interweaving and reciprocity is seen throughout. Ultimately, the argument 
is that educational practice and policy must be based on empirical evidence, and MBE can now 
finally help the field achieve this goal.  
Education as Science: A Bridge Too Far? 
Perhaps no one has brought more focus to the issue of the gap between neuroscience and 
education than the field’s most cited critic, John T. Bruer. In his now-seminal critique of 
neuroscience and education, Bruer called the attempt to connect the two fields “a bridge too far” 
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(Bruer, 1997). While Bruer’s argument echoes others who have questioned the inability of 
neuroscience to produce “usable knowledge” in terms of curriculum for educators (Clement & 
Lovat, 2012), it is the phrase he coined—“a bridge too far”—that turns up in much of the 
literature in the field (Clement & Lovat, 2012; Fischer, 2009; Samuels, 2009) as a problematic 
metaphor that seems to have shaped MBE even as MBE scholars have struggled to separate from 
it. In suggesting that it should be cognitive psychologists who build and cross the bridge between 
the two islands of neuroscience and education, what Bruer (1997, 2006) inadvertently did was to 
reveal the banking model of education upon which the field is built.  
Further, even as MBE scholars debate this divide throughout the literature of the field 
(Fischer, 2009; Fischer et al., 2010; Szucs & Goswami, 2007), they find themselves in what 
Paulo Freire (2000) called a “limit situation,” or a situation beyond which people cannot imagine 
themselves (Dimitradis & Kamberelis, 2006; Freire, 2000). What they reveal is that, like Bruer, 
they possess little knowledge related to theories of education, which could potentially aid 
collaborative conversation between the two fields. Central to the process of learning in Freire’s 
work, for example, is the power of dialogue, which he defined as encompassing collective 
reflection, naming the world, and action (Freire, 2000). However, this concept of collective 
dialogue and what Freire called a “problem-posing” approach is not only missing, but also 
negated by the literature that attempts to address this untenable divide. In short, even as the field 
now encourages its scholars to “mind their metaphors” (Stein, 2015, p. 1) and move away from 
concrete notions of islands and see the field more as an ecosystem, the earlier literature in the 
field around this problem exposed the underlying positivist and colonial roots of the field. 
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In other words, the field of neuroscience functions from a Western epistemology that 
privileges mastery of or power over, protecting and privileging the place of science historically, 
as pure and analytical—a process Freire (2000) would deem a replication of hegemonic values, 
reinforcing separation, and preserving a hierarchy that undermines education. Precisely this 
epistemological limitation has created a “relationship of struggle” (Darder, 2014), making 
horizontal dialogue (the basis for just human interactions) impossible (Darder, 2014; Freire, 
2000). Bruer’s metaphor absolutizes the separation, creating polarity and hinting that 
neuroscientific knowledge is an object that must be carried across a bridge and inserted into 
educators. This, again, echoes the “banking model” (Freire, 2000), rather than an emancipatory 
view of knowledge and education as a constructed phenomenon that emerges from dialogue. For 
example, Bruer and those who critique him concentrate on the gap as an irredeemable problem, 
instead of a problem with the possibility of solution. From a Freirean perspective, not only are 
the two fields of knowledge not separate, but also the ideological separation could be engaged 
through horizontal dialogue, in ways that might point to a transformative praxis, which could 
potentially result in new and more expansive understanding (Darder, 2014; Freire, 2000). But 
this is only possible if mutual respect, dignity, and a liberatory vision serve as the foundation for 
such discussions. 
While Bruer’s (1997) major criticism is that neuroscience has discovered a great deal about 
neurons and synapses but not nearly enough to guide educational practice, his own language 
seems devoid of the epistemological understanding required for transforming the divide. The 
span between brain and learning, he contended, cannot support much of the “load,” arguing that 
too many people marching in step across “the bridge” could be dangerous. This language is laden 
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with the non-constructivist view of knowledge that informs the early days of the field and, 
wittingly or unwittingly, pushes the two fields even further apart, suggesting that communication 
is so impossible that a mediator is necessary. So even scholars in the field who engage and even 
reject Bruer’s metaphor (Ansari & Coch, 2006) seemed to miss the point that the possibility for 
constructive dialogue across neuroscience and education is debilitated in the field from its very 
core.  
The point here is that whether the metaphor is bridge, boundary (Beauchamp & 
Beauchamp, 2013), or ecosystem (Stein, 2015), and whether cognitive psychologists “inform” or 
“neuroeducators” (Fischer, 2009) “facilitate” discourse, what is missing in the field, even in the 
arguments put forth by MBE scholars who seem to be more aware of critical theories (Samuels, 
2009) and social justice (Stein, 2010, 2013, 2014) is a deeper understanding of the 
epistemological impossibility of transcending MBE’s colonial and positivist history. So when 
Usha Goswami (in Szucs & Goswami, 2007), one of the people consulted in the formation of the 
Common Core standards, used the phrase “the shaping of individual brains via targeted practice 
in the classroom” (p. 120) to describe education, the issue is not just with how words like 
“shaping” and “targeted” are historically rooted in both individualistic and colonial sensibilities, 
but that so long as the field is not decolonized—and not just metaphorically (Tuck & Wayne 
Yang, 2012)—it is in danger of continuing and even renewing science’s colonial history in 
education. 
The Decade of the Brain and the New Phrenology 
While the push for neuroscience into education was coming about in academia, the full 
impact of advances made by imaging techniques began to capture the public imagination in the 
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1990s. Much like the popularization of phrenology in America, brain-based learning (fueled by 
the same fervor to “measure” the brain) entered the business sector, where educators and others 
interested in the brain were able to take part in the many workshops (not strictly educational, but 
business-based workshops). In this context, phrases like “super learning” and “accelerated 
learning” emerged as the information age came into full bloom (Jensen, 2008, p. 2).  
As brain research emerged as the “holy grail” for learning, the “neuro-hype” resulted in 
an explosion of books on brain-based education aimed at teachers and parents. The idea was that 
teachers are teaching brains, so it would make sense that they understand as much as possible 
about the brain. But that idea itself is based on a scientific view that students are just brains and 
their capacity to learn is only tied to classroom information. Another reason for the interest had 
roots in the scientific view of pathology. Brain science promised to make clear for educators why 
some children have difficulty with learning, which from the perspective of disability studies, 
again, clearly put the problem in the “body” or, in this case, in the brain of the student (Connor et 
al., 2008; Smith et al., 2009).  
However, since science is already so deeply engrained in our thinking, it seemed 
educators—even more than the scientists—became (and continue to be) fascinated by the 
implications of neuroscience to classroom teaching; reflecting how they, too, though not 
technically trained in the sciences, have been socialized by commonsensical notions of science 
within schools and society. Many educators, such as Eric Jensen, Pat Wolfe, David Sousa, Bob 
Sylvester, to name just a few, became world renowned experts in neuroscience and education, 
pushing the field forward, writing books, holding workshops and professional development 
programs, and ultimately creating a new field where teachers “considered tops in their field” 
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(Wolfe as cited in Glick, 2011, p. xiii) were recruited to become coaches to help other teachers 
and school leaders understand how they might use neuroscience research in schools.  
Even Jensen (2008) admitted that he discovered brain-based learning in a business 
development workshop. Excited to transfer these kinds of learning in seminars to teachers and 
students, educators easily forget that this view is too simplistic, in that it ignores the context and 
history of the students. I have to admit when I first came across the promises of brain-based 
learning, I myself had a similar response. After years of training in scientific thinking, my own 
brain was used to generalizing from one case to an entire population—in this case, to all brains. 
It took years of work in the context of individual families and students for me to realize that it is 
not enough to even say that no two brains are alike (as in the case of dyslexic brains for 
example), the issue is that no two human beings are alike. Each child requires her or his own 
unique approach. Of course we can make some cultural generalizations, but they are always only 
a starting point, linked to communal life and the histories of survival of cultural communities.  
A student is dyslexic, beyond knowing that they struggle with reading, even with 
extensive testing that pinpoints exactly which wiring is impacted, there is no way to predict how 
best that student will learn. That understanding only comes with time and with getting to know 
the students and how their particular brain functions, the cultural and familial background, 
context, and history and the conditions of everyday world, which shape their lives. In pursuit of 
this understanding, however, I have to admit that, as an educator, I, too, soon became a victim of 
the brain-based economy. Targeted by myriad books, conferences, and programs, I spent 
countless hours and a great deal of money learning about “brain research,” much of it amounting 
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to little that could help students. Today, I spend much time in my practice separating the wheat 
from the chaff.  
During this explosion of brain research in academia, research from unrelated fields such 
as genetics, physics, and pharmacology also began to appear in scientific journals (i.e., 
Biological Psychiatry and Journal of Social Neuroscience) where Mind, Brain, and Education 
research was being established. Suddenly, lay people were equally captivated by brain-based 
research in every area of life, aiming to make connections between the laboratory and the world 
(Choudhury & Slaby, 2011). In the process, the term “brain-based” gained widespread use and, 
in education, came to be defined as: “the engagement of strategies based on principles derived 
from an understanding of the brain” (Jensen, 2008, p. 4) and a multidisciplinary approach based 
on learning in accordance with the way the brain is “naturally” designed to learn. The problem 
here, of course—as with the case of phrenology and IQ testing—is that the dominant 
epistemology still impacts how one views the world. Just as science has long explained natural 
phenomena using androcentric principles (Alcoff & Potter, 1993; Aronowitz, 1988; Harding, 
2008; Harding, 2004), so too can we begin to build a model of how the brain “naturally learns” 
based on epistemicides (Paraskeva, 2011), and then disseminate this knowledge as scientific fact. 
A perfect example can be found in Eric Jensen’s (2008) book Brain-Based Learning: The 
New Paradigm of Teaching. In a subsection titled “Survival of the Fittest,” Jensen (2008) 
referred to the old adage “You can lead a horse to water, but you can’t make it drink” (p. 5) to 
first criticize traditional educators’ views that if children don’t learn how to read using a standard 
curriculum, for example, it is because they are deficient. This view, he explained, is based on 
determined behaviorist ideas that assert: with enough punishment and reward, we can get any 
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desired behavior. As a brain-based naturalist, on the other hand, he asked: how can we make the 
horse thirsty, so that it will want to drink from the trough? In other words, according to Jensen, a 
brain-based educator would think, “How could I discover the learner’s natural impediments and 
built-in motivators, so that desired behavior emerges as a natural consequence?” (Jensen, 2008, 
p. 6).  
At first glance, this approach seems more evolved; however, it still follows a scientific 
approach that views the brain as independent of society and history, views impediments as 
natural and as part of the learner and not socially constructed, and is still ultimately aiming to 
engineer a desired outcome. Moreover, a few paragraphs later, Jensen proclaimed that the “brain 
is designed for survival,” and since it “operates naturally on a selection principle, can it still learn 
through instruction?” (Jensen, 2008, p. 6). Jensen, thus, raised fewer questions about classroom 
teaching and more questions about the conclusions being made about how the brain “naturally” 
learns. This book, like many others in the field, offers a series of lessons on brain physiology and 
function, then continues with individualistic and meritocratically based conclusions about how 
the brain learns, along with suggestions on how educators can help students “grow a better brain” 
(Jensen, 2008, p. 189). In short, there is little innovation offered by neuroscience and, instead, all 
of its reform suggestions retain the traditional underlying scientific views about knowledge and 
education.  
Somehow, even though we still don’t have a cohesive picture of how the brain works, 
there seemed to be little hesitation about the assumption that we know enough to change the way 
we teach, based on brain research (Jensen, 2008). A more popular example, related specifically 
to MBE, is the research on “enriched environments” that led to the development of the “baby 
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Einstein” boom in the 1990s (Tokuhama-Espinoza, 2010). Even though the scientific research 
later took back the claims that the rats in the enriched environments had in fact made more 
synaptic connections and admitted that the difference observed was between normal and 
deficient environments, the baby Einstein phenomenon which promised super babies, if parents 
simply enriched their children’s learning environment, continues to be a part of the educational 
landscape today and to generate millions of dollars in sales. This is just one of countless 
examples of how faulty brain-based education research began to capture the public imagination, 
influencing not just the private market, but also public policy and funding (Howard-Jones, 2014). 
The 1990s also ushered in the idea of the “chemical learner” (Jensen, 2008, p. 4). 
Whereas the idea of the brain as a computer was the prominent model between the 1950s and 
1980s, in the 1990s, the idea that the best brains are those with the “just right” brain chemicals 
took hold. This suggested that those with the right combination of brain chemicals—like 
dopamine and serotonin—would succeed, while “those whose chemistry is not quite right will be 
inattentive, unmotivated, or violent” (Jensen, 2008, p. 4). Such ideas fueled a whole new billion-
dollar industry of brain-alerting medications, mind foods, and smart drugs worldwide (Jensen, 
2008). The growth was international. The field exploded. In 1969, there were only 500 
neuroscientists registered in the International Society of Neuroscience; by the 1990s, there were 
more than 30,000 (Jensen, 2008). Diseases like Parkinson’s and Alzheimer’s were being better 
understood and treated, but now scientists could begin to also look for “the biological roots of 
impulsive and violent classroom behavior” (Jensen, 2008, p. 2), shattering conventional 
educational beliefs. All in all, the 1990s solidified that neuroscience was the next great frontier in 
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both research and product innovation; while the quest to use science to explain the mysteries of 
life also became the means for amassing wealth.  
Perhaps the most important discovery of brain science in the latter half of the 20th 
century, which contributed greatly to interest in the brain and education, was the understanding 
of neuroplasticity. Where science once showed that intelligence was innate and unchanging, and 
that the brain develops during a critical period in early childhood and then becomes static, new 
brain science was showing that many aspects of the brain could be altered (are plastic) well into 
adulthood. The hopeful implications of plasticity for education (which had of course always been 
there until science decided it wasn’t, with its limited research on intelligence) should have had 
positive repercussions. However, soon the research on neuroplasticity turned into a 
Frankesteinian attempt to create a kind of super human. About this, Glick (2011) wrote, 
Science has given us a solid foundation from which to be optimistic about the ability of 
the human brain to sculpt, change, and rewire itself through different experiences. These 
experiences can make us smarter, healthier, more engaged human beings. Plasticity 
makes it possible for the mediocre teacher to become the great teacher, for the principal 
who has trouble with public speaking to develop into a masterful communicator, and 
maybe, most importantly, for the child who sees school as a series of disappointments to 
see, instead, his own success. (p. 173)  
Armed with this research, there began a new economy of brain-based education, which continues 
to haunt the field of Mind, Brain and Education (Dekker, Lee, Howard-Jones, & Jolles, 2012; 
Howard-Jones, 2014; Pasquinelli, 2012;). 
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Neuro-Phrenology and Today’s Educational Landscape 
The neuro-education boom also fit in well with the accountability policies of No Child 
Left Behind, eventually morphing into what we see today as the call for Mind, Brain, and 
Education becoming one more “innovation,” promising new “tools to resolve” the “onslaught of 
issues” challenging schools (Glick, 2011, p. 175). In short, neuroscience has become one more 
reform-driven movement, now being sold as the new great White hope to fix the supposed failing 
American education system. In concert with this view, Leslie Hart (1983) proclaimed, 
Education is discovering the brain and that’s about the best news there could be . . . 
anyone who does not have a thorough, holistic grasp of the brain’s architecture, purposes, 
and main ways of operating is as far behind the times as an automobile designer without a 
full understanding of engines. (p. xi) 
The problematic comparison between children as automobiles and teachers as automobile 
designers aside, the very definition of education as a discovery of the brain is steeped in 
scientific thinking, exposing the framework that Mind, Brain, and Education is built upon. This 
is most likely not how most educators view their role, not to mention that for centuries we have 
not had a thorough grasp of “the architecture of the brain,” but that has not stopped the work in 
education. The point is that the push for the Mind, Brain, and Education movement from the side 
of educators as mediators has in effect constituted a “selling out” of the democratic principles of 
education once held dear; and, instead, issues a call for teachers and students alike to become 
more like scientists. This view is also echoed in the belief that if educators want to make more 
money or have the same prestige as doctors in society, they need to become more like scientists 
and neuroscience and that education can provide the path (Jensen, 2008). In other words, it is not 
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society that needs to begin to respect and reward those in the social sciences—which feminists 
claim is usually associated with the feminine (Harding, 2008)—but rather they must become 
more scientific or masculine in order to earn the right to respect and prestige. Therefore, while it 
might seem on the surface that those educators encouraging teachers to learn the language of 
science are encouraging communication, in truth they are advocating for a deeper acculturation 
and assimilation into hegemonic norms (Darder, 2012).  
As a result, where critical educators see love as part of the pedagogical vocation of 
teachers (Darder, 2004, 2015; Freire, 2000), these “neuroeducators” (Fischer, 2009) see their 
primary charge as agents who must “increase learning” and “analyze the learning organ and 
begin to understand how we learn” (Glick, 2011, p. 1). In this way, they can act as a “game 
changer” (Glick, 2011, p. 173) for students’ academic achievement, social emotional 
environments, morale, communication, and engagement. Hence, the belief is that “the skills and 
habits of mind we will need for the 21st Century are embedded in these practices and programs” 
(Glick, 2011, p. 176) promised by neuroscience. But it might be of use for MBE scholars to 
remember that the founder of American public education, Horace Mann, also believed that 
pedagogy should be based on sound scientific principles and his science of choice was 
phrenology (Cozolino, 2013; Davies, 1955)—the detailed study of the shape and size of the 
cranium as a supposed indication of character and mental abilities—which he regarded as “the 
greatest discovery of the ages and built all his theories of mental and moral improvement upon” 
(Davies, 1955, p. 85).  
In fact, there exists a sad but similar history in American public education, ironically 
among more progressive movements in the field, that shows the excitement over phrenology as a 
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way to educating all students, including those with learning struggles and difficulties that very 
much mimic the excitement around brain-based education today (Davies, 1955; Tomlinson, 
2005). What is most alarming about this history is that, in its time, phrenology was not seen as a 
fad but a scientifically based approach with the aim to emancipate (Bakan, 1966; Davies, 1955). 
With its “important cultural influence in America, especially in vitalizing many varieties of 
reform movements” (Davies, 1955, p. xi), one cannot help but see the parallels to MBE.  
Equally worrisome, are the cultural and economic conditions today that, much like the 
post WWII era, are producing a perfect storm, in which the desire to reduce humanity to its most 
basic and understandable units (alongside funding to do so), creating an atmosphere that can lead 
to an exacerbation of the problems we have lived with for decades. Neuroscience now promises 
to finally reveal the simple biological truths about learning, behavior, and education perhaps 
“with neuro-replacing the old psycho-" (Billington, 2017, p. 869) and even further back, the old 
phreno-. The aim, Billington (2017) asserted, is the same: “to police the boundaries of difference 
and to sustain exclusive practices, social and educational” (p. 869).  
So the question that remains is whether “the field of neuroscience has given educators a 
great gift” (Glick, 2011, p. 176), which allows, “stitching together powerful foundational 
understanding regarding learning and teaching” (p. 176), or is the gift a Trojan horse? The fact 
remains, whether all this is rooted in rhetoric of failure and the need to save students or the 
rhetoric of success and the dream to be superior (or more recently, as it has become trendy, the 
dream to serve all children), it is not an epistemological lens in line with a humanistic view of 
education. Today, as research into the genetics of learning has begun with the hopes that 
someday soon, it will be possible to select genes for teaching and learning (Blakemore & Firth, 
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2005), one must wonder if the need to make learning “less and less mysterious” and to make the 
art of teaching supposedly “more and more accessible” (Glick, 2011, p. 176) through a focus on 
the brain—at the exclusion of heart, body, and spirit—is nothing more than a veiled attack on 
democracy itself, despite the fact that the call is made in the name of democracy and equity.  
With this in mind, it is up to us as Mind, Body, and Education educators committed to 
justice to decide “not only [to] recognize this gift, [and] unwrap it” (Glick, 2011, p. 176) but to 
critically question the strengths, limitations, and consequences to the making of a more just 
world. With this intent in mind, the following chapter aims to utilize a social justice lens to 
consider more closely the epistemological roots of Mind, Brain, and Education and more recent 
advances in the field, in order to interrogate the social justice implications and limitations of the 
field. By so doing, the discussion will provide a rationale for the establishment of a critical social 
justice paradigm of MBE and consider the emancipatory potential of such a shift.  
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CHAPTER 4 
THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL ROOTS OF MIND, BRAIN, AND EDUCATION  
Epistemology can be defined as the study of knowledge, its sources, structures, and 
borders, and how knowledge gets created, justified, disseminated and legitimized. As the study 
of the historical roots of neuroscience and its move into education reveal, the field of MBE is 
deeply rooted in the empirical, positivist tradition. Epistemology is also concerned with how our 
knowledge of reality is essentially limited by the means and methods used to discern what is 
viewed as legitimate and, as the previous discussion demonstrates, MBE knowledge is 
implicated not just by the scientific method but also by the systems of schooling and academia in 
which hegemonic ways of knowing are embedded and reinforced across disciplines and within 
the larger context of society.  
Important to understand here, however, is that science’s epistemology is not just about 
the promotion of positivist epistemologies, or the ways in which this epistemology, which is 
predominantly that of the Western male and Western scientific methods, has achieved what 
Haraway (1988) called the “god trick of seeing everything from nowhere” (p. 581), but also that 
this hegemonic epistemology has been able to violently impose forms of knowledge production 
directly linked to the persistence of the coloniality of power (Quijano, 2000). Therefore, further 
exploration of epistemology, the coloniality of power, and the struggle over knowledge control is 
vital to the heart of this study. 
The Coloniality of Power and the Construction of Epistemicidal Knowledge 
 
Boaventura de Sousa Santos has eloquently argued that an “abyssal line” divides the 
hegemonic epistemological terrain—a line that depicts the global South as nonexistent. 
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Consequently, this produces deadening epistemologies or epistemicidal knowledge that bolster 
the unequal power dynamics necessary for the hegemonic production and containment of this 
nonexistence (Janson & Paraskeva, 2015). This one-dimensional consciousness, so to speak, is 
representative, then, of what de Sousa Santos (2010) termed an “epistemicide,” that is, the 
extermination of knowledge and ways of knowing that coincide with the emergence of 
modern/colonial structures of knowledge as the foundational epistemology of Westernized 
systems of governance and education.  
In other words, it is not just that the scientific epistemology is limiting, but that what 
science (steeped in epistemicidal values) has managed to do is to kill off all other ways of 
knowing. What this further represents is a coloniality of power, a concept interrelating to the 
practices and persistent legacies of European colonialism within both governing social orders 
and the production of knowledge (Quijano, 2000). Here, non-Western ways of knowing are 
absorbed, invisibilized, or destroyed (de Sousa Santos, 2009) by the abiding sensibilities and 
epistemologies of the hegemonic order (Darder, 2018) such that “the model of power that is 
globally hegemonic today presupposes an element of coloniality” (Quijano, 2000, p. 533). 
As such, epistemicidal knowledge has devastating effects globally—in sync with a global 
coloniality of power (Grosfoguel, 2011; Mignolo, 2007b; Quijano, 2000)—in that it is “deeply 
anchored within dominant cultural and class expectations—expectations defined by the 
interests of the economically and politically powerful” (Darder, 2002, p. 9). This has 
resulted in internationalized forms of cognitive injustice, which have supported attacks upon the 
very existence of racialized populations who exist outside of the global North (de Sousa Santos, 
2010). As Paraskeva (2011) argued, “The epistemicide needs to be seen as a world tout court 
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Western secular rationality spreading from the hard sciences to the social sciences and on to the 
humanities;” such that the humanities are “gradually being dominated by the prestigious 
Anglophone discourses (and practices), due no doubt to its associations with the power structures 
of modernity (slavery, eugenics, technology, industry, and capitalism) that impose a positivist 
worldview” (p. 3). 
What is of particular concern to this discussion of the field of MBE is the manner in 
which science’s epistemicides have not been limited to scientific endeavors. In other words, as 
the previous history of science in education shows, what the positivist and empirical tradition has 
done is colonize schooling and society as a whole in such a way that it has forced education as a 
field to also be absorbed into its epistemology, thus rendering invisible all other traditions and 
identities within the field of education in the West in the name of science and modernity. This is 
the reason that the more recent calls in MBE for new metaphors for the brain, such as an 
“ecosystem” instead of a “computer” (Stein, 2015), for example, or the call to replace 
standardized testing with cognitive testing in schools, in the name of social justice (Stein, 2014), 
continues to fall short of a true decolonization of the field. New research, no matter how novel or 
inclusive its models, will not be able to cross the abyssal divide and will, in fact, continue to 
widen it, unless attention is given to the ideologies of our society at large as well as Western 
science, research, and education’s powerful positions as colonizing agents of a divided world, 
with MBE belonging to this world.  
Similarly, it is crucial to take note of the way a colonizing—or what Edward Said (1978) 
called “orientalist” gaze—is implicated in MBE research about the other. The literature in the 
field is rich with references to educators as naïve and uneducated in the ways of science, 
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contributing to the production of neuromyths that sustain the superior and unquestionable 
authority of neuroscience (Goswami, 2006; Howard-Jones, 2014). Educators are therefore 
depicted as being in desperate need of a re-education by science and the insertion of 
neuroscientific research into their educational practice in order to lend real legitimacy to their 
teaching. The assumption is that educational systems without neuroscience guidance are 
“inadequate to provide an answer to the challenges of the 21st century” and must therefore be 
“guided by scientific principles rather than by intuition and professional wisdom only (or, worst, 
by tradition)” (Pasquinelli, 2011, p. 186). It is interesting to note that this rhetoric mimics the 
historical discourse of imperialism with respect to the colonization of indigenous knowledges 
(Cajete, 2008; Grande, 2015; Smith, 1999). 
Within a decolonizing approach to the exploration of a social phenomenon (such as 
MBE) then, bodies of research produced within the context of hegemonic epistemologies and 
traditional research priorities must be analyzed, deconstructed, and reinvented in order to 
dialectically posit decolonizing meanings to support emancipatory praxis and social change 
(Darder, 2015). Such an interrogation must consider epistemology as well as ideology and 
remain attentive to questions of cultural politics, the political economy as well as the historicity 
of knowledge in order to understand and prevent a repetition of oppressive histories. To do so, 
we must carefully consider the “abyssal divide” (de Sousa Santos, 2010) within MBE, 
understanding that this divide bolsters the imperial gaze and the empirical ideology of conquest 
that drives its persistent control over what constitutes legitimate knowledge. Hence, within the 
tradition of critical progressive theorists such as Apple, Giroux, Darder, Paraskeva, de Sousa 
Santos, and Smith, the dominant traditions and curriculums of MBE, fueled by positivist 
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dogmas, must be challenged in order to more effectively shift toward an itinerant and organic 
grounding, where new ways of knowing and emancipatory knowledge can emerge and unfold. 
Epistemology and the Struggle over Knowledge Control 
In her book Decolonizing Methodologies; Research and Indigenous Peoples (1999), 
Linda Tuhiwai Smith explained why the very word “research” is one of the dirtiest words in 
indigenous vocabulary. Inextricably linked to imperialism and colonialism, the word conjures 
images, she explains, ironically, of scientists filling skulls of indigenous peoples with millet 
seeds in an attempt to measure their intelligence (Smith, 1999, p. 1). From an indigenous 
perspective, or the vantage point of the colonized, Smith speaks of the collective memory of 
imperialism through the use of scientific research—a means by which the coloniality of power 
continues to be exercised (Darder, 2018)—where information about indigenous people was 
collected, classified, and represented through the eyes of the West based on encounters with a 
few; yet, resulting in the rejection of the knowledges and ways of knowing of entire civilizations, 
all while extracting and claiming ownership and propriety over them. 
In mainstream American educational circles, the word research does not necessarily 
conjure such feelings or memories, because despite the rhetoric in MBE literature about the 
different epistemologies of science and education, education in the West is itself built upon a 
positivist tradition. In fact, institutions of schooling are the places we all go to have our minds 
“trained” in the scientific, empirical, and positivist values of knowledge construction. 
Nonetheless, the language used in MBE—when talking about educators and education in 
general—is that of “imperialism as the subjugation of ‘others’” and “imperialism as a discursive 
field of knowledge,” and as evident in the brain-based industry and policy and reform 
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movements, now based on neuroscience as a current form of “imperialism as economic 
expansion” (Smith, 1999, p. 21).  
In this way, just as there has been a mystification of indigenous cultures and knowledge 
—or what Paraskeva (2011) called “indigenoustude” (p. 3)—so, too, there is a deeper 
mythologizing of the ways in which teachers practice as unscientific because, even though 
teachers are raised and educated under the positivistic educational system of the West, their 
messy human (and gendered) practices cannot be clearly measured and fall outside the Western 
requirements of legitimate rationality. These practices must, therefore, either be fixed or 
silenced. Scholars in MBE, often formally trained neuroscientists themselves, do not readily 
recognize their call for an interdisciplinary or transdisciplinary field, with its own curriculum 
based on the hegemony of science, as a form of “curriculum epistemicide.”  
What is clear from the literature and the goals of MBE is that “science” has acquired and 
perpetuated a “positional superiority” (Smith, 1999, p. 59) over education, based on the 
established hegemony scientific thinking enjoys. So much so that all educational initiatives, in 
order to be considered legitimate or even lawful (Bransford, Brown, & Cocking, 1999), must, 
today, pursue more rigorously the positivist tradition in now neuroscientific ways. Therefore, 
today’s scientific hegemony is not satisfied with solely maintaining its current dominance, but 
instead insists on engulfing educational practices even further, by way of its quickly evolving 
neuroscientific epistemologies. In this way, as the literature reveals, we observe what can be 
referred to as a “social fascist view of epistemology” (Paraskeva, 2011, p. 4), whose primary aim 
is to imperialize education, rather than “to develop alternatives” (Kliebard, 1975, p. 49) to the 
ways we think about the field of neuroscience and education as a whole. 
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An accompanying question, therefore, in exploring the epistemological roots of MBE is: 
To what extent do political and economic interests distort perceptions of the “other” within 
education, given the history of educational reforms based on so-called scientific research and 
evidenced based proclamations? As will be discussed later in the chapter, what soon becomes 
apparent from the literature of MBE is an underlying, hidden curriculum whose assimilation of 
the other (in this case, education) into the epistemologies of science is the underlying goal. How 
much of this goal is simply the result of the allure and legitimizing impact of science and how 
much is based on the embeddedness of the coloniality of power, where classed, racialized, 
gendered, and sexual hierarchies or supremacies of Western scientific domination fuel the 
capitalist aims and special interests of the field?   
As Paraskeva (2011) noted, what is necessary when dealing with conflicts in curriculum 
and epistemology is the recognition that to theorize a new field and a new curriculum—in this 
case for MBE—requires we  
(1) put into historical context the emergence and development of the history of the field; 
(2) unveil the emergence of a group of critical theorists within the curriculum field; (3) 
offer a new metaphor of the field as ‘a critical curriculum river’ that meanders 
extensively to help understand these theorists’ complex journey, including the battles 
fought for control of the field; and (4) examine and lay out a critique of the 
reconceptualist movement. (p. 1)  
Only then can MBE truly emerge as a new field, not anchored in any one discipline or in the 
positivist epistemology that has ruled education over its history, but as an itinerant field that 
follows a rhizomic model of “ands” instead of “ors” (De Freitas, 2012; Strom, 2015).  
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In short, what is needed in MBE is not a new and more sophisticated scientific 
educational curriculum but a decolonizing curriculum theory that goes beyond the struggle for 
curriculum relevance and beyond the tensions between science and education as described in the 
MBE literature, to assume an “itinerant position” (Paraskeva, 2011). Here, cognitive fluidity and 
non-fixity drive the struggle for curriculum relevance away from knowledge epistemicides and 
toward a different and more just path. But the question remains, does the field, as represented by 
its literature today, have the level of intellectual honesty required for such a shift? 
Education, Science and Knowledge Control 
 
No institutional apparatus has been employed more completely as a global tool for the 
control of knowledge than the Western educational system. What is of note in that system is that 
at the end of the nineteenth century it, too, went through an epistemological shift where the 
metaphor of “the mind as a muscle” (Paraskeva, 2011, p. 22), began to impose a new social order 
in the United States via a mainstream curriculum in which only institutionally authorized 
knowledge was to be diffused in schools. This move, which further solidified the culture of 
positivism (Giroux, 1981) was fundamentally concerned “with controlling and dominating the 
natural and human environment” (Wexler, 1976, p. 8), thus fostering cognitive passivity 
(Kincheloe, 1993) through a colonizing curriculum built on a persistent legacy of genocide with 
respect to all other knowledge forms.  
A dark chapter in the history of American education (and not limited to the United States 
but extending globally to all colonizing empires of the West) includes the outlawing of 
indigenous languages and cultures and the forced removal of indigenous children from their 
families and cultures in order for them to be “educated” in “modern” schools by Western 
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(superior) thinking (Smith, 1999) educators. No place is the politics of location (Braidotti, 2013; 
Haraway, 1988) then more relevant than in the classroom, where the battle over knowledge is 
played out by educators and where the dominion of science is presented as an authorizing corpus 
of knowledge, without being analyzed with respect to its perpetuation of cognitive and social 
exclusions. As Freire (1987) argued, naming the world is directly linked to claiming it and to 
claiming those ways of viewing the world that count as legitimate within the context of lived 
experiences —this speaks to the knowledge that has been systematically excluded and erased 
from the educational process of subaltern populations (Darder, 2012). 
In presenting itself as the overarching knowledge authority, achieved by a specific set of 
cognitive techniques that reflect a hegemonic society ruled by excluding norms and values, 
science has undermined other ways of knowing in order to shroud and eliminate conflicts that 
would normally catalyze new knowledge paradigms—paradigms that might question those 
formerly unquestionable epistemological conceptions of the world and the interests that inform 
them. In other words, science, has been amputated from its own historical etiology, no longer 
taught as a complex field of argumentation and counter argumentation based on contested 
theoretical and procedural frameworks, but instead as neutral and objective while concealing 
moral, intellectual, and political conflicts (Gouldner, 1970). Students are therefore introduced to 
a scientific methodology that lacks contestation of its objectives, its methods, and the foundation 
of its paradigms (Dreeben, 1968, Paraskeva, 2011). In this way, science is no longer an ideology, 
in Gramscian terms, but an objective applied notion that has done away with discords and is 
understood as the true sources of scientific progress.  
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This is especially worrisome in a field like MBE, where there is a push to bring together 
two systems of knowledge without allowing for engagement with the conflict that should and 
must arise from such a meeting. From an indigenous perspective, for example, “science is an 
abstract, symbolic, and metaphoric way of perceiving and understanding the world” (Cajete, 
2008, p. 494). This is in direct contradiction to the Western cultural perspective that views 
science as a rational way to solve problems. But these two approaches might share some 
complementary dimensions if they were allowed to exist side-by-side and engaged in the 
Freirean sense horizontally (Darder, 2015). Cajete (2008) likened this to “the sacred twins in 
Native American mythology, they are by nature intimately interrelated. Each derives its meaning 
from the other” (p. 494).  
Such a vision, however, is beyond the reach of MBE, where the gap between research 
and practice persists because neuroscience aims to install the rational as supreme rule within 
education. Yet, Cajete (2008) again has reminded us that, from an indigenous perspective, 
science as a whole is based on both the intuitive and rational minds. This perspective moves 
more inclusively beyond the “boundaries of objective measurement” and honors the importance 
of “direct experience, interconnectedness, relationship, holism, quality, and value” (Cajete, 2008, 
p. 491). These standards of Native American science are far more in line with the standards and 
values of an emancipatory education approach; and, more importantly, could work to transform 
the exclusions of Western science if it were to “allow for more holistic and integrated perception 
of itself to take hold and grow” (Cajete, 2008, p. 496); and, as such, perhaps the bridge between 
neuroscience and education would no longer be “a bridge too far” (Bruer, 1997). 
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Giroux (1981) has noted, “American educational theory and research became firmly 
entrenched within an instrumentalist tradition that defined progress as technological growth and 
learning as the mastery of skills and the solving of practical problems” (p. 5). This is precisely 
the kind of educational theory that the field of MBE wishes to advance. This “instrumentalist 
tradition” is now even more engrained within the new evaluative instruments made available by 
neuroscience, in concert with the definition of learning “the mastery of skills and the solving of 
practical problems . . . [as opposed to a] natural activity for all human beings [that is] lifelong 
and holistic” (Cajete, 2008, p. 496). 
It cannot be overlooked that even considering the question of the enduring gap between 
neuroscience research and classroom practice in MBE feels intellectually dishonest, as it 
assumes the question to be left open for discussion from different paradigms, including that of 
education. But, in reality, when answering the question, “What knowledge is of most worth?” 
(Spencer, 1860, p. 84), MBE still promotes the ideas of Spencer (1860), who pioneered a 
functional curriculum design based on identifying and classifying human activities that became 
the predominant way of thinking within the U.S. educational system. Accordingly, the field 
answers the question indirectly, by stating that “not science, but neglect of science, is irreligious” 
(Spencer, 1902, p. 45). The Spencerian conception of a worthwhile curriculum has had major 
repercussions on the U.S. curriculum for over a century (Paraskeva, 2011), and MBE falls right 
in line with Spencer’s (1860) vision:  
Science. This is the verdict on all the counts. For direct self-preservation, or the 
maintenance of life and health, the all-important knowledge is—Science. For that indirect 
self-preservation which we call gaining a livelihood, the knowledge of greatest value is—
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Science. For the due discharge of parental functions, the proper guidance is to be found 
only in—Science. For that interpretation of national life, past and present, without which 
the citizen cannot rightly regulate his conduct, the indispensable key is—Science. Alike 
for the most perfect production and present enjoyment of art in all its forms, the needful 
preparation is still—Science, and for the purposes of discipline—intellectual, moral, 
religious, the most efficient study is, one more—Science. (p. 84) 
This, therefore, is the push in MBE today, because if science rules supreme, then our very 
methods of teaching and pedagogy must themselves be scientifically valid. Neuroscience then is 
not meant to learn along or with education; it is not even meant to simply impact it. There is, 
moreover, a quest to obliterate conflict between the two fields, by assuming authorship and 
authority over education. Hence the gap is simply because the take-over of education by science 
is not yet complete. This echoes the sentiment of Smith (1999) when she argued: 
Imperialism and colonialism are the specific formations through which the West came to 
“see,” to “name,” and to “know” indigenous communities. The cultural archive with its 
systems of representation, codes for unlocking systems of classification, and fragmented 
artifacts of knowledge enabled travelers and observers to make sense of what they saw 
and to represent their new-found knowledge back to the West through the authorship and 
authority of their representations. (p. 60) 
This colonizing approach is found throughout the literature and language of MBE, on both the 
educational and neuroscience side. Science’s imperialism of course, as shown in the previous 
chapters, was, ironically, born of the Enlightenment period and its modernity project and then 
facilitated by the industrial revolution (which transformed schools into assembly lines) as well as 
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the philosophy of liberalism (with its focus on individualism), which determined Western 
scientific knowledge to be superior (Smith, 1999).  
How, then, can science stand to save education, when science set up the modern 
educational system specifically to discover, extract, appropriate, and distribute what it deems 
legitimate knowledge, in an organized, excluding, and systematic way? If MBE aims to move 
forward in ways that actually tackle the problems faced by our educational system, it must first 
examine the history that this system carries and dissect the relationship that exists between 
knowledge, research, and imperialism, instead of, for example, simply appropriating indigenous 
knowledge forms where convenient and to its own benefit, only to turn around and continue its 
epistemicidal project of colonizing the minds of teachers, students, and the educational system as 
a whole. In other words, it is science, with its hidden curriculum—that, on one hand, promotes 
itself as ideologically neutral and, on the other, harkens positional superiority, as Said would put 
it—that is itself the source of the problem. 
The Hidden Curriculum of MBE 
 
So, if in both science and education ideology is declared dead, what has emerged is an 
Orwellian reality that has been both naturalized and normalized as common sense and embedded 
into the hidden curriculum of hegemonic schooling (Darder, 2012). Michael Apple (1990) has 
noted that the hidden curriculum consists of “the norms and values that are implicitly, but 
effectively, taught in schools and that are not usually talked about” (p. 84). Simple examples are 
the great psychological premises of American education: (a) that the aim of life is happiness, that 
is maximum pleasure; and (b) that egotism, selfishness, and greed, as the system needs to 
generate them in order to function, actually lead to harmony and peace (Fromm, 1976). 
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Similarly, widespread proclamations of self-esteem within American education, rooted in quasi-
scientific explanations, belie the underlying conditioned passivity of hegemonic schooling, 
particularly with respect to racialized and impoverished communities (Bergeron, 2017).  
Ironically, these deceptive notions are also the basis for the failure of the “Great Promise” 
of education in the United States (Paraskeva, 2011). The hidden curriculum, however, goes even 
further. As Ivan Illich (1971) noted, the hidden curriculum “adds prejudice and guilt to the 
discrimination which a society practices against some of its members and compounds the 
privilege of others with a new title to condescend to the majority” (p. 33). It is part of the 
bureaucratic and managerial functions of the school and serves as a place and ritual of initiation 
into a consumer society obsessed with the aims of science to explain, to conquer, to perfect, to 
demystify, and to own (Illich, 1971). Perhaps, this is why scholars who identify themselves as 
critical neuroscientists—who are concerned with the tremendous pace of developments in 
neuroscience and an increasing emphasis on using these findings to impact the cultural and the 
social lives of human beings—push back against the hegemonic curriculum of the field 
(Choudhury & Slaby, 2012).  
But how does this hidden curriculum emerge in MBE? The literature in the field reveals 
that a major concern continues to be the gap between neuroscience and education as well as 
attempts to move beyond this gap. But what is missing is an understanding that this gap itself is a 
reflection of the hidden curriculum or the pedagogical unsaid, which aims to deform knowledge 
into discrete and decontextualized technical skills that are then packaged to serve the politics of 
ideological conformity that support the interests of big business at the expense of humanity 
(Paraskeva, 2011; Steiner et al., 2004). Giroux (1988) maintained that our systems of reason 
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“always represent patterns of judgments about the nature of knowledge, classroom social 
relationships, and the distribution of power” (p. 15). To focus on systems of reason is to consider 
the rules and standards that order the practices of curriculum and teaching.  
The field of MBE since its inception has struggled with how to bring together seemingly 
opposite fields, given the limiting positivist lens that informs its production of knowledge. Under 
this explanation, schooling embodies a style of comparative thought that differentiates, 
distinguishes, and divides (Popkewitz, 2009), preventing MBE from having the type of truly 
transformative impact that education needs today. This is partly so because the field continues to 
function unaware of its ideological historicity, when the fact is that “These rules and standards 
are historically produced, and function as cultural theses” (Popkewitz, 2009, p. 303) within the 
overarching curricular endeavors of American education. Along similar lines, Giroux (1981) 
argued: 
The hidden curriculum represents one of the most important conceptual tools by which 
radicals can explore the dialectical relationships and tensions that accompany the process 
of reproduction at the level of day-to-day classroom interactions...to make sense of the 
hidden curriculum means that schools have to be analyzed as agents of legitimating 
organized to produce and reproduce the dominant categories, values, and social 
relationships necessary for the maintenance of the larger society. (p. 72) 
Hence, to try to make sense of the hidden curriculum means that schools have to be analyzed as 
legitimating agents that labor to produce and reproduce the dominant values, and social 
relationships necessary for the maintenance of the status quo (Paraskeva, 2011). Therefore, MBE 
cannot break loose of its unexamined hegemonic intentions without undertaking a critical 
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examination and exploration into the dialectical tensions that accompany the process of 
reproduction at the level of day-to-day classroom interactions and the asymmetrical power 
relations that belie its democratic pronouncements. 
As Paraskeva (2011) argued, an accurate examination of the nature of conflict enables 
one to explicitly experience the profoundly political nature of curriculum content, unveiling the 
overt and intricate nexus between the hidden curriculum and the knowledge relayed via school 
dynamics. Moreover, for MBE to consider the gap in the field, it must first recognize that social 
change and progress emerge and are fueled by the dynamics of conflict. These dynamics cannot 
be dissociated from the curriculum as a mechanism of knowledge construction. With such 
dissociation, “there [will be] no union between the school and society” (Gramsci, 1971, p. 35). In 
short, any analysis that does not take into account the asymmetrical power dynamics that inform 
the pedagogical culture and political vision of the educational process within and outside schools 
is likely to fall into reductive and instrumentalizing conclusions related to student achievement—
a conclusion that squelches the dynamics of transformation or strategies of resistance necessary 
for structural change.  
Critical educational theorists (Apple, 2004; Darder, 1991/2012, 2015; Freire, 2000; 
Giroux, 1981; hooks, 1994; McLaren, 1998) have long argued that it is the job of teachers to 
work critically within their classrooms and out in the world in order to unveil the hidden 
curriculum of oppressive pedagogical notions and to reinvent and re-imagine a pedagogy for the 
evolution of social consciousness. In the case of MBE, this task falls not only on teachers, but 
also on anyone who identifies as an MBE scholar, practitioner, or “neuroeducator,” given that 
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MBE has always aimed to situate itself squarely as part of the larger field of education 
(Tokuhama-Espinosa, 2011a).  
Therefore, it is the job of those who claim to have an interest in social justice to work to 
unveil the hidden curriculum of the field, and “the tacit ways in which knowledge and behavior 
get constructed” (McLaren, 1994, p. 191), instead of trying to get teachers and students alike to 
comply with dominant ideologies and pedagogical practices tied to Western scientific thinking 
and its ramifications. It is, moreover, the job of social justice advocates who claim interest in the 
field to require that MBE be submitted to a wider form of analytical accountability, recognizing 
that 
the crisis of the curriculum and organization of the schools, i.e. of the overall framework 
of a policy for forming modern intellectual cadres, is to a great extent an aspect and a 
ramification of the more comprehensive and general organic crisis [of capitalist 
inequalities]. (Gramsci, 1971, p. 40)  
The conflict between neuroscience and education must thus be viewed from different 
perspectives. From a Marxist perspective, for example, conflict is actually considered be to a 
necessary source of social change and innovation. The conflict between neuroscience and 
education could be understood as a key dialectical moment for engaging the dynamics of 
legitimization and potential emancipatory possibilities. But this can only occur through a process 
of critical interrogation, one that begins by asking who is part of the conversation; and why? 
Who is not part of the conversation; and why? What kinds of issues are at the core of the 
conversation? Where are the voices of teachers and students? What is the impact of the 
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conversation on classroom practice? Who benefits from the “complicated” conversation? And, in 
which language(s) will this conversation be carried out?  
Challenging Epistemicidal Formations 
It is by engaging conflicts within the field where the potential exists to challenge what de 
Sousa Santos (1998) denounced as epistemicides. It is therefore important to understand that 
education is itself a positivist enterprise, drowning under a crisis of curriculum and a call for 
reform that stems not from a lack of empirical evidence in the field, as MBE suggests, but from 
the presence of the positivist tradition itself. In order for MBE to move toward a social justice 
paradigm, it must challenge epistemicidal formations within the field in a new and critically 
informed way. If we are to understand that the ongoing almost-epidemic call for reform in U.S. 
education has far less to do with not having the ideal curriculum (which MBE, through the use of 
neuroscience evidence, now promises) and much more to do with practices and curriculum that 
dehumanizes students and teachers alike.  
Hence, conflict in the field of MBE reflects the larger societal and ideological conflicts at 
work in a society where both scientific and educational formations reinforce and reproduce 
considerable social exclusions and inequalities. MBE will forever be plagued by this conflict, so 
long as we refuse to look at the underlying formations of inequality and instead opt to pretend 
that all that is needed is a more scientifically sound curriculum. With this mind, the following 
section examines the medicalization of education, the myth of development, economic priorities, 
and the language of conquest and colonization as epistemicidal formations that challenge the 
move toward social justice in the MBE field.   
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The Medicalization of Education 
 
As noted in the last chapter, throughout the MBE journal, comparisons with the field of 
medicine are common. In these comparisons, MBE scholars often point to the ways in which 
research and practice are thoroughly intertwined in medicine, resulting in huge improvements in 
treatments and interventions (Fischer, 2009). Other examples such as meteorology, cosmetics, 
food processing as well as automobile manufacturing, agriculture, the chemicals industry and 
construction are used to pose the rhetorical question: “What happened to education?” The 
lamentable answer, of course, is that education has been left behind; and thus requires a hefty 
dose of the medical model to bring reform to contemporary notions of schooling.  
Claiming that “every major modern business grounds itself solidly in research that is 
shaped by practical questions about how products function and how they can be used effectively 
in context” (Fischer, 2009, p. 3), the field views itself as the scientific and business solution to 
the problems of education. Despite staking its claim as part of departments of education, the field 
seems oblivious to the history of science in education, as well as previous attempts to “fix” 
education using both scientific and business models, with catastrophic results. Ironically ignoring 
scientific research that shows Black children, for example, are twice as likely as White children 
to be put into programs because of brain deficits (Children’s Defense Fund, 2007), the field 
forges on with a need for a new science (Fischer et al., 2007) to save education from its 
humanistic peril. Even more ironic, the comparison between medical research and medical 
practice is used to argue that research must move beyond the ivory tower and into the arena of 
“real” life, in order to ensure that educational practices are made “available for scientific 
scrutiny” (Fischer et al., 2007, p. 1). While there is no talk of whether such a comparison could 
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or should be made, the language of interweaving and reciprocity of the medical and educational 
fields peppers the literature throughout. 
These comparisons are then used to make the case that “Knowledge- and evidence-based 
approaches to education put forward the fact that educational systems are inadequate to provide 
an answer to the challenges of the 21st century” (Pasquinelli, 2011, p. 186), making the claim 
that scientific principles should guide education, rather than intuition or professional wisdom. 
Schools are regretfully deemed “to be a science-free space” (Hille, 2011, p. 63) with “no culture 
of applying science to the classroom” (p. 64), while others in the field call for integrating 
‘‘translational research’’, as done in medical research by “a special type of scientist” (p. 63), as a 
means to ensure “transferring” neuroscientific findings into education (Hille, 2011).  
Ultimately, it seems the argument is that educational practice and policy must be 
medicalized; that is must be based on empirical evidence, as the time has come for “education, 
biology, and cognitive science, to join together to create a new science and practice of learning 
and development” (Fischer et al., 2007, p. 1). In this way, MBE views itself as a vehicle for 
making education more empirically sound, by specifically seeking to introduce medical clinical 
approaches within classrooms. Interestingly, at the same time, in its 2002 Educational Strategic 
Plan, the U.S. Department of Education set a specific goal to transform education into an 
evidence-based field and to increase the relevance of research to meet practitioners’ needs, 
asserting that   
unlike medicine, agriculture and industrial production, the field of education operates 
largely on the basis of ideology and professional consensus. As such, it is subject to fads 
and is incapable of the cumulative progress that follows from the application of the 
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scientific method and from the systematic collection and use of objective information in 
policy making. (U.S. Department of Education, 2002)  
This demonstrates that the push by MBE is similarly met by a push by national imperatives to 
make education more empirically (that is, scientifically) based—thus more like medicine.  
But what the argument for this scientification formation of education in MBE essentially 
does is to bolster and enact, as mentioned earlier, what de Sousa Santos (2009) called abyssal 
thinking: 
Modern Western thinking is an abyssal thinking. It is a system of visible and invisible 
distinctions, and the invisible sustain the visible. The invisible distinctions are established 
through radical lines that divide social reality into two distinctive realms: the universe 
from this side of the line and the universe of the other side of the line. The division is 
such that the other side of the line vanishes as reality, becomes nonexistent and is 
simultaneously produced as nonexistent. Everything that is produced as nonexistent is 
radically excluded for it lies beyond the realm of what the accepted conception of 
inclusion. (p. 23) 
It is not difficult to imagine a future in which classroom teachers are expected to use 
neuroscience methods to diagnose normalcy on one side of the divide, making everyone on the 
other side simply irrelevant or nonexistent. Thus, scientific knowledge and modern law, de Sousa 
Santos (2009) argued, represents the most accomplished pillars of modern Western abyssal 
thinking: 
In the field of knowledge, abyssal thinking concedes to modern science the monopoly of 
the universal distinction between true and false. Tensions between science, philosophy 
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and theology are explicit although they occur just on this side of the line. Its visibility is 
based on the invisibility of forms of knowledge that do not fit into any of these ways of 
knowing. I refer to the popular, lay, plebeian, peasant and indigenous knowledges across 
the line. Across the line there is no knowledge, there are beliefs, opinions, magic, 
idolatry, intuitive understandings, or subjective, which, at best, can become objects or 
raw material for scientific inquiry. (p. 8) 
Once neuroscience rules supreme, fighting for the inclusion of children who are 
“othered,” or advocating for inclusionary practices where diversity and difference are viewed not 
through the dichotomous black-and-white lens of science will become increasingly difficult. This 
is especially true because this “epistemological disenfranchisement” (Connell, 2007, p. 109) is 
not limited to MBE. In education itself, despite small disruptions in the 1960s and 1970s 
(Bowles & Gintis, 1976; Henry, 1963; Jackson, 1968; Jencks, 1972; Kozol, 1967) that for a 
moment inflamed the U.S. curriculum field (Paraskeva, 2011), what persists is the culture of 
testing (Darder, 2012), which is being further developed into the push for “the shaping of 
individual brains via targeted practice in the classroom” (Szucs & Goswami, 2007, p. 120), as 
the new definition and formation of learning. All this is happening alongside the simultaneous 
demand for policy-making anchored in science (Alberts, 2010), which has become more 
vociferous in the three decades.  
Researchers who promote the push for neuroscience, with its medical formation, into 
education argue that “the objective of evidence-based education at this level is to ensure that 
future research on education meets the criteria of scientific validity, high-quality, and practical 
relevance that is sometimes lacking in existing evidence on educational activities, processes, and 
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outcomes” (Davies, 1999, p. 109). Such a reductive analysis ignores the relational and more 
encompassing vision of democratic education by failing to recognize its capacity for resistance 
and transformation of injustices within school and society. But this reductive vision is deeply 
ensconced not only in science, but also in the arena of education and educational policy.  
Accordingly, despite concerns in MBE about the field’s lack of impact in education, the 
fact is, the time is now ripe for science to enter education in even more exclusionary ways. This, 
unfortunately, sits rather comfortably in the field as well as within the larger society, given 
normalization of the belief that limited and faulty cognitive capacities lie within the individual, 
rather than as socially emergent conditions of a deeply unjust capitalist society (Augoustinos, 
1999). This echoes the traditional medical model’s orientation, wherein a problem exists solely 
within the individual and the physician’s task is to fix the problem. 
What is more, as Paraskeva (2011) argued, epistemology helps us understand that the 
knowledge of reality is inevitably limited by the (technical/scientific) means and methods used to 
investigate and discern what constitute truths. Researchers in MBE call for empirical 
investigations, which take place in real learning contexts; claiming that these are required, in 
order to establish evidence-based education. Even the language of “empirical investigations” and 
“educational treatments” and “empirical evidence gathered through reliable, methodologically 
sound evaluations’’ (Pasquinelli, 2011, p. 187) are is based on colonizing sensibilities that point 
to an absolute truth that is held in the hands of the scientific (or medical) expert.  
What is most worrisome is that if we create a new rule in education where only that 
which is supported by empirical evidence is valid, we are, wittingly or unwittingly, bound to 
disempower teachers and students who are now the “objects and raw material for scientific 
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inquiry,” pushing the entire field “across the line.” Unfortunately, according to Pasquinelli 
(2011), this seems to be the very aim of MBE, namely to lead the field toward:  
(a) the generalized feeling of the necessity of reforming education; (b) the idea that 
education is too much of a crucial condition for the development of individuals and 
society to be influenced by prejudice and bias in favor of tradition. We must know what 
works, and eventually why it works—thus establishing a fully scientific approach; and (c) 
the analogy with healthcare institutions and methods. (p. 187)  
But these aims as well as the language used to articulate them are the tools of conquest and 
control used often, as history shows, at the price of the misuse and destruction of nature.  
Some have also argued “neuroscience and any conjecture of ‘normal’, therefore, needs to 
be performed not just by neuroscientists but by social scientists,” and “those who will be at the 
receiving end of such theories and diagnoses and who are at risk of exclusion” (Billington, 2017, 
p. 875). But from a decolonizing perspective, the desire to reduce humanity to binary categories 
of normal and abnormal is itself problematic. Dumit (2011) noted,  
There are concerns in any studies which attempt to find ‘normal’ whenever in the 
sampling they fail to take into account, for example, ‘such characteristics as age, 
ethnicity, handedness, culture (refugee status), sexuality, familial histories, past head 
trauma, and medical history [which] are all still unknown confounders. (p. 201)  
These failures, Dumit (2011) further argued, “fatally compromise” many neuroscientific studies 
because “there are so many different definitions of normal, of who could be included as a normal 
control, and how explicitly their attributes should be noted” (p. 201) that attempts to standardize 
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a database ends up being a contrived affair and, thus, makes little sense beyond an ideology of 
social control.  
Yet these efforts persist, leading to the danger that “neuroscience will merely lead to the 
‘same old’ antics, generating new technologies in pursuit of a new ‘normal’”; and, as the field 
encroaches into education, “it is possible that neuroscience and education might ignore the 
opportunity to focus on the benefits of diversity and aspire instead to the eugenicist dream of 
unearthing perhaps just a few fortunate ‘supernormal who have no probable pathology’” (Dumit, 
2012, p. 200), upon whom we can build some kind of “utopian/dystopian future” (Billington, 
2017, p. 875). As this pursuit of ‘normal’ continues, it is possible, as has been in the case of 
psychology in the past, that new neuroscientific pathologies would rise with potentially more 
serious consequences (Hyman, 2010), especially for those already marginalized, while 
fabricating epidemics in an ongoing attempt to formalize diagnoses (Kutchins & Kirk, 1997). 
In this way, the science offered by brain images may not only be misleading but could be 
in danger of crudely repeating old mistakes. Of this, Bao and Pöppel (2012) argued, “An 
uncritical use of new imaging technology may open the door to a new kind of old fashioned 
phrenology” (p. 2144). Even if the images and “evidence” offered by neuroscience might not be 
misleading in and of themselves, their inclusion in education without critical preparation and 
engagement of what these mean and their varied impacts can “merely enhance the processes and 
procedures of psychopathologisation” (Billington, 2017, p. 875). MBE, then, if it seeks to 
present itself as a transdisciplinary field, must spend far more time and energy addressing these 
concerns both in the literature and within its practice. Moreover, about the folly of perpetuating 
such an exclusionary formation within education, Billington (2017) noted: 
 146 
The impact of a century of exclusion in education cannot be calculated because persons 
cannot be calculated while the value of human qualities such as dignity, respect and 
courage in the face of oppression is opaque to a positivist science. As educators, 
therefore, we might be well-advised to sustain our focus on the value of our own work 
with young people, the subjectivities and mind (i.e. as process) which lie beyond any 
scan. It would be a serious educational, psychological and indeed serious scientific error 
were we to ignore the void that exists between compelling images of electrical activity in 
the brain and the actual experience of persons which remain much less accessible to any 
form of neurological or psychological reductionism; “there is an abyss between 
knowledge and experience which cannot be bridged scientifically.” (p. 876) 
The Myth of Development 
As mentioned earlier, a major area of concern for scholars in MBE is the issue of 
neuromyths. The creation of these “biased distortions of scientific fact” (Howard-Jones, 2014, p. 
1), however, is mainly blamed on educators and/or lay people who are not trained in the sciences 
and perpetuate myths because of their ignorance. Article after article in The Journal of Mind, 
Brain, and Education make references to the dangers of neuromyths and the importance of 
guiding against them (Christoff, 2008; Grotzer, 2011; Lindell & Kidd, 2013; Pasquinelli, 2012; 
Tardif, Doudin & Meylan, 2015), as well as on the importance of “Educating to Use Evidence in 
Thinking About Education” (Newcombe, 2013, p. 147). Ironically, the tendency toward 
reductionism is highlighted in the discourse around neuromyths in the field, but without any 
discussion of the reductionist tendencies of science. 
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According to Shiva (1993), modern Western patriarchy’s special epistemological 
tradition is reductionism because it not only “reduces the capacity of humans to know nature 
both by excluding other knowers and other ways of knowing, but also because it manipulates 
science as inert and fragmented matter” (p. 22). In a way, such a reductionist mechanism is 
“protected not merely by its own mythology, but it is also protected by the interests it serves. Far 
from being an epistemological accident, reductionism is a response to the needs of a particular 
form of economic and political organization” (Shiva, 1993, p. 23). The mechanical reductionist 
Western scientific paradigm, Shiva (1993) argued, together with “the industrial revolution and 
the capitalist economy are the philosophical, technological and economic components of the 
same process” (p. 24). 
Yet, there is no such discussion in the literature on neuromyths in MBE. At best, one 
might say that scientific training has been so successful as to render these researchers blind to 
their own biases. At worst, one wonders if all the talk about the dangers of neuromyths is nothing 
more than lip service, as the field pushes its colonizing agenda of development. The irony here is 
reminiscent of the Plan of the Millennium where 10 or so industrialized countries through the 
United Nations appointed committees that involved research by distinguished scholars and 
prestigious universities. These then produced reports that raise funds to fight poverty; money that 
was—ironically—solicited from the same people whose wealth is founded on the corporate 
systems that produce poverty and whose policies keep it in place (Mignolo, 2011). “The same 
vicious cycle informs the fight against pollution and global warming” (Mignolo, 2011, p. 295) 
and, it seems, MBE, as well. In other words, the truest neuromyth seems to be the myth of 
modernity that would have us believe that our world can only be genuinely known through 
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dispassionate inquiries and transcendent postures of scientific neutrality, as defined by Western 
philosophical assumptions of knowledge (Darder, 2011a).  
Many such examples of the myth of development exist in the literature where 
neuroscience aims to make its case in education. A common (and far simpler) example of how 
neuroscience research has been able to successfully inform education, for instance, concerns high 
school opening times. Research on circadian rhythms in adolescence has shown that adolescent 
body rhythms are naturally shifted (Crowley, Acebo, & Carskadon, 2007), so that high school 
students find it difficult to get to sleep and wake up as they must, if they are to start school at 
7:30 a.m. What this research ignores, however, is the colonizing history from which the school 
system emerged (Bowles & Gintis, 2011; Darder, 2012), so that rules focused on productivity 
rather than human needs have forced adolescents to wake up against their circadian rhythms for 
generations. Similar arguments can easily be made regarding neuroscience’s other great claims 
of contributions to education, such as the case of remediation of learning disabilities (a construct 
created by science), or neuroplasticity—whose negation by science caused centuries of 
oppression. So while it is true that scientific evidence can also help us question our common-
sense traditions, we must first question from whence common-sense traditions originated, if we 
are not to reproduce them.  
In short, the trouble with neuromyths is not just that “the cognitive and brain sciences 
have been misunderstood, and misused” (Pasquinelli, 2012, p. 89). The problem isn’t simply that 
“there are many hypotheses in science which are wrong” (Sagan as cited in Pasquinelli, 2012, p. 
89), but why? Why does scientific information, even wrong scientific information, feed into 
“neurophillia” (Pasquinelli, 2012, p. 91)? Are the reasons limited to the untrained mind of 
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educators and the general public, or the communication shortcomings of the media, as the 
literature in MBE suggests, or is there something deeper going on? Are the dangers of the 
persistence of neuromyths and the appetite for brain news simply due to “deeper cognitive 
intuitions” (p. 89) that favor confirmation of bias or the tendency to seek or interpret fresh 
information in a way that confirms previous beliefs (Nickerson, 1998) limited by unfounded 
notions of hemispheric specialization? Or does neuroscience promise to confirm our hidden 
desires for power? Can MBE truly protect itself from the rise and dangers of “neuromarketing” 
(Lindell & Kidd, 2013, p. 35) and “the seductive allure of neuroscience explanations” (Weisberg, 
Taylor, & Hopkins, 2015, p. 429) without asking why it is that “by implying a strong scientific 
basis, ‘brain-based’ product names are remarkably effective in implicitly manipulating consumer 
opinion” (Lindell & Kidd, 2013, p. 35). In other words, how can the field critique and fight the 
engrained beliefs in the larger culture about the powers and prestige of science, at the same time 
that it forms itself on that very belief in the power and prestige of science as necessary for 
legitimizing educational practice?  
Moreover, we cannot ignore (as noted above) that such research is (re)produced by the 
same institutions that have created the problems of inequality and exclusion in the first place. So 
in inquiring about the problems of education, like those of hunger, justice, and inequality, one 
cannot help to wonder, for example, about the  
undying myth of development, that it will remove all poverty forever from all corners of 
the world . . . [when the fact is] “that even societies that have witnessed unprecedented 
prosperity during the last five decades, such as the United States, have not been able to 
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exile either poverty or destitution from within their borders. (Sen as cited in Mignolo, 
2011, p. 303) 
Correspondingly, this similar “undying myth of development” that neuroscience will ameliorate 
all our educational woes once and for all, which is the biggest myth within MBE and the dark 
undercurrent of the MBE movement. In fact, as Mignolo (2011) argued, the real answer lies in 
“decolonizing development” (p. 302) and, in this case, decolonizing MBE. 
In my own work as an educational therapist, for example, I can attest that the biggest 
gains my students make are due to the trusting relationship we build together, and to the old 
pencil and paper methods and consistent hard work and sweat they put in, more than any brain-
based tool I use. So while I do use neuroscientifically based methods and tools, it is exactly 
because I remember that they are my tools as a teacher and not the other way around, that I am 
able to use them effectively. This is not the case, however, with many of my colleagues and 
parents who have these tools marketed to them directly and who, inadvertently, turn over all 
power of their own knowledge, history, and experience to them.  
When we leave out issues related to power and exclusions within the history of science 
and education in this country, we also close off the possibility for “openly discussing disciplinary 
differences and assumptions” (Fisher & Daniel, 2009, p. 2). How can we, therefore, critique 
neuromyths and the dangers of the brain-hype without a deeper interrogation of the 
epistemological roots that inform them and how the field promotes these neuromyths for its own 
economic and political interests? Does simply acknowledging that neuromyths exist and placing 
the blame on the media or the shoulders of the layperson who, also uninformed about science, 
“buys into” what the media peddles, relieve the field of ethical responsibility?  And if the 
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solution is “building a transdisciplinary framework that focuses on issues of interest across the 
disciplines and methods” (Fisher & Daniel, 2009, p. 2), can we really ignore decades of work 
tied to pedagogies of liberation and critiques of science, whilst we hang tight to old colonial 
frameworks? If MBE aims to inform education in an increasingly global world, can we do this 
work without “remapping the order of knowing” (Mignolo, 2011, p. 77) and addressing its own 
contradictions inherent in its formations?   
About this, Emmerich (2015) argued: 
What is required is a more acutely socio-political understanding of not only the 
neurosciences and what they have to offer but also of neuroethics more generally. Human 
beings are not simply neurological, or even biological phenomena. We are made up of 
socio-cultural and historical elements and, like psychological discourses before it, the 
neurosciences are now part of this realm…There needs to be a greater level of dialogue 
and engagement between neuroscience and social science if we are to use the knowledge 
and technologies that emerge from this domain in a politically, and not just ethically, 
responsible manner. (“A Broader View” section, para. 3). 
As such, under the guise of promoting development or the claim that “the diversity of abilities 
and disabilities will help educators and parents to facilitate individual students’ learning and 
development” (Fischer et al., 2010, p. 68), we have to be careful that we are not simply 
reproducing the very same lines of economic, racialized, and gendered divisions that we 
politically claim to want to eliminate.  
Moreover, to create “a strong research foundation for education requires a collaborative 
approach,” as MBE scholars assert, “with a two-way dialogue in which practitioners and 
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researchers work together to formulate research questions and methods so that they can be 
connected to practice and policy” (Fischer et al., 2010, p. 68), in ways that do not reproduce old 
myths of inequality and exclusion. Unfortunately, instead of representing and integrating the 
voices of teachers and students, MBE researchers often try to scientifically dissect and 
understand why differences exist, producing lists of categories such as “differences in 
orientation” and “lack of understanding of the entrenched and unspoken differences across 
research disciplines” and “special challenges for interdisciplinary fields” (Kalra & O’Keeffe, 
2011, p. 163). Moreover, this is carried out without considering that perhaps this is not a question 
that can be answered using scientific methods, but rather requires conversations that begin with 
acknowledging the question of humanity and the wealth to be found within the silenced 
knowledge of those we seek to “save.”  
From this vantage point, MBE must ask new questions that move away from trying to 
identify what is wrong with “the other” so as to fix it, and instead support emancipatory 
conditions where teachers and students can participate in posing and answering questions 
essential to their own well-being. In short, instead of pathologizing the divisions in the field, the 
way forward is to examine how cultural formations within the field inform these divides, in order 
to better “let the questions be your guide” (Rose, Daley, & Rose, 2011, p.153). 
Economic Priorities  
 
In an alarming study about the allure of neuroscientific explanations and neuromyths, 
Weisberg et al. (2015) showed that people find explanations more satisfying when they contain 
irrelevant neuroscience information and are then offered a number of reasons as to why this may 
be. The first reason offered is that explanations that reference “harder” sciences are seen as 
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generally more legitimate across disciplines (and even a more pronounced effect in psychology, 
which holds a general bias toward making psychological explanations sound “more scientific”). 
A second explanation is that people are intuitively dualist. Yet another is that people tend to 
embrace causal explanations and are particularly biased toward teleological information that 
provides evidence of an ultimate cause for an event. And finally, the authors asserted that it is 
possible that neuroscience seduces because of a general preference for reductive explanations.  
However, what is missing from these arguments is an acknowledgement of the 
commonsensical manner in which Western scientific ideology conditions us; which may, 
perhaps, explain what is behind these tendencies to see with authority anything considered to be 
scientific. As such, human beings (as in their biology) tend to prefer reductionist, causal, dualist 
scientific proof, without concern over what knowledge is not allowed to exist. Science has so 
successfully managed to erase and limit human thinking that we simply now assert our 
socialization under its reign, explaining it as “how people tend to be.” The fact is, it is neither our 
brains nor biology that make us susceptible to science’s exploitations. This ideological 
phenomenon occurs by epistemological design. 
As critics have asserted, “Both psychology and education in their institutional forms 
became absorbed by the ‘modern’, a project in which psychological science offered 
simultaneously both to individualize and to homogenize all human functioning as part of an 
underlying commitment to progress” (Billington, 2007, p. 869). Neuroscience, then, and brain-
based education, specifically, like phrenology before it, are popular perhaps because of the 
underlying promise of modernization they offer through methodologies that produce tangible 
economic results. As the studies on the allure of neuroscience demonstrate, modernity has a 
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"darker side" (Mignolo, 2011, p. 3), such that, in the popularization of neuroscience and its 
methodologies in everyday life and as part of “global modernities,” we are, once again, 
forgetting the implications of “global colonialities” (p. 3) tied to the advancement of interests 
held by the wealthy and powerful.  
It is no wonder then that with the emergence of the “neuro-world” (Billington, 2017, p. 
866) and the dubbing of the 21st century as “the century of the brain,” critical neuroscientists are 
concerned not just with the widespread distribution of neuroscientific research and discourse and 
the threatening ways in which it is permeating social life (Billington, 2017; Choudhury & Slaby, 
2012; Davis, 2004; De Kessel, 2015; De Vos, 2015; Kirmayer & Gold, 2012; Kraus, 2015; Rose, 
2012), but also with the ways in which neuroscience methodology promotes the hegemonic 
power of and profit from neuro-knowledge, all while limiting our actual understanding of the 
potential of the human brain.  
Nonetheless, as the study by Weisberg et al. (2015) and others who have demonstrated 
how most people simply trust anything with a scientific explanation, name, or a picture of the 
brain attached (McCabe & Castel, 2008; Lindell & Kidd, 2013) show, the hegemony of 
empirical science contributes much to the accumulation of capital. The economic consequences 
of the global prevalence of neuromyths (Howard-Jones, 2014) have been well documented. The 
billion-dollar brain-based educational industry aside, neuromyths from Baby-Einstein and The 
Mozart Effect to The Myth of Three (Howard-Jones, 2014) and programs packaged to cure 
learning disabilities (Goswami, 2006) lay the foundation of a political economy where bad 
science is shaping policy and misusing public funds in the name of so-called evidence-based 
education (Howard-Jones, 2014).  
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So, it is not just that notions of personhood are being radically transformed in this new 
and growing medicalized context (Vidal, 2009), where neuroscience pushes us toward a reality 
where “we are our brains” and no more than our “neurochemical selves” (Rose, 2003, 2007), but 
that such notions are being used to build economic models of educational investment (Heckman, 
2008). In this way, “the prefix neuro- has won its final battle” not just because “it has conquered 
critique itself” (De Vos & Pluth, 2016, p. 22), but because it has done so while turning a hefty 
profit. Moreover, as Giroux (1988) has argued, the development of psychological science and 
new technologies not only suppresses historical consciousness but also replaces that 
consciousness with a new rationality wherein all areas of social existence are informed by the 
advancement of industrial capitalism. What generally emerges in place of real or meaningful 
reform is simply the reproduction of an epistemicidal formation that reifies knowledge and acts 
to pacify minds—all in the interest of advancing capitalist gains.  
Language of Conquest and Colonization 
Finally, the question of language formation is also of concern in MBE’s analysis of why 
the field struggles with its identity and unity (Knox, 2016; Scott & Curran, 2010). As Samuels 
(2009) matter-of-factly stated, “Historically, science and education have demonstrated separate, 
but interwoven, influences on society that have led to a characterization of science as prestigious 
and education as failure ridden” (p. 46). This language, though is meant to “help,” is not only 
insulting, but also reproduces traditional beliefs about education and educators that are simply 
not true, reflecting a version of history in which one group is superior over the other and where 
science reigns supreme (Smith, 1999). Hence, MBE employs a language that, as Smith argued, 
mimics the “colonizing of disciplines” (p. 65). Accordingly, “academic knowledge are organized 
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around the idea of disciplines and fields of knowledge” but with the underpinning belief that 
only science is the “all-embracing method for gaining an understanding of the world” (Smith, 
1999, p.65). 
In the same way, the linguistic use of the prefix “neuro” and the discourse that follows it 
is, itself. problematic. The use of this prefix, like the use of brain images, immediately affords 
legitimacy while undermining other forms of knowledge. The word exemplifies the language of 
power (Rizvi, Lingard, & Lavia, 2006), “being circulated, not in any neutral way but on the basis 
of a politically sanctioned authority” (Billington, 2017, p. 868), gaining an ever-expanding 
sphere of influence (Kirmayer, 2012; Rose, 2006). The fact is,  
renaming teaching as “brain-based education”, while keeping the present model in place, 
is like rearranging the deck chairs on the Titanic. This is because teaching is a social, 
interpersonal, attachment-based endeavor, ill matched to Western scientific 
methodologies applied within a model of industrial mass production. (Cozolino, 2013, p. 
xxi).  
Ideology lies deep within a culture and within its language (Darder, 2012). It is therefore 
imperative to critically examine how the language of MBE and the neuro discourse reflect our 
unconscious power imbalances. 
If MBE is to be a true transdisciplinary field it must be “resistant to a universalizing 
language—a language of empirical inquiry that has often been anchored in dominant 
epistemologies” (Darder, 2015, p. 63). MBE research concurs, “learning and teaching require 
active construction of knowledge” (Fischer, 2009, p. 6) and cites that both cognitive science 
research (Baldwin, 1894; Bartlett, 1932; Piaget, 1952) and neuroscience research (Singer, 1995) 
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have demonstrated this consistently for over a century. Hence, to move toward social justice, the 
field must begin with a shift from the language of conduit models of knowledge transmission 
(Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; Reddy, 1979)—that reflect Freire’s (2000) banking model—toward a 
language of inclusion and reinventing (Freire, 1989), anchored to a political intent where “new 
readings of the world can unfold in ways that lead us toward change, both in theory and practice” 
(Darder, 2015, p. 63).  
Decolonizing the Field of MBE 
 
At the end of the nineteenth century, a complex social framework (economic, political, 
cultural, religious, and ideological) emerged in the United States (Paraskeva, 2011). As the 
Industrial Revolution brought about significant transformations in society, the last two decades 
of the nineteenth century revealed that schooling was an outdated institution facing the pressures 
of a newly emergent social order. This marked the beginning not just of new tensions in the 
curriculum field, but also of a profound and entangled struggle for the control of school 
knowledge, as well as its social and cultural functions (Paraskeva, 2011). What we see in MBE 
today is a continuum of this struggle. Moreover, the role of decolonizing challenges aimed at the 
very core of such political, ideological, cultural, and educational debates over school knowledge 
cannot be minimized.  
A just curriculum that can foster equality, democracy, and social justice can only be born 
of complexifying the struggle for curriculum relevance and challenging obsolete and positivistic 
functionalist school systems. In a way, ironically, this is what MBE aims to do. However, as the 
literature in the field shows, MBE continues to fall short of its goals because it continues to 
employ the exclusionary epistemology and methods that created the problems. As Freire (2000) 
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argued, educators who “(even with the best intentions) carry out the revolution for the people” 
(p. 127) —a process whereby indigenous knowledge is excluded by the curricular imposition of 
“official” knowledge—“by the same methods and procedures used to oppress them” (p. 128) 
must be denounced. This calls for the radical ethics embraced by both de Sousa Santos and 
Paraskeva, who have argued that the struggle for social justice must challenge the coloniality of 
power and knowledge at the very foundations of West-centric knowledge. This further entails an 
understanding of what it means to have “a rich and paradoxical engagement with the pertinence 
of what lay in an oblique or alien relation to the forces of centering” (Bhabha, 1994, p. xi).  
Thus, as an ethical radical pedagogical project, MBE would also signify an ethical radical 
political project that engages in the struggle against epistemicides, de-territorializes its 
approaches, and assumes a critical itinerant position (Paraskeva, 2011). At the heart of this is, of 
course, the assumption that another knowledge is, in fact, possible—but only when we are able 
to go beyond the Western epistemological platform, respecting and being attentive to other forms 
of knowledge, beyond the abyssal divide of the West. Such an approach would require MBE to 
move away from its current territorialized curriculum wars (predicated on a positivist 
epistemology of supremacy) and fixed knowledge borders toward epistemological diversity, an 
itinerant fluidity, and socio and cognitive justice. To move in this direction, MBE must begin 
with the task of decolonizing itself. As Shiva (1993) noted, 
decolonization in the North becomes essential if what is called the environment and 
development crisis in the South is to be overcome. The North’s prescription for the 
South’s salvation has always created new burdens and new bondages, and the salvation of 
the environment cannot be achieved through the old colonial order based on the White 
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Man’s Burden, the two are ethically, economically and epistemologically incongruent. (p. 
265) 
If the past 500 years of history have taught us anything, it is that a relationship of 
colonization persists in the world today and continues to be reflected within the context of 
education. Of this colonizing relationship, Shiva (1993) argued, 
The colonizing men and society have assumed a position of superiority, and thus of 
responsibility for the future of the earth and for other peoples and cultures. Out of the 
assumption of superiority flows the notion of the White Man’s Burden. Out of the idea of 
the White Man’s Burden flows the reality of the burdens imposed by the White Man on 
nature, women, and others. Therefore, colonizing the South is intimately linked to the 
issue of colonizing the North. Decolonization is therefore as relevant in the context of the 
colonizer as in that of the colonized. Decolonization in the North is also essential because 
process of wealth creation simultaneously create poverty process of knowledge creation 
simultaneously generates ignorance and process for the creation of freedom 
simultaneously generate unfreedom. (p. 264) 
For MBE, then, to move toward a social justice paradigm and become a genuinely 
transformative and transdisciplinary field—as argued throughout this chapter—it must move to 
overcome its adherence to the coloniality of power and its epistemicidal formations, which 
perpetuate false conflicts between neuroscience and education (two positivist traditions) and 
ignore deeper issues of cognitive injustice. More importantly, MBE must integrate silenced 
epistemologies that aim to liberate and emancipate the educational agenda—for which 
neuroscientific claims in education are not absolved from participation. The struggle against the 
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West’s eugenic coloniality of knowledge is essential then to pedagogical and political efforts to 
transform the field of MBE, as well as schools and society. No doubt, such a struggle is a 
Herculean task, but one that cannot be ignored if we are truly committed to what Freire 
considered a just and loving society.  
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CHAPTER 5 
TOWARD A SOCIAL JUSTICE PARADIGM FOR MIND BRAIN EDUCATION 
In September of 2016, I attended the fourth biannual conference of the International 
Mind, Brain, and Education Society (iMBES). I knew the work of the group. A few years prior, I 
had been accepted to the Mind, Brain, and Education (MBE) Master’s program at Harvard 
University, a program I had not technically applied for, but had been encouraged to attend in 
place of the doctoral program for which I had been waitlisted. Since I already held a master’s 
degree, it did not make sense to me to go into almost a hundred thousand dollars of more student 
debt for a one-year degree. Yet this seemed to be the advice of the faculty there who presented 
the one-year master’s program as a good way to get acclimated with the work and the culture at 
Harvard and a good way to open opportunities to move toward doctoral work at the 
university. This was my first interaction with MBE as a field. It left a bad taste.  
Still, I decided to leave the experience behind and for now, as a first-year doctoral student 
at Loyola Marymount University in a program that felt far more closely aligned with my 
personal values, re-engage with the field. I had just spent a year delving deeply into social justice 
issues in education, and I felt strongly that my new understandings of social justice implications 
with regard to the meeting of science and education might add to the conversation in MBE. I 
decided to submit a poster that focused on my preliminary conceptual and research design for 
this study at the conference. I was very excited to have it accepted. To attend the conference in 
Toronto meant missing two days of work, and over a thousand dollars in travel cost and 
conference fees, but I did not mind. This was my opportunity to learn alongside the very people 
doing the kind of work I hoped to be doing once I finished my degree: bringing neuroscience and 
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brain-based tools into classrooms in ways that could truly support teachers and students. But my 
three days at the conference turned out to be a very different experience than what I had 
expected.  
From the first keynote, which was given by a prominent psychology professor from the 
University of California at Berkeley, I felt disconnected. This was not my first scientific 
conference. I had spent quite a bit of time as an undergraduate student circling medical 
conferences, trying to figure out if I wanted to stay in the sciences before deciding against it, 
partially because of the same feeling of disconnectedness. But this was an education conference, 
and yet, the psychology professor went on for over an hour presenting on her lab’s quantitative 
findings on social cognition and learning, which was hard to follow, despite my science 
background. It was not long before I started to feel that I was in the wrong place, that my work is 
not scientific enough for iMBES, and that as an educator and a budding social justice scholar, I 
certainly did not belong.  
That night, as I struggled to fall asleep on the uncomfortable bed at the only Airbnb room 
I could afford (the conference had been scheduled during the Toronto Film Festival and all 
accommodations were astronomical in price, which may not have been a hindrance for many, but 
must have been for some), I found myself crying. Perplexed by my own strong reaction, I 
decided that the overwhelming feeling that I had wasted my life and gone in the wrong direction 
by becoming an educator was due to my inherent inability to accept that I had not been smart 
enough to stick with the sciences. As is the tendency at such moments, I blamed myself, rather 
than stopping to consider that there might be something about the culture expressed in the 
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conference that caused feelings of alienation and isolation to anyone whose thinking sat outside 
its narrow epistemology. 
The next day, the feeling got heavier with yet another keynote speaker, presenting on the 
effects of early life stress on the executive function skills of “at risk” children. But this time, I 
didn’t just feel disengaged and overwhelmed by scientific data and jargon, the language being 
used (inner-city children, high-poverty kids, subjects, etc.) felt demeaning. For a moment I 
thought, what if, instead of spending all this money on MBE research, we used that money to 
actually change the conditions of the schools and communities in which the children being 
researched must survive? And that’s when I first took notice that every keynote speaker, with the 
exception of one Oxford-educated presenter of East Indian decent, was Caucasian or 
Euromerican.  
The realization made me feel even more uncomfortable. Suddenly, I was aware of my 
presence and my skin color in a way I never expected to be at an educational/academic 
conference. Once again, I felt I didn’t belong. I looked around for the two MBE graduate 
students I had reached out to prior to the conference, hoping that connecting with other students 
would make me feel more at ease. They both worked in labs at a different university in Los 
Angeles, and I had been excited to share my research with them. However, when we met, and I 
had explained my approach to them, they seemed confused and not particularly curious. Now, at 
the conference, one gave me a quick smile from a different table, and the other simply avoided 
eye contact, despite two attempts on my part to actually wave at her.  
Whatever the culture or politics of MBE, I seemed to lack competency and I now found 
myself using my foot to quietly push my poster tube deep under the table. I was no longer 
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excited about my poster presentations that afternoon and even contemplated leaving the 
conference early. At lunch that day, I sat quietly chewing on my salad as students who identified 
as neuroscientists introduced themselves to one another. At one point, I eavesdropped on a 
conversation between two researchers complaining about the frustrations of doing research in 
classrooms, because of the uncontrollable variables that do not allow for funding. No one 
listening seemed concerned with the irony of that fact. No one seemed concerned with education 
at all it seemed. “Implications for educators” seemed like an after-thought at the conference 
much as it was in the papers being presented.  
Finally, it was time for the poster sessions. I stood, again quietly, by my poster, as person 
after person talked to the presenters on either side of me, their posters filled with fMRI images 
and data graphs before politely passing mine with a smile. The thought to take down the poster 
and leave crossed my mind more than once, but I kept reminding myself that they had seen my 
poster ahead of time and had approved it. They had invited me to come, so I could not be that out 
of place. That is when it first occurred to me that perhaps I was there not because of the merit of 
my work, but because the words “social justice”—ironically written in big bold letters across my 
poster—were a necessary accent to the conference. My approach to the work was not a 
legitimate methodology to them, and as I let my self-criticism get the best of me, my work no 
longer felt legitimate even to me. The hegemonic force of the hidden curriculum of authority had 
eroded my confidence and rendered my research irrelevant and inconsequential.  
It wasn’t until I found myself in the hotel restaurant patio, fighting cigarette smoke and 
the cold chill of the Canadian fall for a reprieve, that I noticed a small group of three women, 
brown like me, congregated nearby. “Are you with the iMBES conference?” one of them finally 
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asked, perhaps noticing my desperate stare. “Yes!” I said and for the first time since I had 
arrived, I felt safe. They were all educators and they were all bicultural women, and two of them 
were also from Los Angeles. They didn’t work in the lab with the MBE students I had met, 
although they attended the same school. They were also doctoral students in an education 
leadership program and had been encouraged to attend the conference so that they could learn 
more about the work of the star MBE professor at their school.  
When I asked about how the women were experiencing the conference, one of them 
replied, “I feel like it’s a bit boring.” Yet, there was the sound of intimidation in her voice—a 
sound that I recognized. I wondered if she meant boring in the same way my students say they 
are bored when they feel intimidated by school. Then one of them finally dared to critique the 
absence of educational discourse. “They keep saying education but what does any of this have to 
do with education? Why aren't there any keynotes by educators? The best talk I've heard so far 
was done before the conference by a history teacher in the pre-conference workshops. The rest of 
this conference makes no sense to me.” Her honesty broke the ice, and for the rest of the 
conference, us four brown women were inseparable, secretly whispering our observations and 
critiques, not behaving like the dutiful student groupies we were supposed to be, but instead 
having serious, critical conversations among ourselves about why the research we were hearing 
about was problematic.  
By the third day, our solidarity had given me a new resolve. So, after yet another talk that 
emphasized the collaborative and interdisciplinary nature of MBE but did not include teachers or 
students, I raised my hand. “Why is no one on the presenter panel right now, in fact no one 
presenting at this whole conference, a full-time educator?” I asked the star MBE scholar who had 
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called on me. The question had struggled to leave my throat, perhaps adding to the force with 
which it finally came out. We all watched as her face changed, her voice becoming defensive: 
“No one can be a full-time educator and a full-time neuroscientist,” she said. “I used to be a 
public school teacher,” she continued and her emphasis on the point made me wonder if she 
thought that would get her “street cred” with us. She continued, “but when I decided to do 
research after a couple years, I was advised by Kurt Fischer to leave the classroom. If you want 
to be a serious scientist, it’s a full-time job.” The silence in the room was palpable.  
In an attempt to ease the tension perhaps, another star in the field chimed in, “Please keep 
in mind, this is a very young field and we are still working toward more collaborative research,” 
she said. But it was too late. There was nothing anyone could now say to un-ring the bell we had 
all heard. The dominant subordinate tensions I had been struggling with throughout the 
conference were a part of the structures, terms of engagement, and guided recommendations of 
the field; so, just like that, the MBE scholar, hesitant to be seen as a lowly educator, had shown 
me that I was in fact, exactly in the right place and that that there was much work to be done—
decolonizing work that sought to challenge the field of MBE both for its marginalization of 
education (considered a gendered or soft science at most) and the isolation of bicultural MBE 
practitioners who seldom found their cultural knowledge reflected in the articulation of the field.  
Hence, from this difficult experience emerged my dissertation focus, in which I have 
sought to understand the elements necessary for a bicultural or subaltern MBE scholar to enact a 
decolonizing praxis in the field, in order to unveil and challenge the power dynamics cloaked in 
the traditional paradigm, underneath a language of “interdisciplinary” collaboration, while 
simultaneously reproducing inequalities. Of course, returning to that fateful moment at the 
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conference, I didn’t have any of this language as I sat down slowly, wiping the sweat off my 
palms on the white table cloth, locking my shaking knees so I didn’t fall into the heavy silence of 
the room, worried that I had just burned every important bridge within the field. But later that 
night, when I sat with my new MBE educator friends at a burger joint in Toronto, candidly 
sharing how upset we were by the conference, how much money we had all just spent to feel 
“less than,” and what a waste of time and money the research we had heard about was to our 
actual struggles, a new language started to form. We exchanged numbers. “Don't give up,” I 
pleaded with them. “Let's work on a presentation for the next conference. Let’s show them why 
our contribution matters.”  
We parted ways and on the flight home, I made the decision to hold on to the difficult 
feelings I had experienced all weekend, to not try so hard to shake them off, because maybe they 
were there to teach me something important. These feeling, in fact, became the fuel for launching 
this study, in that I began to recognize them as my human response to practices of exclusion, 
which signaled the dire need for a social justice paradigm of MBE to guide our future work in 
the field. Hence this chapter is an effort to identify a variety of components that must come 
together in the process of reinventing an emancipatory vision for the future of MBE.  
Decolonizing Mind Brain Education 
 A deep dive into the history of neuroscience, the branch of science that informs MBE, 
and the epistemological shaping of the American education system by the sciences not only 
reveals the colonial roots of MBE but also serves as a warning, a sounding an alarm for the 
potentially destructive consequences MBE can have in education, if it is not re-imagined through 
an epistemological disruption that shifts the field away from its Eurocentric, scientific, 
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capitalistic paradigm toward a paradigm of love that honors the genuinely democratic aims of 
emancipatory education. 
 In defining critical theory and pedagogy as it relates to education, Giroux (1981) referred 
to the nature of self-conscious critique and the need for a discourse of social transformation and 
emancipation that not only critiques positivism but also envisions schools as a place for social 
and cultural transformation. Such a view embraces a dialectical view of knowledge and a fluid, 
supple view of humans that is relational, where theory and practice co-exist with the aim to 
liberate, through an organic resistance to reification, rather than domination (Darder et al., 2009). 
In his philosophy for a humanizing education and liberating praxis, Freire (2000) further built on 
this discourse by offering a vision of teachers and students engaged in the process of overcoming 
authoritarianism and alienating intellectualism by becoming subjects of educational process 
wherein the pursuit of humanity and a commitment to the process of becoming is at the heart of 
education. A new paradigm for MBE must rest on these traditions.  
However, to accomplish this, a process of decolonization must first be in place. Of this 
Freire (2000) argued that decolonization begins in our own minds. For communities that have 
been purposefully neglected and willfully damaged by the colonizing processes of society and 
schooling, Freire called for an educational project linked with other anticolonial movements for 
political self- determination to become full subjects of history, in the struggle to control their 
own destinies. A decolonizing approach to MBE would support such shifts not just in schools but 
within the field itself. Here, its intentions, research, and practice must aim toward working to 
develop an emancipatory critical consciousness, from which to take action to produce research 
that views all students and teachers as integral beings (Darder, 2012).  
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Further, MBE must combat the effects of a disempowering capitalist system, build on a 
cultural hegemony that relies on “banking” epistemicides within education by first recognizing 
that these systems exist and challenging them as a significant part of the very mission of the 
field. In fact, transforming existing conditions of inequality and injustice in schools and society 
must be at the heart of the MBE movement. A critical awareness of the colonizing hidden 
curriculum of MBE research and practice is therefore fundamental because only then can the 
field uncover the actual problems and needs at work in schools in order to create change.  
Michael Yellow Bird described this decolonizing process as a different way of knowing 
(Waziyatawin & Yellow Bird, 2012). In his conceptual model of decolonization, Yellow Bird 
defined decolonization as both an event and a process and of reaching a level of critical 
consciousness where we have an active understanding that we are (or have been) colonized as an 
event. But as the historical and epistemological review of the literature in this study has 
demonstrated, a number of decolonizing principles must also be enacted in order to activate the 
necessary state of critical consciousness that can serve as the jumping ground for establishing a 
decolonizing praxis of MBE—an emancipatory praxis that must begin with our own minds.  
As I have been working my way through this study, the acronym MBE has regularly 
conjured an image of the field in my own mind. The image has been a cold one, of an isolated 
brain with wires that could be EGG wires or computer wires connecting it to nowhere. The 
acronym has also summoned the color blue, like the brain on the cover of the MBE journal, as 
well as the feeling of isolation and disconnection that I felt at the iMBES conference. Perhaps 
this is a feature of acronyms in general, but throughout this study, I have found myself forcing 
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my mind to pull apart these letters and visualize the words, Mind, Brain, and Education, focusing 
on the word education as it elicits the warmest feeling, given my lived history and experience.  
This may be a more literal way to begin in our own mind than Freire intended, but as I 
now come to my vision of a socially just paradigm of MBE, I cannot help but think of the 
visceral experience of this language and its symbolism in my mind and body. It has made me 
wonder, as I often wonder, about the ways in which we separate and isolate the mind and the 
brain and the structural, systematic, almost industrial way we approach education. Language, in 
all traditions, including in the scientific study of it in the field of linguistics, holds the highest 
place in humanity’s attempts to make meaning.  
In decolonizing traditions and social justice work, language again carries great power. As 
Yellow Bird argued, the first activity to engage in is to work within Indigenous cultural traditions 
to develop words in the Indigenous language for both colonization and decolonization 
(Waziyatawin & Yellow Bird, 2012). The purpose of this exercise is to provide an opportunity 
for both individuals and communities to think consciously and critically about the meaning of the 
terms from within their own cultural framework. Similarly, Smith (1999) talked about the 
importance of how identifying the literal and figurative meanings of words allow us to own them 
and thus consciously understand our cultural worldview through our interpretations. In 
indigenous epistemologies and axiology, for example, where science is about interdependence 
and resonating with nature, the word “science” itself translates as “seeking life” or “for life’s 
sake” (Cajete, 2000). In short, through the idea that we are participants in science, not just 
observers or manipulators, the hope of creating a more sustainable and meaningful world and 
future is embedded in the language.  
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In this same tradition, I would like to put forth the challenge of consciously and critically 
redefining the words Mind, Brain, and Education, so that, as educators, leaders, and MBE 
scholars with a social justice mission, we can own and understand our view of these terms and 
this field within both our cultural understanding of the world and our lived histories of teaching 
and learning. Therefore, as part of arriving to greater critical consciousness (which is an ongoing 
and ever-evolving process), there must be a process of creating, restoring, and birthing 
(Waziyatawin & Yellow Bird, 2012). This process involves restoring cultural practices, thinking, 
beliefs, and values that were taken away or abandoned but are still relevant and necessary to 
survival. It also means the birthing of new language, frameworks, ideas, thinking, technologies, 
and lifestyles that contribute to the advancement and empowerment of communities. As 
mentioned, the first step of this decolonizing process is the process of daring to unveil the silence 
and rename our world in ways to center the subaltern voice (Darder, 2018). In this light, for a 
decolonizing, socially just paradigm of MBE to emerge, we must examine courageously the 
meaning of the terms that comprise its parts—Mind, Brain, and Education—so that we can 
reconfigure or reinvent these meanings for a new vision of the field. 
The Mind  
 While Western science has historically and epistemologically separated the mind from 
the body, other medical traditions such as Chinese, Ayurvedic, and Indigenous medicine do not 
separate the mind and body. Western medicine has yet to confirm this mind-body connection, 
thus limiting the way we look at problems all together. But new research, specifically research 
from neuroscience, confirms that the mind is not separate from the body as in the medical model 
nor is the mind an isolated mental state or isolated experience (Damasio, 2003; Mate, 2011). 
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Rather, it is a connected collective that influences and is influenced by other humans, our 
environment, histories, cultures, and our values and priorities. So, while the word “mind” in 
MBE seems to invite the study of mind in the Western science and psychological tradition, I 
would argue that in a decolonized paradigm of MBE, other excluded scientific traditions and 
philosophies must be now included in our definition of mind (Squire & Kandel, 1999). Such a 
philosophical perspective would not just call for a rational or critical analysis, but would 
encourage healthy skepticism, a skepticism that is constantly wary of reductionism and the 
possibility that the problem may not be the child’s mind or brain, in of itself, but rather the 
context in which the child exists that impacts the mind.  
Such a philosophical perspective would also be both critical and synthetic, raising 
important questions regarding the nature of personhood, the world we live in and how humans fit 
into the overall scheme of things. In Chinese philosophy an orientative view always has the 
intention to “effect some change in the self or in the world” (Lao, 1989, p. 277). Remembering 
that our thoughts and feelings are real, not just mechanical as in the Newtonian tradition nor a 
duality as in Descartes’s tradition, and they are not only causally related to our brains but also to 
our social interactions with the environment and others in the world. As such, the word “mind” 
no longer conjures images of firing neurons in the brain, but of an expansive phenomenon of 
integral social interaction, of personal thoughts and feelings, of metaphysics and spirituality as 
well as an ethics of knowing, which questions the limits of neuroscientific research rooted in the 
old paradigm of science (Lipton, 2005). In short, the word mind must encourage teachers to 
adopt a broad philosophical perspective on issues related to the mind and its function, instead of 
a mechanical one that is both reductive and deterministic, a view that complicates knowledge 
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construction and the dynamic relations between human existence and the environment of which 
we comprise one knowing, living, and breathing dimension of the living ecosystem.  
The Brain  
Perhaps no word is as important and potentially problematic in the field of MBE as the 
word “brain”—which research in the field suggests may have been included in the name of the 
field specifically for its allure (Lindell & Kidd, 2013; Weisberg et al., 2015). Whether as part of 
“brain-based learning” or actual images of the brain or in the prefix “neuro,” which also conjures 
up images of synapses and the cold gray matter of the organ, the word brain has been 
weaponized in the field simply because of the power and mystique it holds. Demystifying the 
word and grounding it in the body where it exists, and in connection to others, where even 
neuroscience research suggests it works best (Damasio, 1995), is therefore imperative to 
reframing how we understand and practice MBE.  
In the Western scientific tradition, the brain is the seat of rational thinking or the mind. 
But neuroscience research has shown that the ability to think rationally requires a balanced input 
of emotion and feeling (Damasio, 2000). In fact, it seems that cognition actually rests on an 
edifice of emotion and that the millions of children diagnosed as having learning-related deficits 
according to the DSM (Diagnostic Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders) are actually 
underserved because of the way diagnostic criteria ignore the emotional seat of the brain, which 
is connected to our visceral state (Mate, 2011). In this light, the brain is simply an organizational 
entity that receives more messages from the inside than the outside at any given time, including 
our bodies. In a society where we are less and less connected to our feelings and to each other, it 
would make sense, then, that our brains are less and less efficient in dealing with our external 
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world, thus creating the epidemic of learning disabilities, especially among already isolated and 
marginalized populations (Shifrer, Muller & Callahan, 2011) who suffer disconnection, given 
their social location and political state of subalternity.  
Today, there are many more kids with behavior problems, emotional outbursts, and 
difficulty learning in our society than ever before (Mate, 2000, 2011). This burgeoning in the 
culture is occurring just as the brain sciences are entering the conversation in education with 
claims to having the answers and solutions. The question we are not asking as we focus on the 
brain is what is happening in children’s lives that is hindering their ability to socially interact 
well, to pay attention well, to learn well, and to be self-regulated? Critical theories encourage us 
to pay more attention to do what is occurring within the cultural and societal context than solely 
what is happening at the genetic or neuropsychological level. This, unfortunately, is not the 
approach being taken in education or MBE.  
The consequence here is that the conditions for healthy brain development, especially for 
the prefrontal cortex, are less and less available to children today (Lipton, 2005; Mate, 2000); yet 
we continue to use brain science to address the behavior and symptoms while the emotional 
edifice causing the child to either act out or display learning difficulties is ignored. In discussions 
in the literature about the use of MBE to impact classrooms or write policy, the scientific 
epistemology continues to place the brain as an organ to be diagnosed, fixed, or perfected. But in 
a decolonizing paradigm of MBE, the brain must be viewed as the seat of relationality, where 
subaltern or indigenous philosophies, beliefs, and values that counter colonizing views of the 
brain and focus on well-being of students are privileged (Waziyatawin & Yellow Bird, 2012).  
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So for MBE to re-direct, instead of contribute to the growing intense cultural interest in 
the brain alongside which there is also a growing rate of childhood diagnosis of brain and 
learning disorders and the use of pharmacological drugs that aim to alter the developing center 
nervous system of children, it must take this organ associated solely with rationality and connect 
it to the relationality of the heart and gut as critical neuroscience research suggests (Mayer, 
2011). What we seem to be facing today is a massive social experiment fueled by a vision of the 
brain and its function that is extremely limited. History shows that such an experiment will most 
likely take as its greatest collateral damage the most marginalized and disempowered children—
children whose conditions for learning can severely impact their neurological health, as we see, 
for example, with Spanish-speaking children who are forced to learn in a language that is not 
their first language (Darder, 2012). But what if we were to shift this at an epistemological (not 
just symbolic) level so that our understanding of the brain can embody the complexity of its 
mystical dimension? What if mutually responsiveness adult-child relationships and loving 
teaching was seen as the best thing we can do for our brain circuitry and our genetic evolution, as 
neuroscience research suggests it is? What if we attempted not to diagnose children’s isolated 
brains but the social, emotional, and cultural environments of scarcity, stress, instability, and 
disconnectedness that threaten our humanity and thus, our capacity for healthy and happy lives?   
We know that genes are regulated by the environment such that even those born 
genetically predisposed to certain diseases can prevent the turning on of those genes with a 
nurturing environment (Lipton, 2005). What if brain-based education was actually about 
understanding how brain development occurs and not about projecting our narrow Western 
scientific projections about its function? What if the brain as a word or picture didn’t make 
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teachers feel shameful about their lack of understanding, but rather powerful, given their 
intuitive intelligence born from their lived histories and practice and the very important role they 
can play in its students’ development? What if kids didn’t experience the stress and test anxiety 
that comes from the conditioned false belief that tests scores are tied to their intelligence and 
worth, thus shutting down learning altogether; and instead, relate it to the importance of their 
bodily sensibility which is the most necessary state for learning and brain development 
(Schulkin, 2006)? What if the brain became a symbol for safety, acceptance, connection and 
feeling, rather than an instrumentalized representation of our fixed potential? 
New findings in neuroscience, moreover, now point to the brain-to-gut connection, 
arguing that the seat of our intelligence may actually be in the gut (Kinsley, 2018). So, while the 
argument here is not that MBE should omit the word brain from its title, but to use the name to 
re-imagine a more grounded and decolonizing vision, where the relationship of the brain to the 
body and soul is genuinely understood and engaged as an integral and harmonious dialectic of 
our human existence. 
Education 
This study challenges MBE’s medicalization and scientification of education, the 
paternalistic tendency to undermine the knowledge of education as a field, and the 
marginalization of cultural sensibilities outside its narrow purview. It is precisely by replacing 
science’s definition of learning and education with decolonizing educational views that the field 
can move closer to a more socially just paradigm (Abdi, 2012). In this way, education becomes 
synonymous with love, ethics, social engagement, politics, and the building of a culturally 
democratic society by empowered citizens. Education becomes a call of conscience where all 
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students (along with their brains) are respected subjects of the world, not objects to be 
manipulated or fixed.  
Such a reframing of the MBE field brings teachers and teaching into a new light. Critical 
pedagogy calls upon teachers to examine the ways in which the school system sustains inequality 
and exclusion (Darder, Baltodano, & Torres, 2017). A social justice–fueled MBE must call upon 
teachers to examine the ways in which the school system isolates brains and sustains inequality 
and exclusion by denying the relational needs of human beings (and their brains) for learning. As 
has been argued throughout this study, it is the struggle against the West’s eugenic coloniality of 
knowledge that is essential to the pedagogical and political efforts of MBE to transform 
education in more socially just ways. It is this work that must be the work of neuro-educators 
who, through critical dialogue, must challenge the dominant discourses overwhelming the field 
of MBE and move instead toward embracing a humanizing definition of education, which 
embodies a pedagogy of love that can also inform neuroscience research in decolonizing ways as 
well. 
As part of this effort, neuro-educators must also evaluate the current state of 
neuroscientific methods, findings, representations, and interpretations of empirical brain research 
and develop concepts for more reflective, inclusive, and itinerant debates in education and in all 
social spheres. Such efforts already exist, for example, in the area of neurofeminism where the 
intent is to initiate dialogue across disciplinary borders, and develop detailed and enriched 
approaches for neuroscientific analyses themselves (Bluhm, Jacobson, & Maibom, 2012; Nelson 
& Nelson, 1997; Schmitz & Höppner, 2014).  
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Neuroethics is another area where some have pointed out that brain and culture must be 
understood as being indivisibly intertwined in an assemblage of reciprocal exchange (Levy 2007; 
2008). In other words, the phenomenon is of the “brain-body-in-culture” constituting and 
continuously re-shaping each other. Adopting such a view makes sense because then education 
becomes a meaningful and active resistance to the forces that perpetuate the subjugation and/or 
exploitation of our minds, bodies, and hearts. Education becomes a means for decolonizing our 
minds and our society, signaling our liberation from colonialism. Key here is the need to reclaim 
and reinvent our understanding mind, body, and education, so that we can, as Freire taught, 
reinvent the field in a more humanizing and socially just direction.  
However, Tuck and Yang (2012) have insisted that decolonization is not a metaphor. It is 
not a term that we simply add to the social justice jargon to reconcile settler guilt and complicity. 
Hence, critical MBE scholars must contend with the fact that decolonization is a historical 
process, which “cannot be understood, it cannot become intelligible nor clear to itself except in 
the exact measure that we can discern the movements which give it historical form and content” 
(Fanon, 1963, p. 36). In its decolonizing efforts, MBE must therefore be aware that “because 
settler colonialism is built upon an entangled triad structure of settler-native-slave, the decolonial 
desires of white, non- white, immigrant, postcolonial, and oppressed people, can similarly be 
entangled in resettlement, reoccupation, and reinhabitation that actually further settler 
colonialism” (Tuck & Yang, 2012, p. 1). The aim then is not to simply equip the field with the 
superficial language of social justice and decolonization. The aim is to actually create 
decolonizing spaces for meaningful alliances from which new language, new research, and 
silenced epistemologies can be heard and take shape, all while remembering that “the process of 
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decolonization requires our continual efforts toward questioning and revealing hidden colonial 
influences in past and current beliefs and practices” (Kaomea, 2004, p. 32). 
In countering the settler premise of colonization and working toward decolonization, we 
must actively work toward our own empowerment and the freedom to transform our lives and 
the world around us. Education as a field, and education as part of MBE, must recognize the 
manner in which historically the scientific paradigm has colonized the field and all who called 
into question the legitimacy of its conclusions. It is from this place that we then begin the 
decolonization of MBE, whereas educators and MBE scholars we begin to actively work toward 
a critical praxis, where we reflect, dialogue, and act (Darder, 2015) upon the field with the aim of 
transforming it. In short, decolonizing MBE and the revolutionary potential it holds must begin 
with the problem-posing of educators (especially, educators from subaltern communities) and 
within the field of education. Only then, will the project have revolutionary potential.  
This is directly in line with my own process of engagement with this field since my 
experience at the iMBES conference. Without a willingness to question the legitimizing of status 
qua beliefs and practices, there can be no possibility of decolonizing the field. This is the means 
by which we turn from subjugated human beings into empowered subjects of history; and the 
way in which we begin to move MBE’s exclusionary paradigm toward an emancipatory 
direction. Unveiling and renaming the field is therefore the first step. In this process, once the 
unveiling and renaming of Mind, Brain, and Education begins to take place, we can turn to 
critical principals to inform our decolonizing praxis as MBE educators. 
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Critical Principles for Decolonizing MBE Praxis 
While critical educational theory is not defined in a definitive manner by scholars in the 
field (Bauman, 1995; Carlson & Apple, 1998; Darder, 1991; Freire 1971; Giroux 1981,1983; 
Grande, 2015; hooks, 1994; Kahn 2010; Kellner, 1995; Kincheloe, 2008; Kincheloe & McLaren, 
2005; McLaren 1986; Shor & Freire, 1987), there are principles that move across their work that 
can help us to think differently about MBE, in ways that guide us toward emancipatory and 
democratic outcomes. The following is a discussion of some of the ways in which critical 
principles can inform a paradigmatic shift in the field. 
Cultural Politics 
According to Giroux (1983), learning “takes place in a variety of public spheres outside 
of the schools” (p. xxviii). As a result, curriculum cannot be analyzed in isolation from the social 
dynamics that construct themselves daily around constitutive and preferential rules (McLure & 
Fisher, 1969). As Darder (2014) posited, all research is conducted and functions within a cultural 
context and is shaped by the norms of the dominant culture that, mediated through power, define 
what we consider legitimate knowledge. Critical MBE research must, therefore, aim to uncover 
the ways in which cultural politics shapes research and the practice of MBE. This idea is 
grounded in Freire’s claim that all education is a political act, where struggles are waged over the 
definition and control of knowledge and curriculum. Therefore, recognizing the asymmetrical 
power relations at work within the field constitutes an important step in decolonizing MBE 
research and undergirds the aim of this study. As discussed earlier, MBE is anchored in and 
continues to function under the dominant epistemology and methodology of Western science, 
thus putting the field at risk of reproducing the dynamics of conquest and control, which result in 
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the intellectual, social, and material colonization of school populations, most notably those from 
subalterns communities. 
What is taught, by whom, and under what conditions is also determined by the group who 
controls the political agenda and, thus, generally enacts hegemonic values, beliefs, and 
ideological construction in commonsensical ways that tend to shroud inequalities and exclusions. 
Therefore, an important task of critical MBE scholars concerned with the future of the field is to 
consider how MBE is implicated by its cultural politics, so much so that it can enact a form of 
pedagogical terrorism. Therefore, in all the research MBE funds and undertakes, a first question 
must be: how is this study implicated in and how will its findings contribute to the cultural 
perpetuation of hegemonic domination and exclusion? 
As long as the boundaries of legitimate knowledge are set by Western science and 
Western science only, the field will fail to accomplish its expressed interdisciplinary aims. 
Separating disciplines is itself a Western scientific methodology of reductive categorization. As 
de Sousa Santos (2005) has argued, given the power of Western science to instigate and foster a 
paradigm anchored in  
strict and narrow divisions among disciplines, its positivist methodologies, that do not 
distinguished objectivity from neutrality, its bureaucratic and discriminatory organization 
of knowledge into departments, laboratories, and faculties that reduce the advance of 
knowledge to a matter of corporatist privilege. (p. xix) 
The decolonizing aim of MBE should not be, therefore, to bring together disciplines but 
to question the lens that dictates the enforced separation. Having the field open itself to different 
traditions of science, such as Native American perspectives, according to Cajete (2008) would 
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allow for the co-existence—in a non-hierarchical way—of both the intuitive and rational minds, 
opening the field to completely new and innovative ways to do research alongside teachers and 
students. It is important to note this is not advocating for the measurement of intuition, as certain 
trends in neuroscience attempt to do, but to allow room for the messy, intuitive, and mysterious 
approaches employed by teachers in their practice and do away with mania of measurement, 
particularly within the context of MBE practice.  
Honoring the importance of direct experience, interconnectedness, and relationship, does 
not mean dissecting and measuring it. As Stein (2014) noted, one of the most dangerous trends of 
modern life has been the measurement and subsequent monetization of that which is 
unmeasurable and should not have a price. Teaching and learning, within MBE, need to be seen 
as the sacred human development processes they are, in order to redefine and reinvent the 
mainstream cultural politics that fuel research today. By understanding that science, like 
teaching, is a political process and not a neutral one, MBE science must engage with the cultural 
and political nature of the classroom, the school, and the larger society. And from this point, 
recognize the transformation of the MBE curriculum is a fundamentally political, ideological, 
cultural, and economic project.  
Political Economy     
Historically, research has conserved the political and economic interests of the powerful 
(Darder, 2014). In today’s neoliberal society, the impact of the political economy on the 
construction of knowledge has placed us in a position where education, more often than not, 
serves as an economic engine to propel capitalist interests. The large sums of money being 
directed into neuroscience research, the explosion of the private brain-based industry, and the 
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money and political will behind the “neurorevolution,” along with the potential consequences of 
these advances for human populations, has ignited a branch of the field focused on the study of 
neuroethics (Illes & Sahakian, 2013).  
Testing, for example, has been a large and profitable industry in the United States since 
its early history (Brown, 1992), representing the first real successful commercialization of 
psychology (other than phrenology before it). Federal legislation has ensured that nearly every 
child in the United States is tested multiple times during his or her years in school (Stein, 2014). 
Moreover, given the largely for-profit nature of the testing industry, the political economy of 
testing today involves public money going into private hands on a massive scale. It is imperative 
that MBE research and practices not only steer clear of contributing to this trend, but also 
deliberately work to oppose it.  
For MBE to serve as an emancipatory intent against the regulation and dehumanization of 
students, teachers, and the educational system as a whole, it must guard against the proliferation 
of neuromyths in more meaningful ways than simply calling them out as a problem, without 
taking action to address their damaging impact to schooling and, in particular, subaltern 
populations. Instead, the field must work intentionally (including the use of research money) to 
carry out efforts to prevent neuromyths from influencing public policy. Hence, the field must 
acknowledge that built into all curricular efforts are the political economic interests that 
perpetuate the cultural hegemony of an assimilative education and society, such that the 
hegemonic interests of the racialized, patriarchal, heterosexist, neoliberal dominant culture are 
carried out systematically through the conformity and complicity of MBE agents (students, 
teachers, neurosciences, neuro-educators, etc.). 
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Some vital questions at the outset of every MBE research endeavor, then, must be, how 
will this work contribute to the values and economic interests of those in power? How does this 
come at the expense of already marginalized groups? How can the project work to shift the 
power to the people? These questions are even more crucial in our current political environment, 
where funding is being withdrawn from public education and used for private programs in the 
name of parental choice. MBE as a field stands on a razor’s edge when it comes to this moment 
in our nation’s educational history. This is because the field and its research can, in the name of 
reform or scientific progress, easily reproduce the educational inequalities and injustices that 
interfere with full participation in democratic life. 
Historicity of Knowledge     
Perhaps the biggest blind spot in the field of MBE is the field’s inability to engage with 
its historicity and how the legacy of conquest is implicated in the research process. While the 
literature on the history of MBE occasionally makes mention of the study of the brain sciences 
dating back to the Egyptians and the Greeks, the field, for the most part, sees itself as truly 
beginning with recent advances in brain technologies. This inability to see that MBE is in fact a 
continuation of research and practice that has long dominated education is problematic. For 
critical researchers, all knowledge is understood as both historical and contextual (Darder, 2014), 
such that the supposed immutable nature to structural conditions of inequality are understood as 
colonizing myths. One myth that MBE must contend with is that it was established to battle 
inequality in schools because of the universality of science. The fact is that the field was formed 
as a continuation of the very historical forces that have created deficit views that sustain 
mainstream systems of inequality. 
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Only when MBE can see itself and the educational system it wishes to impact as 
historical institutions, rooted in the coloniality of power and shaped by historical conditions that 
inform the contemporary moment can the field truly move toward socially just goals. The field 
must then move away from the colonizing language and belief system that studies “subjects,” 
particularly of color, as deficit beings (or brains) in need of fixing. Instead, the research in the 
field must begin with the lived histories of the students, teachers, schools, and communities it 
wishes to serve, while also recognizing and acknowledging the positionality and history of the 
researcher—especially when those “being studied” are from subaltern communities. The aim, 
therefore, must not be to impact education, but rather to understand how settler colonialism has 
shaped schooling and educational research in the United States, and how the history of science 
has contributed to its perpetuation. 
Dialectical View of Knowledge     
In its view of knowledge and knowledge formation, MBE continues to struggle to break 
the barrier between research and practice. Similarly, the field struggles with effective 
communication between researchers and practitioners. This is partly due to the fixed and 
dualistic view of knowledge that categorizes fields into absolutes, like neuroscience and 
education. In the critical tradition, knowledge is understood as dynamic, reconstructive, 
regenerative, and always contextual and partial in nature. With this in mind, critical research 
seeks to disrupt the traditional binaries and dichotomies (i.e., humans/nature; mind/body, 
science/non-science) and hierarchical notions (i.e., elitism, privilege, empirical) of the world 
(Darder, 2014). In this way, oppositional elements that exist across a fluid continuum of tension 
or negations are seen as the source of transformative change. Therefore, through challenging 
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MBE’s scientific epistemology, we can confront and unveil, name, and challenge its limit-
situations (Freire,1970) and construct new possibilities of interaction between neuroscientist and 
educators, in the interest of emancipatory knowledge.  
What is necessary then is not just dialogue between researchers and practitioners as the 
field now claims, but dialogue about the actual differences and tensions that exist between them. 
Freire and Macedo (1995) spoke of a critical relationship between theory and practice, where 
there is neither “a theoretic elitism or a practice ungrounded in theory, but the unity between 
theory and practice. In order to achieve this unity, one must have an epistemological curiosity—a 
curiosity that is often missing in dialogue as conversation” (p. 382). Instead of working to 
transcend self-set boundaries, MBE must work to understand that a truly dialectical view of 
knowledge recognizes and engages contradictory elements and tensions linked to the negation of 
oppositions (Darder, 2015). It is through this dialectical process of knowledge construction that 
more just possibilities can emerge. Further, Smith (1999) noted, decolonizing research is not 
simply a complete rejection of Western theories and research approaches. It actually implies the 
deconstruction of dominant Western views of science and challenges the totalitarianism of 
Western science in terms of what counts as science, arguing instead for collaborative work 
among native and non-native researchers.  
One aim of decolonizing research then is to create the conditions to question.  
Who defines and legitimizes what counts as scholarship, who has the power to name? 
How does naming reify existing power relations? Are the tools for decolonization only 
available to indigenous researchers or can this be a shared process? How has the 
discourse on decolonizing research been colonized or appropriated? (Mutua & Swadener, 
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2004, p. 2). These are difficult questions, since the very structures of academia are often 
“an impediment to the decolonization of research” (Blauner & Wellman, 1973, p. 324), 
but asking these tough questions is essential to decolonizing the field. Yet, while 
democratic forms of horizontal engagement are necessary to the process of 
problematization (Darder 2014), it is naïve and counter-productive to think that MBE can 
shift the dominant western ideologies both in academia and in public education on its 
own. One of the suggestions of this study is that fields like special education, educational 
therapy, and K–12 education are also in need of decolonizing interrogations and 
fundamental transformative shifts toward socially just structures and practices.  
Ideology and Critique         
A decolonizing pedagogy and methodology requires that we understand that research is 
never neutral but instead encompasses the values, beliefs, ethics and contradictions; or, in brief, 
the ideology of the dominant society. Once the ideology behind research is acknowledged, it 
must be carefully critiqued with respect to questions of social justice. Critique entails the 
decolonizing interrogation of values and beliefs that sustains asymmetrical or colonizing 
relations of power. An aim of this study has been to unveil the hidden epistemologies and logics 
of coloniality at work within the structure of MBE methodologies and, thus, its research 
conclusions. After this process of deconstruction, there must be a reconstruction or reinvention 
of the field for transformative practice and social empowerment. This however can only happen 
if those in the field are able to name their own reality and positionality, problematize it, and posit 
new possibilities for change (Darder, 2014). This cannot happen without the recognition and 
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critique of the ideology behind the field, both as a scientific enterprise and as a part of the 
educational system within capitalist society.  
In a time where our education system is being pushed toward specific ideological goals 
that value the defunding of public education in the name of choice, addressing ideology in 
critical ways is essential, especially in a field that produces educational research. It is also 
important to understand that critique must be infused by and grounded in an emancipatory 
political vision, for it is within this vision that one is able to coherently and precisely engage the 
deeply embedded issues at work within the hegemonic terrain of MBE. What this requires is a 
counterhegemonic space for resistance and critique (especially by teachers and students).  
In addition to creating such a space within the context of MBE, such efforts need to be 
supported with research funds set aside specifically for studies that work to self-critique in the 
field. Both the Journal of Mind, Brain, and Education as well as the iMBES conference can 
serve as places for such research and practice, though recognition of the importance of critique as 
part of a research and practical process that advances a social justice vision and mission within 
schools and society. Honoring and recognizing the practices of teachers at iMBES conferences, 
acknowledging the cultural differences that exist, and creating a place for unveiling oppressive 
ideological views, attitudes, and practices represents an important first step. Engaging 
systematically the critiques that emerge from the first step is a vital second step. 
Hegemony, Resistance, and Counter-Hegemony      
If the greatest trick of science has been the “god trick of seeing everything from 
nowhere” (Haraway, 1988, p. 581), the greatest sleight of hand of the U.S. educational system is 
its often-touted self-description as a tool for the creation and promotion of equity and democracy 
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in our nation. Unfortunately, despite such lofty aims, commonsense notions have functioned to 
naturalize and normalize assimilative relations of power, which perpetuate paternalism and 
deceptive notions of impartiality, shrouding underlying hegemonic interests. Unveiling the ways 
in which practices of research serve to perpetuate the coloniality of power and legitimate the 
existing social order, must be at the center of a socially just approach to MBE. MBE has to work 
to ensure that its own research practices do not replicate the ideological machinery that preserves 
the status quo, but in fact specifically works to create counter-hegemonic spaces for research and 
knowledge formation, as noted above.    
Decolonizing MBE’s research efforts must therefore aim to dismantle oppressive theories 
and practices in order to emancipate and transform existing conditions in education. As such, 
research that is supported by MBE must support the creation of intellectual and social 
counterhegemonic spaces where alternative readings of the world can exist in the interest of 
liberatory practice. Any decolonizing political project, by necessity, must seek to push back 
against the dominant hegemonic theories and practices that allow for asymmetrical relations of 
power to persist. As Darder (2014) had pointed out: 
There is an enduring legacy of cultural hegemony and racialized language policies 
associated with centuries of colonialism that has resulted in a long history of protracted 
language struggles around the world . . . In order to ensure that the “Other” is kept in line 
with the system of production, racialized institutional policies and practices historically 
have led to national efforts which have resulted in the push for assimilation, deportation, 
incarceration, and even the genocide of minority populations. (p. 1) 
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In examining these interpretations more deeply, we can begin to better understand the way in 
which asymmetrical relations of power are exerted through the use of an institutional structure 
(academia) that perpetuate contemporary forms of colonization and social injustice (Darder, 
2014).  
Rather than business as usual, a decolonizing MBE must work to resist these structures. 
Freire believed that the political empowerment of teachers functions to nourish and cultivate the 
seeds of political resistance, “a resistance historically linked to a multitude of personal and 
collective struggles waged around the world in efforts to democratize education” (Darder, 2002, 
p. 61). MBE research must then work to engage the voices of teachers and subaltern 
communities in a variety of ways, recognizing that it is through their understanding and lived 
practices that resistance to hegemonic practices in education will ensue—not the mainstream 
views of scientists or the MBE field as it exists today. Moreover, incorporating decolonizing 
approaches to teaching social justice as part of the preparation of MBE practitioners is 
paramount, in that programs that aim to graduate MBE scholars and practitioners must include 
such coursework in their curriculum.  
Alliance of Theory and Practice     
Research must be of relevance not only to the profession in which it is rooted, but to the 
larger society as well. What this work argues is that this relevance cannot be established solely 
through a clinical or positivist approach, but requires a detailed re-documentation of MBE 
phenomenon that integrates an emancipatory understanding of theory and practice (Maroun, 
2012). A decolonizing methodology and curriculum must therefore be fundamentally linked to 
the practical intent of transforming current inequities in the MBE field. The emphasis here is on 
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what Freire (1970) called praxis, where social relations (as noted earlier) are grounded in a 
reconstituting and self-generating process of reflection, dialogue, and action (Darder, 2014). 
Decolonizing MBE research must aim to have a purpose in the everyday life of vulnerable 
populations and be linked to the real world. As de Sousa Santos (2009) has argued, a Southern 
epistemology respects three fundamental pillars: (a) learning that the South exists, (b) learning to 
go to the South, and (c) learning from and with the South. MBE must consider these 
decolonizing pillars as it also works to become more flexible and fluid, shifting and moving 
according to the actual conditions that emerge within the context of classrooms, rather than 
laboratories where conditions are fabricated. About this, Freire (2000) has noted: 
No pedagogy which is truly liberating can remain distant from the oppressed by treating 
them as unfortunates and by presenting for their emulation models from among the 
oppressors. The oppressed must be their own example in the struggle for their 
redemption...Pedagogy which begins with the egoistic interests of the oppressors (an 
egoism cloaked in the false generosity of paternalism) and makes of the oppressed the 
objects of its humanitarianism, itself maintains and embodies oppression. It is an 
instrument of dehumanization. (p. 23) 
There is a loud call for classroom-based research in MBE (Fischer et al., 2010) but how 
can such research be funded when science calls for exact measurements and empirical evidence 
and decontextualized neutrality, while the living classroom enacts a muddy and messy human 
reality? Unless MBE aligns its theories with the realities of real life practices, it will continue to 
fall short of any social justice goals. Therefore, the question should never be how can we better 
use student data to inform our scientific aims, but rather how can we create methodologies and 
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epistemologies that reflect the realities in which students exist and the condition in which they 
are forced to survive?  
Dialogue 
All this requires that we begin with the voices of students and teacher. As a result, an aim 
of the field must be to create dialogical spaces where perspectives and insights of students and 
teachers are encouraged and engaged as legitimate forms of knowledge. To do this, the field 
must ensure that it is echoing the voices of the classroom instead of inserting science’s 
historically paternalistic and assimilative voice into the classroom. Trinh Min-Ha (2009) 
explained: 
You who understand the dehumanization of forced removal-relocation-re- education-
redefinition, the humiliation of having to falsify your own reality, your voice—you know. 
And often cannot say it. You try and keep on trying to unsay it, for if you don’t, they will 
not fail to fill in the blanks on your behalf, and you will be said. (p. 80) 
Hence, dialogue is essential to the alliance of research and practice, but dialogue is no 
easy task, as it requires an ongoing commitment to be with the people. Darder and colleagues 
(2009) have noted that dialogue constitutes one of the most important aspects of critical 
pedagogy, in that it engages an emancipatory process that is committed to the social 
empowerment of communities, by respecting them as rightful historical subjects of their world. 
Freire’s approach to pedagogy (Freire & Macedo, 1995) necessitated that we move from 
“speaking to” to “speaking with” others, which implicitly communicates respect for the 
knowledge and dignity that others bring to our dialogue. Freire and Macedo (1995) argued: 
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Dialogue characterizes an epistemological relationship. Thus, in this sense dialogue is a 
way of knowing and should never be viewed as a mere tactic to involve students in a 
particular task. We have to make this point very clear. I engage in dialogue not 
necessarily because I like the other person. I engage in dialogue because I recognize the 
social and not merely the individualistic character of the process of knowing. In this 
sense, dialogue presents itself as an indispensable component of the process of both 
learning and knowing. (p. 379) 
With this in mind, dialogue between scientists and teachers and students would require 
meaningful opportunities to engage with one another, across our differences. It would mean 
earnestly involving communities, families, young children, students, faculty, and all that are 
directly impacted by the research and the practice. This, of course, requires the humility to let go 
of the arrogant shield of expertise often found among MBE professionals and to instead enter 
these relationships as vulnerable and open human beings. This also requires a commitment to 
dialogue, even when it seems like the difficult choice or too “time consuming.” In this way, 
dialogue within MBE can become an earnest attempt to engage students and teachers with 
respect, for who they are, rather than adhering to a common tendency to see teachers and 
nonscientists as those who need to be educated and students as subjects to fulfill the research 
needs of the field.    
Conscientization    
As has been repeatedly stressed, collective emancipatory action for transforming existing 
conditions of inequality and injustice in schools and society must be at the heart of decolonizing 
the MBE movement. To combat the effects of a capitalist system that relies on a “banking” 
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epistemicide within education, Freire (2000) posited “Conscientização—a term that denotes the 
skill of perceiving social, political, and economic contradictions—to take action against the 
oppressive elements of reality” (p. 35). This social critical consciousness affirms a commitment 
to the humanity of subaltern communities, anchored by a “deeply reflexive interpretation of the 
dialectical relationship between our cultural existence as individuals and our political and 
economic existence as social beings” (Darder, 2002, p. 568). While MBE presents itself as a 
field where knowledge construction of the research process is understood as a collective process, 
such a dialectical engagement is still lacking in the field (Fischer et al., 2010). A critical 
awareness of its own research and actions is fundamental because only then can the field uncover 
commonsensical notions that reproduce inequalities, in order to seek ways to create genuine 
change.  
Freire’s (2000) work was as much about unveiling the structures of domination as it was 
about decolonizing our minds from “hegemonic ideologies that made us complicit with our 
oppression” (Darder, 2015, p. 34). Instead of educating students for the dehumanizing roles 
prescribed by racializing epistemologies, Freire’s pedagogy challenged notions of identity and 
Western concepts of human development (Darder, 2015). For communities that have been, at the 
same time, purposefully neglected and willfully damaged by the colonizing processes of 
schooling, Freire’s work supports the call for an MBE educational project linked to anticolonial 
struggles for self-determination and a politically just world. To this end, MBE must support 
decolonizing shifts not just in schools but within the field itself, its intentions, and its research 
and practice by working to develop a critical consciousness from which to forge a decolonizing 
MBE curriculum that views students and teachers as integral and capable human beings.  
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Forging A Decolonizing MBE Curriculum 
Following our reasoning regarding the need to decolonize the field of MBE in order to 
move toward a social justice paradigm, there must also be a decolonizing vision of curriculum 
that embraces a global push for cognitive justice. From this perspective a decolonizing 
curriculum would push back against the current positivist curriculum in MBE and struggle for a 
more itinerant, deterritorialized, and rhizomic epistemology (Paraskeva, 2011) for the field. 
An Itinerant, Deterritorialized, Rhizomic Curriculum  
What is clear from this study is the need for a more culturally relevant curriculum in 
MBE and for recognition that this struggle is one against the coloniality of knowledges as well as 
a fight against epistemicides. In essence, as has been argued, the struggle for social justice is a 
struggle to achieve cognitive justice (de Sousa Santos, 2007b) and to democratize knowledge 
(Paraskeva, 2011). In such a struggle, there is a need for a shift from our current position toward 
a more itinerant theoretical posture with what Paraskeva (2011) called “the critical curriculum 
river” (p. 1) running beneath it. Such a posture would go beyond the obstacles created by the 
Eurocentric and patriarchal tensions between science and education and instead “turn from 
science as the single standard of knowledge [that currently dominates education] in favor of a 
plurality of equally ways of knowing” (Wexler, 1976, p. 8).  
Such an itinerant curriculum theory (ICT) would dare to violate the scientific canon and 
(Paraskeva, 2011) and propose decolonizing alternatives for research and practice in the field. In 
MBE, ICT would actually bring scientific knowledge face-to-face with nonscientific knowledge, 
explicitly local knowledges from classrooms and communities that are grounded in the 
experience of teachers as well as leaders and activists of social movements in education 
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(Paraskeva, 2011). These knowledges and realities of education are not just limited to the 
classroom but would extend to the larger context of schooling and politics. This decolonizing, 
deterritorialized, rhizomatous approach sees reality beyond dichotomies, beyond beginnings and 
ends, and looks to research that is not stable but arises from a multiplicity of platforms. The 
“clean” and “absolutizing” knowledge territories that center around science are at the heart of the 
problem in MBE; in response, a centerless, periphery-less position is required to build something 
truly new (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987; Eco, 1984). To do this, the field must commit to fight for a 
decolonizing research platform where we can push toward “instability, not stability” (O’Brien & 
Penna, 1999, p. 106) and embrace the actual conditions of the messy, non-Western-scientific 
world of education. 
Central to such a vision is also the move from dualism to monism, away from a binary 
perspective that is characterized by separations and oppositional “either-ors” to a world that is 
interconnected, where knowledge is porous, and the only separations that exist are seen to be 
imposed by our own thinking. Similarly, this requires a simultaneous focus on developing a 
politics of location (Braidotti, 2013; Haraway, 1988)—or mapping out the power relations 
characterizing the assemblages or multiplicities in which we are embedded. MBE must therefore 
work to decenter notions of the human (and the human brain) as the central actor in the world 
and instead offer a more collective referent in theorizing the place of the mind and brain within 
education.  
One of the most important ways to do this is to account for the ways we, as teachers and 
researchers, decide on what and how we teach and research from our own politics of location and 
to move away from the dangerous myth of the distanced, objective researcher, and instead 
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reframe research in more situated, fluid, relational, and complex terms. Such understandings are 
also essential to developing systems-level perspectives that see the self as one part of a larger, 
relational network that is constantly in motion, instead of the current individualistic and atomistic 
view of the field that places all power (and deficit) in the individual brain and aims to alter that 
brain through drugs, brain-training, and the like. As mentioned earlier, some in the field have 
begun to push for such shifts by calling for a metaphor of “ecosystems” for the mind as “living, 
growing, and self-regulating in a metabolic relationship to its environment” (Stein, 2015, p. 28). 
But what this Neo-Piagetian approach continues to ignore are the historical, political, and 
structural oppressions at work in this paradigm and why simply changing our scientific 
metaphors will do little to transform the colonizing structures that continue to bind marginalized 
groups in this country and around the world.  
The notion of the world as produced by heterogeneous mixtures is also a way to develop 
a different understanding of the differences we see among students. From this vantage point, we 
can try to reconsider not just how we look at norms and those who are different from the norm, 
but the power of collectives, so that we can begin to “think about the addressable, the 
unthinkable, the non-thinkable of the curriculum” (Corazza as cited by Paraskeva, 2011, p. xxiii) 
and imagine new ways to think in order to simultaneously oppose the oppressive neuromyths that 
persist. Only with such a call to engage in a radical creativity of thought can we expect 
neuroscience and education to forge, together, decolonizing and just alternatives (Braidotti, 
2013). 
It is important to note again that this is not a struggle against science. As Freire (1998) 
claimed, “To deify or demonize technology or science is an extremely negative way of thinking 
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incorrectly” (p. 39). Instead, the point is making a political commitment to advancing a new 
understanding of science, which implies an effort to decolonize fields across universities, in 
particular teacher-education programs as well as neuro-educator programs. ICT challenges one 
of the fundamental characteristic of abyssal thinking: the impossibility of co-presence of the two 
sides of the line. But to do this, we must ask the towering question: Dare MBE build a 
decolonizing social order? Because only then, in such a post-abyssal theory and curriculum can 
a just form of science truly be possible.  
If we can assume such a rhizomatous approach (Gough, 2000) that sees reality beyond 
dichotomies, beyond beginnings and ends, a theory of non-spaces (Augé, 2003) that breeds from 
the multiplicity of immanent platforms and defies clean knowledge territories (Deleuze & 
Guattari, 1987; Eco, 1984), we can also come to imagine schools that are no longer tyrannized 
by the rhythms of classification and compartmentalization, headed by spurious dynamics, or 
consigned to produce segregated outcomes. The great challenge facing curriculum theory in 
MBE then is to figure out how “to operate a [decolonizing] order, a new system anchored in new 
and powerful non-state ways of articulation, which imposes new geographies of centrality” 
(Sassen, 2004, p. 126). 
MBE must also engage in the struggle for what de Sousa Santos, Nunes, and Meneses 
(2007) have called epistemological diversity and a commitment to an emancipatory, 
nonrelativistic, cosmopolitan ecology of knowledges, bringing together dialogues and alliances 
between diverse forms of knowledge, cultures, and “cosmopologies” in response to different 
forms of oppression that enact the coloniality of knowledge and power (Paraskeva, 2011). MBE 
must remember that we need to learn from the South because reinventing social emancipation 
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goes beyond the critical theory produced in the North and the social and political praxis to which 
it has subscribed (de Sousa Santos et al., 2007a). This is the reason the field must reimagine 
through a decolonizing lens the role of students, teachers, and schools and understand that it is 
engaged in a fight for a just and equal society alongside them.  
But MBE must do this while recognizing its own position in the battle against the 
monoculture of scientific knowledge. Though not in the MBE literature specifically, for 
example, other educational offshoots of neuroscience research such as Universal Design for 
Learning (UDL) aim to bring “a scientifically valid framework for guiding educational practice” 
in order to “address the primary barrier to fostering expert learners within instructional 
environments” (http://www.udlcenter.org/aboutudl/whatisudl/conceptofudl). Ironically, 
programs and frameworks such as UDL have formed as a way to critique “inflexible” and “one-
size-fits-all” curricula and instead try to promote curricula “designed from the outset to meet the 
needs of all learners” by addressing learner variability by suggesting flexible goals, methods, 
materials, and assessments that empower educators to meet the varied needs of all learners 
(http://www.udlcenter.org/aboutudl/whatisudl/conceptofudl).  
But the fact remains that a scientific framework that aims to meet the needs of all learners 
is by definition a form of “monoculture of knowledge” (de Sousa Santos, 2007a, p. xxxix). 
About this de Sousa Santos (2007a) asserted, “It is increasingly acknowledging that current 
scientific knowledge imposes as the only true or adequate interpretation of reality a worldview 
conceived as a global explanation of the world, thereby eliminating the possibility of a 
complementarity or articulation of knowledges” (p. xxxix). It is exactly these global explanations 
that such programs aim to achieve in education, all the while emphasizing variability and 
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flexibility. Similarly, some MBE scholars, including Zach Stein (2014), who leads the 
conversation about social justice in the field, have criticized critical educators’ stance that the 
learning sciences have been a predominately negative force in schools, claiming that this is 
shortsighted because: 
There has, in fact, never been a true science of education brought into the schools. Like 
Christianity and Communism, as the saying goes, a true science of education has not 
failed––it has never been tried. Given the significance of advances in the learning 
sciences in recent decades, the possibilities for adopting them for use in test design are 
profound, (p. 264) 
But reducing the argument of critical theorists to that of just blaming all injustices on science is 
evidence that these theories have not been seriously engaged. The point is not to blame science 
nor is it to give it dominance. Rather, the point is to push away from universal notions of 
learning and testing and adopt a more itinerant position that recognizes the multiplicity of our 
humanity—including within the cognitive sphere.  
This is not just limited to MBE or the sciences. The overwhelming majority of teacher-
education programs are deeply insensitive to fostering different ways of thinking, which is partly 
why universalizing neuromyths perpetuated by MBE can easily take authority. Teachers, 
however, are exhausted by the attempt to produce “similarities” in the midst of an increasingly 
diverse and intricate multiplicity (Roy, 2003). We therefore need to free teacher education from a 
representational framework, allowing young teachers to think differently and in new ways, in 
order to better understand the productive and relational power of difference (Paraskeva, 2007; 
Roy, 2003). For it is, indeed, difference rather than similarity that drives the process of change 
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and transformation. The challenge then is to work within critical curriculum theory and practice, 
in order to find decolonizing methodologies that incorporate teachers’ and students’ 
understanding of difference in new and positive ways (El-Haj, 2006; Paraskeva, 2011; Roy, 
2003).  
Drawing from Deleuze’s (1994) analyses, as MBE scholars and advocates of cognitive 
justice then, we need to fight for a curriculum theory and practice that departs from dominant 
systems of meaning that take a Platonic position and reproduce the coloniality of power, which 
perceives the world as a reproduction of a particular original model (Paraskeva, 2006, 2007, 
2008; Roy, 2003). Instead, we must fight for theories and practices that view education as a set 
of relationships in which the personal plays a leading role and change is embraced as a critical 
aspect in the evolution of human consciousness (Darder, 2015). 
In short, before talk of neuro-educators or new testing models, MBE must engage the 
educational and curriculum theorists who function as epistemological pariahs, challenging a 
decolonizing theoretical path that appear to them as inexact; yet, these are, in fact, the result of 
rigorous inquiry (Deleuze, 1990) in search of cognitive justice and ready to unveil hidden 
curriculums and denounce epistemicides. This is a call then. For the formation of itinerant MBE 
theorists who are profoundly sentient of the multiplicities of lines, spaces, and dynamic 
becomings (Deleuze, 1990), willing to get engaged with alternative readings within the 
curriculum field that have been erased or marginalized (Malewski, 2010). In other words, the 
first decolonizing task of MBE researchers is to cultivate the capacity to be critical (Freire, 
2000). 
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Ethics and Emancipatory Possibilities for MBE 
To conceive of a decolonizing vision requires that it be tied to one’s lived history and to a 
clear political emancipatory project (Darder, 2011b). About this, Freire (1994) argued:  
A politicized person is one who has transcended the perception of life as a pure biological 
process to arrive at a perception of life as a biographical, historical, and collective 
process. A politicized person is one who can sort out the different and often fragmented 
pieces contained in the flux. Political clarity is possible to the extent that we reflect 
critically on day-to-day facts and to the extent that we can transcend our sensibilities so 
as to progressively gain a more rigorous understanding of the facts. (p. 130)   
Similarly, MBE as a field needs to become politicized, first, to ensure that the field is not 
upholding the structures of domination and exploitation that prevail, and second, to transform the 
oppressive structures that exist. Such an emancipatory political vision of the field requires 
commitment to moral and ethical relationships with the world. The field must embody these in 
its language, literature, methodology, research goals, and practice. 
In both the MBE literature and the larger literature around neuroscience is a great deal of 
discussion around ethics. Generally, two ethical themes run through the literature (Illes & 
Sahakian, 2013; Levy, 2009). One is concerned with the integrity and autonomy of individuals, 
questioning the limits of scientifically based interventions and asking the important question: 
Should all knowledge be used just because it can be? This area of study has come to be known as 
neuro-ethics. The other theme is concerned with questions of equity, access, and the fair 
distribution of scientific benefits, as science continues to make progress. 
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There is no question that, as MBE scholars, as critical educators, and as critical 
neuroscientists we must ask: What dangers do the vision and mission of MBE pose? With the 
advances of brain-training and the war against public education, could the future of education be 
nothing more than brain training, where the definition of learning is reduced to making 
synapses—synapses that can be made through computerized trainings more than thoughtful 
discussion, critical engagement, and connection. As Stein (2013) noted, we must also recognize 
“where educational processes become unacceptable because of what is being done to students, 
not just because of what is withheld, lacking, or inequitably distributed” (p. 2). 
There is also no question that our public education system, which has been historically 
conceived by policy makers as a “sorting machine” for human capital (Spring, 1989), is now 
being dismantled and replaced by a mixture of for-profit private schools, charter schools, on-line 
education providers, and what remains of traditional public schools as they become increasingly 
underfunded and undervalued. What emerge are perhaps the most complex and overtly 
economically driven educational configurations in the history of our country and the world. In 
this new education system, we are already overwhelmed like never before by the swift 
replacement of Deweyian ideals of a democratic system by economic interests all while we 
watch brain sciences take us from the task of raising children to designing them (Stein, 2010). As 
this happens, students, especially those who have historically been the collateral damage of our 
educational practices and unjust economic structures, are at risk of once again as our approach to 
education aims to accelerate a process of epistemological McDonaldization (Andrew, 2009). It is 
a dark moment, indeed, and somehow the discussion around neuro-ethics sheds an even darker, 
more paralyzing, shadow on the future.  
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It is exactly in these moments, however, that we must remember that “as men and women 
inserted in and formed by a socio-historical context of relations, we become capable of 
comparing, evaluating, intervening, deciding, taking new directions, and thereby constituting 
ourselves as ethical beings” (Freire, 1998, p. 38). In other words, our first order of business must 
be to recall that ethics, like love, reflect a continuing “interpretation of the dialectical relationship 
between our cultural existence as individuals and our political and economic existence as social 
beings” (Darder 2009, p. 568). Our ethical responsibility must therefore move beyond the 
discussion of ethics we see in MBE today. Our ethical responsibility as decolonizing MBE 
educators comes back to our capacities as critical moral leaders. We must question how our own 
ideological beliefs and pedagogical intentions and our own adherence to the status quo impacts 
us and, from this place, work to unveil the hidden curriculum of oppressive pedagogical 
structures, transforming the fear that binds us, into courage and into an armed love (Freire, 
2000).  
The questions raised in the field around ethics, then, while important, fall more under the 
reach of morality than they do ethics, in the Freirean tradition. For Freire, the best way to 
struggle for ethics is to live it in our educational practice, in our relationships with our students, 
and in the way we deal with the contents of what we teach (Darder, 2014; Freire, 1998). To be 
grounded ethically then, is to understand our own being in the world as a presence that is in 
relationship and interdependent with the world and others. 
This presence can reflect upon itself, it can intervene, it can speak of what it does, it can 
take stock, evaluate, decide, and it can transform (Freire, 1998). It is important then that we, as 
educators and researchers, do not subsume our ethics under large questions of morality, or 
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simply look at them as an area of study such as in neuro-ethics; but that we, instead, ground our 
decolonizing ethics in our everyday lives and actions. This is what Freire meant by transgression. 
We must therefore take responsibility for our own individual actions and, in so doing, exercise 
our power and release our fear of doom. Only then can we see that the future, while problematic, 
is not determined fatalistically, despite the fatalism that seems to surround us. In fact, if we focus 
on Freire’s ethical framework of presence, our present moment slowly escapes its overwhelming 
pessimism and shifts from what we might perceive as the darkness of the tomb, to what might 
actually be, the darkness of the womb. This moment might constitute the moment of 
transgression we have all been waiting for and a decolonizing approach to MBE can serve as a 
means in that mission. But only if we remember that it is our ethical responsibility to embrace a 
politics of hope in our daily work.  
MBE as Social Justice Paradigm 
 
The purpose of this study has been to re-think and re-envision the field of MBE, looking 
specifically at the lack of engagement with social justice concerns in order to: (a) critique the 
dominant epistemology of science that reproduces inequalities, not just within the field itself but 
in its intended practice; and (b) move toward the formulation of a social justice paradigm of 
MBE that supports the conditions for an emancipatory and humanizing view of teachers, 
students, and brain-based educational practices, through a decolonizing interpretive methodology 
(Darder, 2014). Toward this aim, this study first worked to challenge and dismantle the deep 
hegemonic epistemologies and structures of the field. This disruption is the necessary first step 
toward opening up the field to re-inventing itself, using a decolonizing lens in order to create a 
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new emancipatory vision for the field. This chapter has outlined the principles that inform such 
an organic reinvention and that support a decolonizing praxis. 
The aim of decolonizing interpretive educational research is to engage the dominant 
literature on pedagogy, curriculum, methodology, and schooling with the aim of disrupting 
dominant epistemologies and building them anew (Darder, 2015). In the case of MBE, the first 
goal is to disrupt the primary stance shaped by a positivist epistemology, where research tends to 
become a means for the promotion of Western scientific thought and its political economic 
project of conquest. In fact, an argument of decolonizing interpretive methodology is that 
research needs to “unveil and destabilize existing structures of power that perpetuate the material 
and social oppression of the most vulnerable populations” (Darder, 2015, p. 4), not contribute to 
the reproduction and perpetuation of these structures.  
As Tejeda (2008) has emphasized, it is important to acknowledge the past and present as 
coexisting in our understanding. Therefore, in order to understand where this young field is now 
and where it hopes to go, it is imperative that we realize the present is unintelligible without a 
reading of the past (Tejeda, 2008). As has been done in this study, the history of science with its 
colonial and capitalistic structures must be considered when examining the field of MBE, which 
both rests on those structures and promotes them. For MBE to be genuinely democratic, the field 
also requires a radical re-engagement between the sciences and education. Such an engagement 
first necessitates a re-reading of the literature in the field through a critical lens, as has been done 
here, in order to unveil the historical and philosophical foundations that inform its evolution. 
Though it may work to cloak the power dynamics within itself, this study has shown that the 
MBE movement is entrenched in hegemonic ways of thinking and oppressive practices that 
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project deficit views upon education as a field as well as teachers as a group and students from 
subaltern communities. In the process, education has become the target of what Freire (2000) 
termed false generosity by those in the world of scientific research. 
As has been demonstrated through this decolonizing interpretive research, this study has 
sought to undertake a critical analysis of bodies of knowledge related to MBE, in order to engage 
with issues related to the lives and survival of those deemed as other. As such, the question of 
the “orientalist” gaze (Said, 1978), as implicated in the Western production of research and 
conclusions about the other, was also considered, especially as the other is now reduced to the 
brains of children (Stein et al, 2010). Similarly, the extent to which Western political and 
economic interests distort the perceptions of the other, where an underlying hidden curriculum is 
aimed at the assimilation of the other in order to preserve the classed, racialized, gendered, and 
sexual hierarchies or supremacies of Western cultural domination (Darder, 2015) has been and 
must continue to be critically interrogated.  
Once these steps have taken place, and once the very definitions of the words in the name 
of the field have been decolonized and re-imagined, a new paradigm emerges that is informed by 
decolonizing principles, an itinerant curriculum, and ethical responsibility. This paradigm rests 
on four pillars (see Figure 3) that includes a value-laden ideology, a rhizomic curriculum, 
contextual research, and locally valid practice. Rejecting the scientific gold standard of research 
for the objective and unbiased search for knowledge, this social justice paradigm recognizes that 
all knowledge is ideological, political, cultural, historical, spiritual, and encourages a deep 
understanding and recognition of the interconnectedness and holism of nature, moving beyond 
boundaries of objective measurement.  
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Assuming such a value-laden ideology would also mean accepting responsibility for 
maintaining harmonious relationships among people, nature, and all life, and placing ethics, not 
objectivity, at the center of all research. This paradigm also follows an itinerant, rhizomic 
epistemology, and fluid curriculum that honors multiple ways of knowing and places them on a 
horizontal field, allowing dialogue and interdependence. Such a curriculum is naturally 
interconnected (not discipline based) and honors epistemological diversity. In this paradigm, 
instead of valuing abstract knowledge derived from experiments and controlled variables, 
knowledge is derived through direct interaction with the natural world and research encompasses 
all processes of perceiving, thinking, acting, and coming to know that evolve through human 
experience.  
Finally, from this paradigm, the practice of MBE would aim to have specific impact that 
is meaningful to the place where the work is ongoing. In other words, instead of seeking to be 
universally valid, research is rooted in local places and is practiced to meet the specific needs of 
the community, aimed at its long-term survival through practical and applied goals. 
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Figure 3 A social justice paradigm of MBE. 
Conclusion 
During the first decade of the 21st century, the world economy fell into crisis as the 
national discourse around politics and policy began to fall once again behind the idea of U.S. 
technological and scientific superiority. This resulted in yet another push for comprehensive 
educational reform in the name of preparing American children for the techno-scientific 
economy of the new century (Stein, 2013). The climate saw federal testing policies move toward 
even more overwhelming accountability metrics for schools, as prescription drugs for academic 
under-performance skyrocketed and “brainhood” (Vidal, 2009, p. 1) became a new way to 
describe personhood. As the neuro-discourse (and the money that fueled it) entered educational 
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policy, neuroscientific research furthered the ideology of brainhood, marking a new shift in our 
very concepts of being human (Lowe, Lee, & Macvarish, 2015; Vidal, 2009; Wilson, 2002).  
As it has been historically the case, these changes have led to an increase in the already 
large financial inequalities between school districts, as technological progress in the broader 
culture began outstripping school infrastructures (Stein, 2013) conducting the further 
deterioration of teaching and learning in schools, during recent decades (Hursh, 2008; RAND, 
2010). Now, almost two decades in, evidence continues to mount concerning the detrimental 
effects of these naïve educational practices, especially around their stigmatizing and 
disempowering impact on students as well as on teachers who have seen their pedagogical and 
curricular options truncated (RAND, 2010). One cannot help but wonder how the continued push 
for the use of neuroscience research in classrooms will impact teaching and learning in the 
coming decades; if history teaches us anything, the trend should be of concern to those of us 
committed to democratic education.  
Just as the last push of science into education in the form of testing and measurement left 
teachers fearful, feeling “they are no longer with their students because the force of punishment 
and threatening dominant ideology comes between them” (Darder, 2002, p. 60), this new push 
will likely further solidify the instrumentalization of education through the intensification of 
ideological values and beliefs that support standardized, prepackaged, teacher-proof curricula, 
and rigorous testing and assessment procedures. Except this new shift now comes with even 
more perfect, more “scientifically sound” measurements. We live in a great shift of 
consciousness, which Freire (1998) warned, if left unaddressed, will bring us to a brutal and 
unforgiving time. Perhaps this time has already come to pass, but surely it is not too late. 
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Freire (2000) was convinced that schools exist as significant sites of struggle, and that 
teachers must “embrace an ethical responsibility as citizens of history” because they are “in an 
ideal position to collectively fight for the re-invention of the world” (Darder, 2002, p. 31). Part of 
the argument of this study has been that such a struggle and re-envisioning is not limited to 
teachers in classrooms but to all those who view themselves as committed to education, 
including MBE scholars, neuroscientists, and policy workers. As such, it is the job of people in 
these positions to engage teachers in promoting social justice and neurodiversity as part of their 
work. This would need to be done at every level including in policy that impacts teacher training, 
and professional development that brings together research and practice in ways that emancipate, 
not bind, students. On the other hand, educators themselves must push back against the 
scientification of their field in ways that limit the work of students and their own work. It is 
therefore the work of MBE scholars to call for this kind of resistance and to work with teachers 
in advocating for the human rights of their students. What Freire’s (2000) vision of a humanizing 
education gave us is an example of a reflective praxis wherein individuals become socially 
conscious of themselves and the world around them. If we were to reject the perils of the 
exploitative system of education fueled by capitalism, he argued, and allowed citizens to realize 
the power of their ontological vocation, we would find on the other side a more meaningful 
existence.  
To achieve this, Freire (2000) provided us with a language and theoretical framework for 
being, in hopes of “transcending a colonial existence that is almost culturally schizophrenic” (p. 
11), a phrase that well describes the ideology of brainhood in education. But such an 
emancipated existence requires first a fundamental shift in the way leaders, educators, and in this 
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case neuroscientists and MBE scholars, view themselves and their role. Such an existence 
requires the rejection of colonizing ideologies that have been responsible for the cultural 
domination of our education system and for the recognition of the self as a subject of history, in 
order to “critique, decolonize, and reinvent the world anew, in the interest of a truly just and 
democratic future” (Darder, 2015, p. 40) in solidarity with others.  
In such an existence, teachers and scientists would not be on opposite sides of a “bridge 
too far” (Bruer, 1997) that could never link the “abyssal divide” (de Sousa Santos, 2009), but 
engaged with one another in a critical understanding of the world that encourages inventive, 
emancipatory arrangements (Darder, 2002). In this new paradigm, all MBE educators would 
work together to decolonize the field by renaming it, to utilize the decolonizing principles to 
inform their work in the field, to push for and engage in a more itinerant curriculum, and to 
uphold the ethical and emancipatory possibilities of MBE in their everyday practice. The pursuit 
of our full humanity, in education or elsewhere, can never be achieved in isolation but “only in 
the fellowship and solidarity of community and social movement” (Darder, 2015, p. 39). This is 
the reason that in order for MBE to reposition itself as a socially just field, it must first commit to 
developing political and social consciousness as a field of study (Darder, 2015). Only then can 
the field overcome the risks it now faces of educating students for the dehumanizing roles 
prescribed by Eurocentric epistemologies and move toward a pedagogy of transgression (Freire, 
2000), committed to transforming the “oppressive ideologies, attitudes, structures, conditions, 
and practices within education and society that debilitate our humanity” (Darder, 2015, p. 5).  
 
 
 213 
EPILOGUE 
A persistent question among my family and friends, and even some colleagues, has 
always been, why do you work with “special needs” kids? I didn’t grow up with a learning 
disability. No one I knew or loved struggled with one. I was always good at school, exceeding 
expectations, getting good grades, the perfect student. But the perfection, and the praise and 
value I received for it, came at a devastatingly high price. It came at the price of my creativity, 
the full potential of my learning, and it limited me, ironically eating away at my confidence, 
creating an environment of fear in which I always thrived but wished I could crash. I would go 
so far as to say it came at the price of the full expression of my soul. 
I grew up of course in a particularly patriarchal and authoritarian regime and school 
system. But like the kids I work with now, I felt unseen, invisible, punished, shamed, and 
ultimately undervalued, underutilized, and disconnected. There is not much difference between a 
student who has disconnected because of an inability to learn and one who has burned out on 
“learning” in the banking model. And it has been in doing this study that I have come to 
recognize why I identify and empathize with a population of which I was never a member.  
My education before this doctorate program was also all in the service of understanding 
why I felt so disconnected and unseen in my schooling. We have such a romanticized and 
beautiful definition of education in the culture but that was rarely my experience. So, I wanted to 
understand how learning is actually meant to happen—and where things go wrong. This is what 
drew me to the learning sciences and education. But while I found much of what I learned 
interesting, the answers to my questions were not in the synapses of the brain or in the 
developmental milestone of the growing child. My studies in the sciences and developmental 
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psychology taught me that children, if given resources and opportunity and guidance, can do 
great things. But one thing was still missing from education, and that was radical love.  
Talk of child-centered education, of constructing meaning, of developmentally informed 
pedagogy fills the progressive education movements and the schools where many of my clients 
come from. But even there, among their privilege, resources, cutting-edge educational practices, 
something was missing, and I would find them turning to me, a brown woman of far lesser 
pedigree, background opportunity, money, and in many instances, education, for help and 
answers. 
My work as an educational therapist taught me that connection, love, trust, hope, feelings, 
safety—these are things that nurture brains and cure “disorders” because that is what disordered 
brains are, they are disconnected. Not surprisingly, this is also what supports the empowerment 
of families, parenting, and even schools. An hour of uninterrupted loving human attention does 
more for a child than three months of a brain-training app. This, I came to know in experience 
after experience. So, while I came into this doctoral program hoping to understand how to scale 
my work as an educational therapist, the quiet secret I carried was, how do you scale love? 
As I leave this program now, I feel far more at ease, far less anxious and troubled by the 
always-blatant, sometimes-savage inequalities and inequities I see in the educational 
opportunities of students in our country. I know first-hand that a privileged but disconnected, 
drugged up child in an affluent Los Angeles neighborhood faces similar social injustice as a 
child fighting poverty on the other side of the concrete freeway. Lack of love, the forces that 
disconnect those children from each other, from themselves, and their world, these are the social 
injustices we must fight and resist.  
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In my own life and learning, I finally see that self-love, self-acceptance, self-connection 
as well as empathic connection to others is all of our calling. Decolonizing our minds and bodies 
from the sources that promote disconnection from self, in exchange for achievement, so-called 
success, perfection, and conquest, must be our goal, as educators and as humans. This is not an 
easy task. The socialization, the culture that wires our brains, is strong, pervasive, and 
overwhelming. At times, I wonder if my work, my time with a student or a parent or an educator 
seeking answers ultimately makes any difference. I know they are up against the same forces as I 
am, as all of us are, with the lure of detachment now so close and readily available at all our 
fingertips, literally. How do we come back to being human? How do we keep trying to 
reconnect? And not just how, but why? Why fight for a world like ours? Why fight for humanity 
even as it shows its worst sides? Or simply its apathetic, disconnected side? The answer is 
simple. Therein lies our salvation. If this process has taught me one thing it is that love is 
scalable when you become it, and salvation is possible when you are privileged enough to have it 
be the byproduct of your efforts.  
More specifically, since completing this study, the shift I have experienced in myself has 
begun to shift my practice. In a field where I am expected to rely heavily on testing and 
diagnoses, I now find myself pushing back against the essentialized belief that all children need 
to be tested not just in the privacy of my work with families, but in schools, with colleagues, and 
the in the field at large. Whereas I have always looked at testing and diagnoses with a grain of 
salt, I now find myself referring less for neuropsychological testing and instead trusting the 
learning process of my students. Similarly, I have started to try and engage the field more 
intentionally with respect to the issue of social justice by writing proposals for national 
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presentations and publications in both MBE and the field of Educational Therapy that put social 
justice at the center of the conversation, and by working to bring this discussion to local study 
groups and schools. I have also begun to work at the leadership level with the Association of 
Educational Therapists as Chair of Research with the sole goal of promoting both student and 
subaltern voices in the field as well as of bringing issues of social justice to the forefront, 
including questioning the field’s tendency to train practitioners specifically for private practice. 
My work with schools has also shifted. Whereas my position before was to offer critique from 
the margins of schools, I now directly engage with schools from within, working with principals, 
learning specialists, and others at the leadership level to invite them to engage more deeply with 
questions of epistemology and how our lens defines the questions we ask.  
None of this is easy. I regularly find myself facing rejection and resistance in the field 
and, in some instances, even the belittling of my work as antiscience or unimportant. I have 
watched the changing expression of colleagues who used to rely on my expertise when they now 
hear me speak in these more revolutionary ways. All this of course brings about initial anxiety 
and self-doubt. But if we are to push back on the structures that bind us and ask others to do the 
same, I remind myself, we must make friends with these doubts. It is in these small moments of 
conflict that the seeds of change are planted, and although this work will no doubt be difficult, 
especially in our current climate, what I also feel in the community is the beginnings of a 
curiosity alongside this fear, perhaps because of our current climate. I am therefore determined 
to invite and welcome into conversation both the fear and the curiosity, in the same way I do 
with students who first come to meet their own learning potential. 
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Since this study, I have also come to appreciate just how much this type of work requires 
time and community. This is not work anyone can do alone, and it is not work that can be done 
quickly. This is community work that needs contributions from those working in theory, 
research, policy, and practice and, like all soul work, it moves at a glacial pace. My hope as a 
researcher, practitioner, and leader is to\ create opportunities for contribution, dialogue, and 
revolutionary praxis across all levels as we work together toward a liberating pedagogy and 
world. But I know not to expect quick fixes or clear answers. The point is to ask better questions.     
For these shifting paradigms, I am eternally grateful to this study and to Dr. Antonia 
Darder, for her trust and belief in me. I came to her with little more than an intuitive feeling that 
something must change, and at an epistemological level (though I did not understand it as such 
then) in my work. The perspective, education, reclaiming of history, authenticity, and my own 
humanity, this work has afforded me has in fact transformed what seemed like the darkness of an 
eternal tomb of disconnectedness, to the darkness of a womb preparing for a birth. For this, I am 
grateful to her and to this methodology, as well as the critical traditions that have informed it, for 
allowing me to decolonize my own mind from the oppressive chains that bound it, so that my 
heart can sing again. My life and the lives of the students I hope to continue to have the privilege 
to serve are undoubtedly forever changed by the tectonic epistemological shift in my 
understanding of self, a shift I now feel empowered to enact, using the tools of this research 
methodology, in every area of my own life and the lives of those I serve.   
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